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This thesis analyzes the First Price Sealed Bidding (FPSB) procurement method
using computer simulations. The First Price Sealed Bidding is a static Bayesian Game
with incomplete information. These games have a well-defined Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Using this theory, this study found the bidders' equilibrium strategies. The
equilibrium strategy is the strategy that maximizes bidders' profit simultaneously. Some
assumptions have been made to be able to construct a model for the FPSB. Then, the
model was transformed into computer simulation code using Visual Basic programming
language. Two different simulation programs used to experiment with several scenarios
under uniform and triangular production cost distributions. The simulation showed the
bidders' behavior and identified factors affecting the bidders' decision while preparing
their bids. The most influential factors found to be production cost distributions and
number of bidders. Concluding observations concerning both buyers and bidders present
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The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have been continually trying to enhance their
war-fighting capabilities through either direct procurement of new systems or
modernization of existing equipment. In either case, these efforts involve acquisition of
systems and several support equipment as well as the acquisition of new equipment for
existing systems' modernization. The Turkish Government is preparing to launch
massive defense procurement programs to bolster its Army, Navy and Air Force and
intends to spend $31 billion for the contracts over the next 10 years. According to the
Turkish Government and Industry sources this Figure may reach as much as $150 billion
through 2025. [Ref. 1]
The scarcity of resources mandates practicing more effective and more efficient
ways of purchasing. The international military market differs day by day because of
economic reasons and the change in global military needs. The recent example of this is
the mergers of giant companies like Boeing and McDonnell Douglas.
To better equip the war-fighters with scarce resources, TAF plans to integrate
smart acquisition programs. In order to achieve efficiency and effectiveness, TAF should
be able to understand the strategic behavior of the prospective bidders.
This thesis will analyze the strategic behavior of the bidders in the First Price
Sealed Bid (FPSB) procurement method. To understand the behavior of the bidders and
to find opportunities to influence the future procurement practice of the Turkish Naval
forces (TNF), this Thesis proposes a model of the FPSB. The model describes the
behavior of the bidders and their actions in similar conditions to actual bidding conditions
using the findings of the Game Theory.
A. AN OVERVIEW OF TURKISH NAVY PROCUREMENT ACTIVITY
The State Procurement Act of 1983 (the Act) has established general rules guiding
the Government agencies' procurement procedures. Turkish Navy mainly uses four of the








The Act bases the Sealed Bidding method as the main procurement method. This
method is generally used to:
a. provide offerors to submit their bids confidentially.
b. provide full and open competition.
The Act established the rules of the FPSB and these rules apply to all the
government agencies. According to the act, FPSB is the main method for buying goods
and services.
The nature of the goods and services make them vital to national security.
Therefore, when acquiring them, we must take into account some special considerations.
First Price Sealed Bid method is one of the methods TNF has been using.
As the international market continually changes, FPSB method seems to remain
fair and efficient whereas applicable. It provides a competitive environment for public
procurement as well.
There are mainly two major bidding methods, first and second price bidding. In
the first-price bidding, the bidders submit their bids, bids are opened simultaneously and
the lowest bidder wins the award. In the second-price bidding, the lowest bidder wins the
award but gets the second lowest bid-price. While the second-price sealed bidding has
some useful properties, there is no regulation governing it in the public procurement
practices of Turkey.
2. Sealed Bidding among Selected Contractors (SBASC)
The Act allows the use of SBASC for the acquisition of aircraft, Navy vessels,
ammunition, electronic devices, other weapon systems and its spares and related defense
industry services if there are at least three capable offerors.
If it is necessary to receive bids from less than three offerors, the soliciting agency
needs to get approval from the Cabinet.
Publication of IFB is not mandatory for this type of procurement.
The goods and services that can be procured through the use of SBASC may be
grouped in five categories:
• Special Military Needs: Aircraft, fighting ships, ammunition, electronic
devices, and other weapon systems and their spares.
• Technical Equipment for Civilian Purposes: Aircraft, electronic devices and
systems, equipment related to railroads and their spares.
• Large and Special Buildings: Construction of dams, power stations, irrigation
plants, ports, airports and roads.
• Special Art Works
• City Planning Works
3. Open Bidding
This type of procurement is done by orally in front of the agency's procurement
commission. This type of procurement is the same as auctioning either positive or
negative.
4. Negotiation
Acquisition by negotiation is the method where buyer and seller try to reach an
agreement through negotiation. An acquisition commission receives the proposals and
negotiates with the offerors. Negotiations may be made with one or more offerors.
However, the Act suggests taking at least three proposals to be able to provide
competition in the acquisition. A government estimate is made and documented. The
commission determines the winner and documents the rationale for the selection.
B. AREA OF RESEARCH
This thesis research will develop a computer simulation model to apply the "Nash
Equilibrium Theory" into the bidding process.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
1. Research Questions
The primary research question for this thesis is as follows:
"How do profit maximizing bidders choose their bids in a competitive
environment? "
This thesis research examines the following subsidiary research questions:
1
.
What are the equilibrium strategies of the bidders?
2. Do the bidders have a dominant strategy in FPSB?
3. How does the number of bidders affect the outcome of the FPSB?
4. How does the cost distribution affect the outcome of the FPSB?
5. How can the procuring agencies use the findings of "Game Theory" in their
acquisition practice?
2. Methodology
The thesis is conducted first by reviewing the literature for first price sealed bid
activity, game theory, use of order statistics and some basic statistical procedures.
The second step in conducting the thesis was to develop a model of FPSB method
and simulate the model with Visual Basic programming language.
The third step was to conduct experimentation by the simulation program under
uniform and triangular statistical cost distributions. The experiments were conducted for
different number of bidders.
The final step was to analyze the results of the experiments and conclude upon the
analysis.




Review the bidding methods used by TNF.
2. Review the game theory providing the background for constructing a model of
the FPSB.
3. Develop a computer simulation to analyze the FPSB and experiment with the
model.
4. Provide recommendations to use computer simulations of different bidding
methods used by the TNF in its contracting practice.
This thesis has been organized in four chapters. Next chapters are as follows.
Chapter II outlines the background information for developing the simulation model and
mentions about the development of auctioning theory as well.
Chapter III first develops a model for simulation and then describes the
experiments conducted as well as developing the bidding functions under uniform and
triangular cost distributions. Then, the chapter analyzes the results of the experiments
conducted with two, three, five, ten and fifteen bidders under different scenarios.
Conclusions and recommendations are provided in Chapter IV. This chapter
addresses each of the primary and secondary research questions written in this chapter. In
addition to this, it gives recommendations for areas for further research.
E. DEFINITIONS
Strategy — refers to the definition, given by von Neuman and Morgenstern,
founders of the Game theory, "a complete plan: a plan that specifies what choices [the
player] will make in every possible situation." [Ref. 3]
Bidder — refers to a responsive and responsible prospective supplier, where:
Responsiveness of the supplier implies the offeror has the ability to comply with
the specifications, quantities to be delivered, and terms and conditions of the invitation
for bids (IFB) and
Responsibility of the supplier means offeror,
1
.
has adequate financial resources to perform the contract or the ability to obtain
such resources,
2. is able to comply with the contracted delivery schedule,
3. has the necessary organization
,
experience, and technical skills,
4. has the necessary production, construction or technical equipment and facility
to perform the contract obligations. [Ref. 4]
Buyer ~ as the name implies, refers to a government agency soliciting an
invitation for bids for a specific contract.
Bidding for contract game — refers to the definition of a single state static game
with incomplete information played by bidders.

n. BACKGROUND
This chapter of the thesis will explore the basic background information used to
develop the simulation model for FPSB. The first section mentions about the elements of
and conditions for sealed bidding. The second section will analyze the games to which
auctioning theory applies. The final section of the chapter will provide information about
the order statistics, which will be used to develop bidding functions for contract games.
A. SEALED BIDDING
Sealed bidding is a method of contracting that employs competitive bids, public
opening of bids, and awards. The following steps are involved:
1. Preparation of Invitations for Bids
Invitations must describe the requirements of the Government clearly, accurately,
and completely. Unnecessarily restrictive specifications or requirements that might
unduly limit the number of bidders are prohibited. The invitation includes all documents
(whether attached or incorporated by reference) furnished prospective bidders for the
purpose of bidding.
2. Publicizing the Invitation for Bids
Invitations must be publicized through distribution to prospective bidders, posting
in public places and such other means as may be appropriate. Publicizing must occur a
sufficient time before public opening of bids to enable prospective bidders to prepare and
submit bids.
3. Submission of Bids
Bidders must submit sealed bids to be opened at the time and place stated in the
solicitation for the public opening of bids.
4. Evaluation of Bids
Bids are evaluated without discussions. Price and price related factors are the only
evaluation factors.
5. Contract Award
After bids are publicly opened, an award will be made with reasonable
promptness to that responsible bidder whose bid, conforming to the invitation for bids,
will be most advantageous to the Government, considering only price and the price-
related factors included in the invitation. [Ref. 5]
Sealed bidding can operate efficiently only when the following conditions are
present:
1. There is a complete, detailed and realistic specification or purchase
description.
2. There are two or more suppliers available, willing and able to compete
effectively for the government's business.
3
.
Selection of the successful bidder can be made, without discussions of the bid,
on the basis of price or price-related factors alone.
4. Enough time is available to prepare a complete statement of the government's
needs and the terms under which it will do business and to carry out its
administrative procedures. [Ref. 6]
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B. THEORY OF FIRST PRICE SEALED BIDDING
This section will define the representation of the bidding for contract game, after
studying non-cooperative games with incomplete information. Defining the equilibrium
in non-cooperative games with incomplete information will provide the theoretical basis
to determine the bidders' equilibrium strategies. The appearance of the equilibrium in the
game will facilitate surveying the bidders' strategies in FPSB.
1. Normal-form Representation of Non-cooperative Games with
Incomplete Information
This thesis surveys non-cooperative games of incomplete information based on
the study of R. Gibson. [Ref. 7] To develop a normal form representation of the static
game with incomplete information, also called Bayesian games; we have to consider non-
cooperative games of complete information. We can represent the normal form of an n
player game with complete information, as follows:
G={S!, S2,...,Sn;u„u2 , ..., u,,}
Where: S; ~ player i's strategic space
Uj - player i's payoff function when the player selects strategy S;
In the static non-cooperative game of complete information, the timing of moves
is as follows: the players simultaneously choose an action from the feasible set of actions,
Aj (i.e., player i chooses action aj), and the payoff Uj (Uj,...,^) is received.
The first step in developing the normal-form representation of the non-
cooperative game with incomplete information is denoting the idea that each player has
private information about his/her payoff. The players, however, are uncertain about other
11
players' payoff functions. Let player i's possible payoff function be represented as
Uj(u,,..., i^, tj), where tj is called the player i's type, tj belongs to a set of possible types
(i.e., type space). Each tj corresponds to a different payoff function. J. Harsanyi first
applied this notion for representing the payoff functions in games of incomplete
information. [Ref. 8]
Given the definition of players' types, if players know their payoff functions it
means they know their types. Likewise, saying the player i may be uncertain about the
other players' payoff function means that player i is uncertain about the other players'
types.
Players have beliefs about the other players' types. We denote the probability
distribution of player i's belief about the probability distribution of other players' types,
given that player i's type is t
{
, as p L(t_j I tj), where t.j represents the set of all possible
types. In our analysis, the players' types (production costs as well) are identical and
independent. In this case, Pj(t_j I tj) does not depend on t j5 thus we can write player i's
belief as Pi(t.j).
We can derive the normal form representation of the non-cooperative game with
incomplete information by joining the normal form representation of the non-cooperative
game with complete information and the concepts of type and distribution of beliefs.
The normal form representation of an n-player non-cooperative game with
incomplete information specifies the players' action space, A,, ..., A,,, their type space,
Tj, ..., T
n ,
their beliefs, p ,,..., pn , and their payoff functions, u l5 ..., u,,. Player i's type,
privately known by player i, determines player i's payoff function u^aj, ..., a„; tj), and is a
member of the set of possible types. We denote this game:
12
G = {A,,..., A
n ;
T„..., T
n ; p„..., pn ; u,,...,^}
As stated by Harsanyi [Ref. 8], assume that the timing of the static Bayesian game
is as follows:
a. nature draws a type vector t; where it is drawn from the set of all
possible types of Tj,
b. nature reveals tj to player i but not to any other player,
c. the players simultaneously choose actions; and player i chooses
action a;.
d. payoff Uj is received
Introducing the fictional move by nature, in steps a and b, produces a game with
incomplete information that also satisfies the requirement for the games with imperfect
information. Because nature only reveals player i's type to player i, but not to others,
other players do not know the complete history of the game when taking their actions.
This is a condition of the game with imperfect information.
Two technical assumptions complete the discussion about the normal form
representation of an n-player non-cooperative game with incomplete information. First,
player i has private information about the type of some of other player(s), as well as
his/her own. We can not exclude this condition explicitly, however, we can assume that
the signal received about the other players' types may be false, and bidders do not
consider this information when taking their actions.
The second point involves beliefs about the other players. It is known that the
timing of the game is common knowledge, so is the p(t) from which the nature draws
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type vector tj. When nature reveals tj to player i, he/she can compute the belief Pj(t_j | tj)
using Bayes' rule of conditional probability. [Ref. 9]
Pi(t_i I ti)=p(t_i, ti)/p(t.i)= P(t.i, ti)/Ep(t.is ^
Furthermore, a player can compute the beliefs that the other players might hold.
We assume that the type distribution is common knowledge and takes the form of either
uniform or triangular distribution.
2. Definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
To define the equilibrium in the static Bayesian game, we have to
first define the strategic space of players. The players' strategy is a
complete plan of action, specifying a worthwhile action in every
circumstance in which the player might be engaged. In a static game with
incomplete information, nature begins the game by drawing the players'
type. Thus, a strategy for a player must specify a feasible action for each
of players' possible type....
In static Bayesian games, unlike games with complete information,
the strategic space is not given in the normal form representation of the
game. In the games of incomplete information, the strategic space is
constructed from the type and action space. Player i's set of possible




It is seemingly unnecessary for the player i to specify actions for
each of player i's possible type. Once nature has revealed a specific type
to the player, that player should not be concerned about the other possible
types. However, in choosing a strategy, player i has to consider what other
players will do. What other players will do largely depend on what they
think player i will do. .
.
[Ref. 10:pp. 12-13]
3. Normal-form Representation of Bidding for Contract Game
The first price sealed bidding is a non-cooperative game with incomplete
information. These games are often called Bayesian games. In these games, each bidder
knows their cost, but does not know any other bidders' cost. Bids are submitted in sealed
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envelopes and the envelopes are opened publicly, so we can assume that the bidders act
simultaneously.
The normal form representation of the bidding for contract game with two bidders





Cj)= ^ (l/2)*(brCi ) ifb-bj
I if b>bj
When more than two bidders are competing for a contract, the normal-form
representation of the bidding for contract game is represented as:















Assuming no more than z bidders submit the same bid.
C. ORDER STATISTICS: AN OVERVIEW
This section of the chapter will outline the basics of order statistics theory using
the guidelines provided in R.Hogg and A. Craig book of mathematical statistics. [Ref. 1 1]
Theory of order statistics deals with the ranked values of a sample of random
variables having drawn from a probability distribution. The ranking of the order statistics
goes from the smallest to largest. Order statistics have some remarkable characteristics.
For example: properties of the order statistics do not depend upon the distribution from
which the random sample has been drawn.
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This thesis uses order statistics to analyze the outcome of the bidding simulations.
Bids and the bidders' production costs are considered to be random variables drawn from
a probability distribution. Ranking the submitted bids and the expected costs in ascending
order we generate order statistics.
Let X l5 X2 ,..., Xn denote a random sample from a continuous distribution, having
probability density function of f(x) that is positive over the interval of a<x<b. Let Yj be
the smallest of these Xb Y2 be the second smallest,..., and Yn be the largest. That is,
Y!<Y2<,..., <Yn represents Xls ..., Xn when they are arranged in ascending order. It can
be proven that the joint probability distribution of Y,<Y2<,..., <Yn is given by:
g(y„ y2>— yn)=n!*[f(x,)*f(x2)*,...,*f(xn)] if a<yi<y2<,...,<yn<b
= otherwise
The proof of this theorem is found in R. Hogg and A. Craig. [Ref. 1 1] Marginal
probability density function represents the probability density function of the order
statistics. This is given by:





This chapter has explored elements of sealed bidding process and theory of FPSB.
At this point, the chapter analyzed and defined the non-cooperative games with
incomplete information as well as providing information about the Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium. The third section summarized the basics of order statistics.
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III. SIMULATION AND EXPERIMENTATION
This chapter of the thesis will explain the model used to develop the simulation of
the FPSB and then provide the results obtained from the experimentation. While
developing the simulation, two different cost distributions were used, uniform and
triangular distributions. First section of this chapter explains the model used to simulate
the FPSB. The next two sections summarize the results of the simulations.
A. SIMULATION OF FPSB
This section of the thesis will develop a FPSB model for simulating the bidding
for contract game. The mathematical model for simulation will be transformed into
computer code using Microsoft Excel' s macro editor.
1. Simulation of FPSB
A model is defined as representation of a system for the purposes of studying the
system. For most studies, it is not necessary to consider all the details of a system; thus a
model is not only a substitute for the system, it is also a simplification of the system. On
the other hand, the model should be sufficiently detailed to permit valid conclusions to be
drawn about the real system. [Ref. 12]
By developing a simulation model we can study the processes and behavior of the
system, and its changes over time.
Models can be classified as being mathematical or physical. A mathematical
model uses symbolic notation and mathematical equations to simulate a system.
Mathematical models can be classified as deterministic or stochastic simulation models.
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A stochastic model uses one or more random variables as inputs. These random inputs
generate random outputs. Since the outputs of the model are random, stochastic models
can imitate the real system. However, the simulation results must be treated as a
statistical estimate of the real-world system's characteristics.
FPSB model represents the bidders. It includes the rules and regulations of the
bids and the bidders' behavior. The actual market conditions, the availability of resources
and other factors also affect the FPSB system. Using more than one cost distribution
incorporated some of these variables. However, to keep the model manageable, a number
of simplifications and assumptions have been made.
2. Information Space of the Game and Strategic Behavior of the Bidder
This subsection will analyze one of the most important aspects of the model, the
bidders' and the buyer's characteristics. The bidding environment will also be analyzed
as well. Because of the wide variety of bidding regulations, this thesis assumes both
bidders and buyers meet regulations. Both parties comply with the applicable laws and
regulations at the time of bidding.
a. Information Space of the FPSB
We assume that the FPSB is a non-cooperative game in which the players
have limited information. However, the players know the following:
1 . The buyer is fully committed not to deviate from the FPSB rules
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during the bidding process, even if the deviation is in the buyer's best interest. All
participants know the rules of bidding.
2. The bidders' utility function is defined by a Von Neuman Morgenstein
utility function, U(-), and it is common for all bidders.
3. The bidders know their production cost
,
Cj, with certainty when they
bid and the cost is private information known only to the bidder. However, the bidders
have subjective assumptions about the range and distribution of production costs for other
bidders. This thesis assumes that the probability distribution for each bidder is the same;
it follows either a uniform or a triangular probability distribution over the production cost
range.
4. The bidders know the number of the bidders with certainty.
5. While preparing the bid proposals, the bidders send signals, sometimes
misleading, about their cost to other bidders. However, cooperation among bidders is
restricted. [Ref. 10]
6. Bidders' proposal preparation costs are not incorporated into the
model. Therefore, unsuccessful bidders' losses because of bid preparation activities were
neglected.
b. The Players' Strategic Behavior
One of the assumptions about the bidders is that the buyer and the bidders
are expected to act rationally. The rationality of the bidders means that:
1 . The bidders pursue their own interest; they attempt to maximize their
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profit by bidding for the contract. Bidders maximize profits by submitting the highest
possible bid. However, the bidders recognize that they are constrained by the other
bidders' bids. The higher the bid the lower the probability of winning the award. This
self-regulating mechanism provides an efficient solution for the game.
2. Bidders consider their production costs and the production costs of the
other bidders. The resulting bids form a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Bidders using the
equilibrium strategy simultaneously maximize the expected profit regarding both their
and other participants' expected bids. [Ref. 10]
3. Model Description
Consider a competitive bidding model in which the buyer solicits an IFB to
procure a specified commodity or service. This thesis assumes that there are n bidders for
a particular procurement and they are responsive and responsible. It is assumed that bids
are submitted and the contract awarded to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder.
The contract specifies the winning firm's total receipts from the buyer. The winner's
expected profit depends both on the bid submitted and the cost incurred. In turn, the bids
are influenced by the firm's expectation about the competing bids.
The constructed model attempts to capture the major and decisive characteristics
of the real FPSB process. However, this model is only a first approximation of many
procurement procedures. The model provides an opportunity to experiment with the
bidders' possible actions and decisions during FPSB. The proposed FPSB model assumes
symmetry of information and preferences, which makes it possible to concentrate
exclusively on a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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4. Computer Simulation Methodology
This thesis uses a personal computer and Excel 7.0 spreadsheet software to
simulate the FPSB process. Two different computer programs were written to conduct the
necessary operations to simulate the process. The simulation results were collected in
separate worksheets. The composed computer programs allow some of the data to be
input interactively. Other necessary experiment data may be input using the Microsoft
Excel 7.0 macro editor.
The bidders' initial production costs, which were random variables during the
entire simulation process, were generated by Excel' s built-in random number generator.
The built-in random number generator provides a random number distributed uniformly
over the interval [0, 1].
B. EXPERIMENTATION UNDER UNIFORM COST DISTRIBUTION
This section of the chapter describes the FPSB simulation when the production
costs are distributed according to the uniform distribution.
1. Mathematical Model for Simulation
For products and services for which fairly mature, simple and common
technologies are used, the costs of production are almost identical. Assume that the
bidders' potential production costs are distributed uniformly over an interval [h, k].
For the uniform distribution:
The probability density function of cost: f(c)=l/(h-k)
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The cumulative distribution function of cost: F(c)=(c-a)/(h-k)
Where h is the upper limit and k is the lower limit of the cost range.
A bidding strategy defines the relationship between the bidder's proposal, bj, and
cost, Cj. The following section is the derivation of the bidding function under uniform
cost distribution.
2. General-Form Bidding Function for the Uniform Cost Distribution
Assume that n players are competing for a contract and the bidders'
production/service cost c
;
has a uniform cost distribution over the range of [k, h].
Assume players 1, 2, 3,..., n-l, n adopt the strategy b(-), and b(-) is strictly
increasing and differentiable. For a given value of the player i's cost, player i's optimal
bidding strategy solves:
Max{(bj-ci) * Prob[bi<b(c ]),..., bj<b(cn)]} where n: number of bidders.
Let b'^bj), b'^bi-n),..., b'^b,,) denote the costs that the bidders must have in order
to bid b„ bi+ i,..., bn . That is, b"
1 (b
i
)= Cj ,..., b"'(bn)= cn if bj=b(Cj),..., bn=b(c n).
We can define the probability of a given player i's bid to be the lowest of all as:
Prob(b
i
<bi+1 ,...,b i<bn)=[l-b-'(b i)]
n- 1








The first order condition is an implicit equation for i l bidder's best response to
the strategy b(-) played by other bidders, given that the i^ bidder's cost is Cj. If the
strategy b(-) is to be a symmetric Nash equilibrium, we require that the solution of the
first order condition be b(Cj). That is, for each of i th bidder's costs, the bidder does not
want to deviate from the strategy b(-), given that the other players play the same strategy.




+ [b(Ci)-Ci ] * (n-i) * {l-b-'tKci)]}"-
2
* dfl-b^EbCcOD/dbpO
where b^lXci)]^ Cj and d{l-b
_1
[b(Ci)]}/dbr^l/b,(Ci)
By substituting these two into the first order differential equation we get:
(1-Ci)""
1
- {[b(Ci)-Ci] * (n-1) * (1-Cir2 }/b'(Ci)=0
(1-Ci)"-
1
= {[b(Ci)-Ci ] * (n-1) * (1-Cir2 }/b'(Ci)
b'(Cj) * (l-Cj)"- 1 - (n-1) *b(Cj)=- (n-1) * Cj





] * {d[b(c;) * (l-Ci)""
1 }^^
Then, the original equation can be written as:
[1/(1-Ci)
n-2
] * (d[b(Ci) * (l-Cir^/dcr- (n-1) * Ci
{d[b(Ci) * (l-Ci)"-
1]}^- Ci * (n-1) * (1-Ci)n-2
Integrating both sides of this equation using by parts method results in:
J{d[b(Ci ) * (l-Cir^/dcr- Jci * (n-1) * (l^r2
b(Ci) * (l-Ci)""^ Ci * (l-Cj)"'
1
-J (l-c^dc,





Finally, by using the boundary conditions we determine the value of k. That is,
b(Cj)>= Cj. If Cj=l then b(l) is finite, which is true; thus k=0.
Therefore, the bidding function, b(Cj), takes the form:
bCc^Cj + Kl-cOJ/n
b(Ci)=[l+(n-l)*Ci]/n
Under the assumption that the players' strategies are strictly increasing and
differentiable, we have a linear and symmetric Nash equilibrium in the n-person bidding
game.




k: the lower limit of the uniform cost distribution.
h: the upper limit of the uniform cost distribution.
3. Experimentation
During the experimentation, five different scenarios were used. In these scenarios,
the number of bidders was changed to analyze the FPSB process and also verify the
accuracy of the simulation. The number of bidders used are two, three, five, 10 and 15.















To allow different cost intervals to be used in the simulation, the required random
number was generated as:
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R=(h-k)*Rand()+k
Where R is the required random number and Rand() is the Excel generated
random number.
The simulation program for FPSB contract game is in Appendix A.
a. Experimentation With Two Bidders
During the simulation, three different scenarios were experimented with
and analyzed. The first scenario was conducted as if both bidders used equilibrium
strategies. In the second scenario, one of the bidders underbid while the other used the
equilibrium strategy. Finally, in the third scenario, both of the bidders did not use the
equilibrium strategy and underbid.
The different scenarios were designed to show that using the equilibrium
bidding strategy maximizes the bidders' profit and any deviation from the equilibrium
strategy would reduce the expected profit for the deviating bidder.
Figure 1 shows the graphical results of the simulation when both bidders
used equilibrium strategies. The results show that there exists an equilibrium in the
contract game and the winners' expected profits approach 0.333 as the number of
simulated games approaches 2000. Another result was that the bidders won almost
equally; bidderl won 982 of the games while bidder2 won the remaining 1018 games.
Average profit per game considers all games in which the bidders bid. As
shown in Table 1 in Appendix C, bidderl won 44 of the first 100 games and its total
profit is 15.2916. Therefore its average profit is 15.2916/100, which is 0.1529. The
average profit is another indicator of bidders' expectations, motivations and behavior.
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The average profit graph for this particular simulation is shown in Figure 2. This graph
also reinforces the result of existing equilibrium in the bidding game. Both bidders'
average profit approaches to 0.167 by bidding in 2000 games.
Expected Profit for Two-Bidder Bidding Game
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Average Expected Profit for Two-Bidder Bidding Game
(Both used equilibrium strategy)
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Total profits for both bidders resulted almost the same; 327.263 for
bidder 1 and 338.872 for bidder2 in 2000 games and are shown graphically in Figure 3.
Total Profit for Two-Bidder Bidding Game
(Both used equilibrium strategy)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Number of Bids (*100)
Bidder 1 Bidder2
Figure 3
The next experimentation was conducted as bidderl underbid by 0.2 while
bidder2 used equilibrium strategy. Bidderl's bidding function therefore, was:
bi=[(l+C!)/2]-0.2
The results of the experimentation is shown in Table 2 in Appendix C. The
experimentation resulted in lower profit for bidderl, 0.085, while bidder2 made 0.40
which is more than the equilibrium amount of 0.333. The expected profit graph is shown
in Figure 4.
The average expected profit for bidderl decreased to 0.069 and 0.074 for
bidder2. The graph for average profit is shown in Figure 5.
Total profit for bidderl also decreased to 104.514 and 1 1 1.956 for bidder2
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Average Expected Profit for Two-Bidder Bidding Game
(Bidderl underbid by 0.2)
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Total Profit for Two-Bidder Bidding Game
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Figure 6
The last experiment with two bidders was conducted as they both did not
use equilibrium strategies. Both bidders underbid by 0.1. Therefore, bidding function for
both bidders was:
b=[(l+c)/2]-0.1
In this scenario, both bidders' expected profits approached 0.23 in 1500
games, which is lower than the equilibrium amount of 0.33. The graphical representation
of expected profit is shown in Figure 7.
The average profit for both bidders also decreased to 0.1 1 and is shown in
Figure 8 graphically. Total profits in 1500 games as shown in Table 3, 171.08 for bidderl
and 175.54 for the other, were also lower than the equilibrium total profit of 243.236 and
253.983 respectively. The graphical representation of total profit curves is in Figure 9.
The bidders won almost equal number of games. Bidderl won 742 games while bidder2
won 758.
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Expected Profit for Two-Bidder Bidding Game
(Both underbid by 0.1)
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Figure 7
Average Expected Profit for Two-Bidder Bidding Game
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Total Profit for Two-Bidder Bidding Game
(Both underbid by 0. 1
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Figure 9
b. Experimentation With Three Bidders
This simulation along with the .other multiple bidder simulations were
conducted to find out the effect of number of bidders on the game as well as analyzing
the behavior of bidders and the accuracy of the simulation. The simulation was conducted
with three bidders and the cost was within the interval [0, 1] under uniform distribution.
During the simulation, three different scenarios were analyzed. In the first
scenario, all off the bidders used equilibrium strategy. In the second scenario, bidderl
underbid while others used equilibrium strategy. Finally in the third scenario, bidders "1"
and "2" underbid by different amounts while bidder3 used equilibrium strategy.
Figure 10 shows the results of the first experimentation of which all
bidders used equilibrium strategy. As seen in the graph, there is a well-defined
equilibrium in the three-bidder bidding game as well as in the two-bidder bidding game.
31
According to the simulation results, the winners' expected profit from bidding
approaches 0.25 as the number of games approaches 2000. Introducing another bidder to
the game reduced the expected profit from bidding. This is true, because as the number of
bidders increase, the probability of winning the award decreases, thus bidders bid lower.
Expected Profit for Three-Bidder Bidding Game
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Figure 10
The average expected profit graph is shown in Figure 1 1 and the overall
results of the experiment are shown in Table 4 in Appendix C. The average expected
profit graph also reinforces the equilibrium of the game. In this simulation, bidders'
average expected profit approached 0.83 while the number of games approached 2000.
As seen in Table 4, each bidder won the games almost equally. Overall,
bidders won 683, 652 and 665 games respectively. Total profit for bidders as seen in
Figure 12, were almost the same; 170.72, 162.6 and 167.13 respectively.
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Average Expected Profit for Three-Bidder Bidding Game
(All used equilibrium Strategy)
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Total Profit for Three-Bidder Bidding Game
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Figure 12
In the next experiment, bidderl underbid by 0.1 while other two used
equilibrium strategy. As a result of 1500 games, bidder l's expected profit decreased to
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0.13 while the other two bidders' slightly increased to 0.258 and .259 respectively. The
expected profit graph is shown in Figure 13.
Expected Profit for Three-Bidder Bidding Game
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Figure 13
Average profit scheme was different than the equilibrium game
experiment. Bidderl's average profit was 0.059 while others higher, 0.708 and 0.706 as
graphically shown in Figure 14.
Bidderl won 680 of 1500 games while others won 412 and 408 games as
shown in Table 5 in Appendix C. Although bidderl won more games than the others
won, its total profit was 88.5022 which is lower than the others'; which were 106.2 and
105.87 respectively. Total profit graph for this experiment is shown in Figure 15.
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Average Expected Profit for Three-Bidder Bidding Game
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Figure 14
Total Profit for Three-Bidder Bidding Game
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Figure 15
The last scenario for three-bidder simulation was bidder3 used equilibrium
strategy while bidders "1" and "2" did not. Bidders "1" and "2" underbid by 0.1 and 0.15
respectively. The experiment resulted in lower expected profits for the first two bidders
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while it was even higher for the third. Bidder l's profit approached 0.1441, which is
slightly higher than in the previous game, which was 0.13 and bidder2's was even lower,
0.0857 in 1500 games. Bidder3, which had used equilibrium strategy, made slightly
higher profit than it did in the first two experiments, 0.2645 as opposed to 0.25 and 0.259.
The expected profit scheme is shown in Figure 16:
Expected Profit for Three-Bidder Bidding Game
(Bidders "1 " and "2" underbid by 0. 1 and 0. 1 5 respectively)
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Number of Bids (*100)
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Figure 16
Total profit scheme was also very different than previous experiments.
Bidderl's total profit turned out to be higher than bidders "2" and "3". It made 77.961
while others made 60.2550 and 67.722 in 1500 games. Bidders won 541, 703 and 256
games respectively. Due to the high number of games won by bidder 1 made him gain
more profit. In spite of winning more games, bidder2 made the lowest profit as seen in
Table 6 in Appendix C and shown in Figure 1 7.
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Total Profit for Three-Bidder Bidding Game
(Bidders "1" and "2" underbid by 0.1 and 0.15 respectively)
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Figure 17
Though, bidder 1 had higher average profit than the others did. It made
0.052 as opposed to 0.0402 and 0.0451 made by bidders "2" and "3" respectively. The
average profit graph is shown in Figure 18:
Average Expected Profit for Three-Bidder Bidding Game
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c. Experimentation With Five Bidders
The simulation was conducted with five bidders according to uniform cost
distribution within interval [0, 1].
During the simulation four different scenarios were analyzed. In the first
scenario, all bidders used the equilibrium strategy. The second scenario was conducted as
bidder 1 underbid while others used equilibrium strategy. In the third scenario, both
bidders "1" and "2" underbid by the same amount while others used equilibrium strategy
and in the last scenario, bidders "1" and "2" underbid by different amounts while others
used equilibrium strategy.
Figure 19 shows the results obtained from the simulation of which all
bidders used equilibrium strategy. As seen in the graph, there is a well-defined
equilibrium in the game as in the two and three-bidder bidding games. According to the
simulation, each winner's expected profit approached approximately 0.166 as the number
of games approached 1 500. As the number of bidders increased, the expected profit from
bidding decreased as it was the case in the three-bidder bidding game.
Average expected profit graph is shown in Figure 20 and overall
simulation results obtained are shown in Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix C. One more time,
the average expected profits reinforced the game equilibrium. The average expected
profits for the bidders approached 0.033 as the number of games approached 1500.
The experiment resulted in very close total profits, ranging from 45.383 to
51.889, as seen in Table 8. The total profit graph is shown in Figure 21. The bidders won
277 to 3 1 3 games during the experiment.
38
Expected Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
(All used equilibrium strategy)
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Number of Bids (*100)
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Figure 19
Average Expected Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
( All used Equilibrium Strategy)
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Total Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
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Figure 21
The second experiment, where bidderl underbid by 0.09 and others used
the equilibrium strategy, resulted in following:
Bidderl made a lower expected profit, 0.07, than the others did, which is
approximately 0.168, as the number of games approached 1 500 as shown in Figure 22:
Expected Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
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Figure 22
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The average expected profit for bidderl approached 0.0209 while others
approached to a range from 0.0269 to 0.0328. The average profit curves are shown in
Figure 23:
Average Expected Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
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Bidderl won 446 games while others won the games in a range of 241 to
292 times. Overall results of the experiment is outlined in Tables 9 and 10 in Appendix
C.
Total profit for bidderl was also lower than the others', 31.3722 as
opposed to 40.4257-49.2515, even though bidderl won more games than the others did.
The total profit curves are graphically shown in Figure 24.
In the third scenario, both bidders "1" and "2" underbid by 0.12 while the
rest of the bidders used equilibrium strategy. Bidders "1" and "2" made lower profits,
0.0378 and 0.0407 respectively, than the rest did, approximately 0.169, as shown in
Figure 25.
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Total Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
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Expected Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
(Bidders "1" and "2" underbid by 0.12)
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The average profit scheme resulted the same; bidders "1" and "2" made
0.01 1 while others did 0.024, 0.0245 and 0.0215 respectively, as seen in Figure 26.
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Average Expected Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
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Total profit for bidders "1" and "2" also were lower than the others'
profits. They made 16.992 and 17.737 respectively, while others profit ranged from
32.21 to 36.71 1 . Total profit curves for bidders are shown in Figure 27.
Total Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
(Bidders "1 " and "2" underbid by 0. 12)
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Number of Bids (*100)
Bidderl Bidder2 _^_Bidder3 x Bidder4 _*_Bidder5
Figure 27
Bidders "1" and "2" won 449 and 436 games out of 1500 games. The rest
won the games 1 89-2 1 9 times. As it was the case in previous experiments, underbidding
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bidders made lower profits, although they won more games than the equilibrium strategy
bidders. Overall results of the experiment are shown in Tables 1 1 and 12 in Appendix C.
In the last scenario, bidders "1" and "2" underbid by 0.12 and 0.1
respectively while others used equilibrium strategy. The underbidding bidders made
lower profits of 0.03781 and 0.06149 respectively while others made 0.169. The expected
profit graph is shown in Figure 28.
Expected Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
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The average profit for bidders "1" and "2" were 0.01 129 and 0.0169 while
others' approached almost 0.024 in 1500 games as seen in Figure 29. The equilibrium
strategy bidders made higher expected and average profits than underbidding bidders did.
Bidders "1" and "2" won 448 and 414 games while the others won very
close number of games ranging from 209 to 218 as seen in Table 13 in Appendix C.
Despite bidders "1" and "2 won much more games than others, they made lower total
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profits in 1500 games. The lowest bidder, bidder 1, made the lowest total profit, 16.9386.
The second lowest total profit was bidder2's, 25.4564.
Average Expected Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
(Bidders 1 and 2 underbid by 0.12 and 0.1 respectively)
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Number of Bids (* 100)
-o Bidderl a Bidder2 A Bidder3 x Bidder4 ,K_Bidder5
Figure 29
Total Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
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Finally, equilibrium strategy bidders made very close total profits ranging
from 35.57 to 36.84. Total profit curves are shown in Figure 30. Results of the
experiment are shown in Tables 13 and 14 in Appendix C.
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d. Experimentation With Ten Bidders
The simulation was conducted with ten bidders according to uniform cost
distribution within interval [0, 1].
In these series of experiments, four different scenarios used to simulate the
bidding process. In the first scenario, all bidders used the equilibrium strategy. The
second one was conducted as bidder 1 underbid while others used the equilibrium strategy
again. In the third one, both bidders "1" and "2" underbid by the same amount while all
others used the equilibrium strategy. Finally, in the last scenario, bidders "1", "2", '3"
and "4" underbid by different amounts while the rest used the equilibrium strategy.
The first experiment, which all used equilibrium strategy, resulted in a
well-defined equilibrium. All bidders' expected profit approached approximately 0.091
as the number of games approached 1500. The graphical representation of the expected
profit is shown in Figure 3 1 . As can be seen in the overall results of the experiment in
Tables 15 through 18 in Appendix C, introducing more bidders to the game reduced the
expected profit from bidding more.
The average expected profit graph is shown in Figure 32. The average
expected profit graph also reinforces the equilibrium of the game. In this simulation,
bidders' average expected profit approaches approximately 0.009 while the number of
games approaches 1 500.
As seen in Table 16 in Appendix C, each bidder won the games
approximately equal number of times. Overall, bidders won in a range of 139 to 162
games. Total profits as seen in Figure 33, were almost the same, ranging between
12.6196 and 14.7461.
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Expected Profit for Ten-Bidder Bidding Game
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In the next experiment, bidderl underbid by 0.0825, which was 1 5 percent
of the average bid price, while others bid according to the equilibrium strategy. As a
result of 1500 games, bidderl 's expected profit decreased to 0.057 while other bidders'
remained at 0.091 . The expected profit graph is shown in Figure 34.
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Total Profit for Ten-Bidder Bidding Game
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Expected Profit for Ten-Bidder Bidding Game
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Average profit for the bidders also reinforced the same scheme as the
equilibrium game had shown. Bidder l's average profit was 0.0011 while others were
very close, approximately 0.008, as graphically shown in Figure 35. Overall results of the
experiment are outlined in Tables 19 through 21 in Appendix C.
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Average Expected Profit for Ten-Bidder Bidding Game
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Bidder 1 won 296 of 1500 games while others won in a range of 124 to
143 games as shown in Table 20. Although bidder 1 won more games than the others
won, its total profit was 1 .6872 which is much lower than the others' profits ranging from
11.3013 to 13.1 131. Total profit graph for this experiment is shown in Figure 36:
Total Profit for Ten-Bidder Bidding Game
(Bidderl underbid by 0.0825)
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In the third experiment, bidders "1" and "2" underbid by 0.0825 while
others bid according to the equilibrium strategy. As a result of 1500 games, bidders "1"
and "2" made expected profits, 0.055 and 0.059, while the other bidders' profits
remained at 0.091. The expected profit graph is shown in Figure 37.
Expected Profit for Ten-Bidder Bidding Game
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Average profit for the bidders also reinforced the same scheme as the
expected profit results had shown. Underbidding bidders' average profits were 0.001
while others were ranging from 0.0064 to 0.0082, as graphically shown in Figure 38.
Bidders "1" and "2" won 264 and 259 games respectively while others
won the games in a range of 109 to 135 times as shown in Table 24 in Appendix C. Total
profits for underbidding bidders were 1.4591 and 1.5343 which are much lower than the
others' profits ranging from 9.7221 to 12.3395. Total profit graph for this experiment is
shown in Figure 39.
The overall results of the experiment are shown in Tables 23 through 26 in
Appendix C.
50
Average Expected Profit for Ten-Bidder Game
(Bidders "1" and "2" underbid by 0.0825)
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Total Profit for Ten-Bidder Bidding Game
(Bidders'* 1" and "2" underbid by 0.0825)
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In the last experiment, bidders "1", "2", "3" and "4" underbid by 0.0825,
0.075, 0.0675 and 0.06 respectively in 1500 games. The remaining six bidders used
equilibrium strategy. The underbidding bidders made lower profits, 0.0063, 0.0148,
0.0229 and 0.03, than the equilibrium strategy bidders did, which was 0.091. The
expected profit curves are shown in Figure 40.
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Expected Profit for Ten-Bidder Bidding Game
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The equilibrium strategy bidders made higher average profits as seen in
Figure 41. The underbidding bidders average profits were 0.00098, 0.00234, 0.00328 and
0.004 while equilibrium strategy bidders' ranged from 0.0053 to 0.0073.
Average Expected Profit for Ten-Bidder Bidding Game
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The underbidding bidders won more games than the others did. They won
the games in a range of 200 to 233 times while equilibrium strategy bidders won in a
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range of 88 to 121 times. Despite this result, the equilibrium bidders made higher total
profits than underbidding bidders. The underbidding bidders' total profits ranged from
1.4674 to 6.0083 while others' ranged from 7.9767 to 11.0308. Total profit curves are
shown in Figure 42. Overall results of the experiment are written in Tables 27 through 30
in Appendix C.
Total Profit for Ten-Bidder Bidding Game
(Bidders "1", "2", "3" and "4" underbid by 0.0825, 0.075, 0.0675 and
0.06 respectively)
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e. Experimentation With Fifteen Bidders
The simulation was conducted with fifteen bidders according to uniform
cost distribution within interval [0, 1].
In these last series of experiments under uniform cost distribution, four
different scenarios used to simulate the bidding process. In the first scenario, all bidders
used the equilibrium strategy. In the second one, bidder 1 underbid while others used the
equilibrium strategy again. In the third one, bidders "1", "2" and "3" underbid by the
same amount while all others used the equilibrium strategy. Finally, in the last scenario,
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bidders "1", "2", '3" and "4" underbid by different amounts while the rest used the
equilibrium strategy.
The first experiment of which all used equilibrium strategy resulted in a
well-defined equilibrium. All bidders' expected profit approached approximately 0.062
as the number of games approached 1500. The graphical representation of the expected
profit is shown in Figure 43. As it was the result of the previous experiments, introducing
more bidders to the game reduced the expected profit from bidding more. The results are
outlined in Tables 31 through 34 in Appendix C.
Expected Profit for Fifteen-Bidder Bidding Game
(All used equilibrium strategy)
0.058
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Number of Bids (MOO)
X BiddeTl fj Bidder2 & Bidder3 p Bidder4 _.a._Bidder5
-* Bidder6 1 Bidder7 Bidder8 — Bidder9 * BidderlO
_B— Bidderll —A Bidderl2 . . .*- . . Bidderl3 —*— BidderH —e Bidderl5
Figure 43
The average expected profit graph is shown in Figure 44. The average
expected profit results also reinforce the equilibrium of the game. In this simulation,
bidders' average expected profit approaches 0.004 while the number of games
approaches 1500.
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As seen in Table 32, each bidder won the games approximately equal
number of times. Overall, bidders won in a range of 86 to 121 games each. Total profit
for bidders as seen in Figure 45, ranged between 5.361 to 7.578.
Total Profit for Fifteen-Bidder Bidding Game
(All used equilibrium strategy)
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In the next experiment, bidderl underbid by 0.075 while others bid
according to the equilibrium strategy. As a result of 1500 games, bidderl 's expected
profit decreased to 0.01 16 while the other bidders' remained at 0.062. The expected profit
graph is shown in Figure 46.
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The overall results of the experiment are outlined in Tables 35 through 38
in Appendix C.
Average expected profit for the bidders also reinforced the same scheme
as the equilibrium game had shown, except for bidderl. Bidderl's average profit was
0.00139 while others were almost the same, 0.004, as graphically shown in Figure 47.
Bidderl won 179 of 1500 games while others won in a range of 69 to 109
games as shown in Table 36. Although bidderl won more games than the others won, its
total profit was 2.07798 which is quite lower than the others' profits ranging from 4.2818
to 6.8147. Total profit graph for this experiment is shown in Figure 48.
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Total Profit for Fifteen-Bidder Bidding Game
(Bidderl underbid by 0.075)
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In the third experiment, bidders "1", "2" and "3" underbid by 0.055 while
others used equilibrium strategy in 1500 games. As a result of the experiment,
underbidding bidders' expected profit approached 0.0057 while others' approached
approximately 0.062.The expected profit graph is shown in Figure 49.
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The average expected profit results were parallel to the expected profit
results. Underbidding bidders' average profits approached 0.0007 while others'
approached to a range of 0.0028 to 0.0041 in 1500 games. The average expected profit
graph is shown in Figure 50.
Average Expected Profit for Fifteen-Bidder Bidding Game
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Total profits for underbidding bidders, ranging from 1.0074 to 1.0914,
were also lower than the equilibrium strategy bidders' total profits, 4.1325 to 6.1872. The
underbidding bidders won 163 to 176 games while others won 67 to 99 games as seen in
Table 40 in Appendix C. The total profit curves are shown in Figure 51 and overall
results of the experiment are shown in Tables 39 through 42 in Appendix C.
Total Profit for Fifteen-Bidder Bidding Game























2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Number of Bids (*100)
-X-— Bidderl —g— Bidder2
-# Bidder6 1 Bidder7
-& Bidder 3
__Bidder8
O Bidder4 _ -5§_ . Bidder5
_— Bidder9 * Bidderl
.Bidderl 1 *— Bidderl2 - -
-x-
-
-Bidderl 3 * Bidderl4 e Bidderl5
Figure 5
1
In the last experiment with fifteen bidders, bidders "1", "2", "3" and "4"
underbid by 0.055, 0.05, 0.045 and 0.04 respectively, while others used equilibrium
strategy in 1500 games. As a result of the experiment, underbidding bidders' expected
profit approached 0.006, 0.0115, 0.0168 and 0.022 respectively, while others' approached
approximately 0.063.The expected profit graph is shown in Figure 52.
The average expected profit results were parallel to the expected profit
results. Underbidding bidders' average profits approached 0.0063, 0.00119, 0.00182 and
0.00229 while others' approached a range of 0.0028 to 0.004 in 1500 games. This result
along with all previous experiments showed that there is indeed a strong equilibrium in
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contract games. The deviant bidders lose profit even if they win more games than the
equilibrium strategy bidders. The average profit graph for this experiment is shown in
Figure 53.
Expected Profit for Fifteen-Bidder Bidding Game
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Total profits for underbidding bidders, ranging from 0.9441 to 3.4353,
were also lower than the equilibrium strategy bidders' total profits, 4.2041 to 6.1235. The
underbidding bidders won 155 to 162 games as opposed to others, which won 67 to 97
games as seen in Table 44. Total profit curves are shown in Figure 54.
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The overall results of the experiment are shown in Tables 43 through 46 in
Appendix C.
C. EXPERIMENTATION UNDER TRIANGULAR COST DISTRIBUTION
This section of the chapter describes the FPSB simulation when the production
costs are distributed according to triangular distribution. The FPSB simulation using a
triangular production cost distribution defines the bidders' behavior under a different cost
condition. The uniform cost distribution was primarily used for simplicity, though it was
reasonable when bidders' production costs were identical due to the similar production
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methods used. Triangular distribution may be a better reflection of reality when some
bidders have competitive advantage over the others because of better production
techniques, management controls or different technologies used for the product.
1. Mathematical Model for Simulation
For products for which relatively new, more complex and different manufacturing
methods are used, the costs of production vary according to the manufacturers' business
practices. Triangular distribution, then, becomes a closer representation of costs
associated with that product.
Assume that the bidders' potential production costs are distributed according to
the triangular distribution over an interval [h, k] with a mode value, m, with probability
2/(h-k).
A bidding strategy defines the relationship between the bidder's proposal, bj, and
cost, Cj. The following section is the derivation of the bidding function under uniform
cost distribution.
2. General-Form Bidding Function for the Triangular Cost Distribution
The probability density function, fx(x), of the triangular distribution is shown as:
f[2*(x-k)]/[(h-k)*(m-k)] for k<x<m
fx(xH [2*(h-x)]/[(h-k)*(h-m)] for m<x<h
lO otherwise
Where k<m<h and,
k: the lower limit of the triangular distribution.
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m: the mode of the distribution.
h: the upper limit of the triangular distribution.
The graphic representation of the triangular distribution is shown in Figure 55:
Height=2/(h-k)
Figure 55 PDF of the triangular distribution











Assume players 1, 2, 3, ...,n-l, n adopt the strategy b(-), and b() is strictly




Max{(bj-ci) * Prob[bj<b(cj),..., bj<b(cn)]} where n: number of bidders.







The first order condition for player i's optimization problem is then:
d{(bi-ci) * [Ub-l(bdf'l}/dbrd
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The triangular distribution has two different distributions over the interval [k, h],
that is, the first one is from the lower limit, k, through the mode, m, and the second one is
from m through the upper limit, h, of the distribution. Because of this unique
characteristic, the triangular distribution of the bidders' costs may be a better
representative of the costs of items when the manufacturing methods are complex and the
bidders use different techniques to manufacture those items.
This section of the thesis will define the bidding functions according to the
interval costs fall into over [k, h].
a. The Bidding Function for the cost interval [k, m]:
The bidders' expected profit, E[rc], has a maximum if the derivative of the
expected profit with respect to b equals to zero. That is:
d(E[7t] )/db=0
The expected profit is:
E[7i]=(b-c)*[l-Fx(x)]
n- 1
By taking the derivative of expected profit with respect to b and then equal























By solving the equation for b using the quadratic formula, we get the
general formula for the bidding function under the triangular cost distribution when
actual costs are in the interval [k, m]:
n*k+(n-l)*c+{[n*k+(n-l)*c] 2+2*{[(n-l)+0.5]*[K-k2-2*(n-l)*c*k]}} - 5
b=
2*[(n-l)+0.5]
The bidding function is a function of number of bidders, cost and cost
distribution functions. Using this general formula, we can derive all the necessary bidding
functions where the cost is distributed triangularly and cost is in the interval [k, m].
b. The Bidding Function For The Interval [ m, h]
The bidders' expected profit, E[tc], has a maximum if the dE[7u]/db=0.
E[7u]=(b-c)*[l-F(x)]n
" 1
dE[7t]/db = d{(b-c)*[l-{[l-(h-b)2]/[(h-k)*(h-m)]}] n
- 1}/db=0

























Factoring out (h-b) yields:
h-b-2*(n-l)*(b-c)=0
Solving for b gives the general formula for the bidding function when the





During the experimentation, five different scenarios were used. In this scenarios,
the number of bidders were changed to analyze the FPSB process and verify the accuracy
of the simulation as well. The number of bidders used are two, three, five, ten and 15.
Since the bidding function depends on the interval where the cost is distributed (i.e.,
either in [k, m] or [m, h]), they take one of the either form of the below formulas using
following parameters:
Lower limit of the triangular distribution, k=0.
Mode of the distribution, m=l.
Upper limit of the triangular distribution, h=2.
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bi= if k < Cj < m
3
2+2*c
bi= ifm < Cj < h
3







bi= if k < Cj < m
5
2+4*c
bi= ifm < Cj < h
5










bi= if k < C; < m
i
bi= ifm < C: < h











bi= ifm < C; < h
19








bi= if k < Cj < m
2+28%
bi= ifm < Cj < h
29
a. Random Number Generation
For simulation, the Excel 7.0 built-in random number generator, which
provides random numbers uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1], was used. To
convert these numbers to be distributed according to triangular distribution, inverse
transformation technique was used. [Ref 12:p. 300]
According to this technique:
c=k + [Rand()*(m-k)*(h-k)]° 5 for k < c < m and
c=h - [Rand()*(h-m)*(h-k)]° 5 for m < c < h
where c is triangularly distributed random number and Rand() is uniformly
distributed random number generated by Excel 7.0.
The simulation program for FPSB contract game is in Appendix B.
68
b. Experimentation With Two Bidders
During the simulation, three different scenarios were experimented and
analyzed. In the first scenario, both bidders used equilibrium strategies. In the second
scenario, one of the bidders underbid while the other used the equilibrium strategy.
Finally in the third scenario, both of the bidders did not use the equilibrium strategy.
The different scenarios were designed to show that using the equilibrium
bidding strategy maximizes the bidders' profit and any deviation from the equilibrium
strategy would reduce the expected profit for the deviating bidder.
Figure 56 shows the graphical result of the simulation when both bidders
used equilibrium strategies. The results show that there exists an equilibrium in the
contract game and the winners' expected profit approaches 0.22 as the number of








Expected Profit for Two-Bidder Bidding Game
(Both used equilibrium strategy)
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The average profit graph for this particular simulation is shown in Figure
57. This result also reinforces the result of existing equilibrium in the bidding game. Both
bidders' average profit approaches approximately 0.1 1 by bidding in 2500 games.
Average Expected Profit for Two-Bidder Bidding Game
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Figure 57
Total profits for both bidders resulted almost the same; 273.6609 for
bidderl and 283.7462 for bidder2 and are shown graphically in Figure 58. Another result
was that the bidders won almost equally; bidderl won 1231 of the games while bidder2
won the remaining 1 269 games. Overall results of the experiment are outlined in Table
47 in Appendix C.
In the next experimentation, bidderl underbid by 0.15 while bidder2 used
equilibrium strategy.
The results of the experimentation are shown in Table 48 in Appendix C.
The experimentation resulted in lower expected profit for bidderl, 0.048, while bidder2
made 0.243, which is more than the equilibrium amount of 0.22. The expected profit
graph is shown in Figure 59.
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Total Profit for Two-Bidder Bidding Game
(Both used equilibrium strategy)
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Figure 58
Expected Profit for Two-Bidder Bidding Game
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The average profit for bidderl decreased to 0.034 and 0.07 for bidder2.
The graph for average profit is shown in Figure 60.
Total profit for bidderl also dramatically decreased to 51.4114 and
105.1904 for bidder2 in 1500 games as shown in Figure 61. Bidderl won 1068 of 1500
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Total Profit for Two-Bidder Bidding Game
(Bidderl underbid by 0.15)
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The last experiment with two bidders was conducted as they both did not
use the equilibrium strategy. Both bidders underbid by 0.1, which was approximately five
percent of their average bids. In this scenario, both bidders' expected profits approached
0.122, which is lower than the equilibrium amount of 0.22 as the number of games
approached 2500. The graphical representation of expected profit is shown in Figure 62.
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The average profit for both bidders also decreased to 0.06 and is shown in
Figure 63 graphically.
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Figure 63
Total profits in 2500 games shown in Table 49 in Appendix C, 152.6738
for bidderl and 153.821 1 for the other, were also lower than the equilibrium total profit
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of 273.6609 and 283.7462 respectively. The graphical representation of total profit curves
is in Figure 64.
Total Profit for Two-Bidder Bidding Game
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c. Experimentation With Three Bidders
This simulation along with the other multiple bidder simulations was
conducted to find out the effect of number of bidders on the game as well as analyzing
the behavior of bidders and the accuracy of the simulation. The simulation was conducted
with three bidders and the cost is within the interval [0, 2] with a mode value of 2 under
triangular distribution.
During the simulation, three different scenarios were analyzed. In the first
scenario, all off the bidders used equilibrium strategy. In the second scenario, bidderl
underbid while others used equilibrium strategy. Finally in the third scenario, bidders "1"
and "2" underbid by different amounts while bidder3 used equilibrium strategy.
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Figure 65 shows the results of the first experimentation of which all
bidders used equilibrium strategy. As seen in the graph, there is a well-defined
equilibrium in the three-bidder bidding game as well as in the two-bidder bidding game.
According to the simulation results, the winners' expected profit from bidding
approached approximately 0.149 as the number of games approached 2000. Introducing
another bidder to the game reduced the expected profit from bidding.
Expected Profit for Three-Bidder Bidding Game
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Figure 65
The average expected profit graph is shown in Figure 66 and the overall
results of the experiment are shown in Table 50 in Appendix C. The average expected
profit graph also reinforces the equilibrium of the game. In this simulation, bidders'
average expected profit approached approximately 0.05 while the number of games
approached 2000.
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Average Expected Profit for Three-Bidder Bidding Game
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As seen in Table 50, each bidder won the games almost equally. Overall,
bidder 1 won 675 games, bidder2 635 and bidder3 690 games each. Total profit for
bidders as seen in Figure 67, were almost the same; 100.41, 94.983 and 104.24
respectively.
Total Profit for Three-Bidder Bidding Game
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In the next experiment, bidder 1 underbid by 0.1, which was approximately
six percent of the average bid amount, while other two used equilibrium strategy. As a
result of 1500 games, bidderl's expected profit decreased to 0.041 while the other two
bidders' slightly increased to 0.1529 and .1541 respectively. The expected profit graph is
shown in Figure 68
Expected Profit for Three-Bidder Bidding Game
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Average profit scheme was different than the equilibrium game
experiment for bidderl. Bidderl's average profit was 0.019 while others higher, 0.041 as
graphically shown in Figure 69.
Bidderl won 687 of 1500 games while others won 405 and 408 games as
shown in Table 51 in Appendix C. Although bidderl won more games than the others
won, its total profit was 28.554 which is lower than the others'; which were 61.925 and
62.879 respectively. Total profit graph for this experiment is shown in Figure 70.
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Average Expected Profit for Three-Bidder Bidding Game
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Total Profit for Three-Bidder Bidding Game
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The last scenario for three-bidder simulation was while bidder3 used
equilibrium strategy bidders "1" and "2" did not. Bidders "1" and "2" underbid by 0.1
and 0.12 respectively. The experiment resulted in lower expected profits for the first two
bidders while it was even higher for the third. Bidderl 's profit approached 0.0469, which
is slightly higher than in the previous game which was 0.041 and bidder2's was even
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lower, 0.0239 in 2000 games. Bidder3, which had used equilibrium strategy, made higher
profit than it did in the first two experiments, 0.157 as opposed to 0.149 and 0.1541. The
expected profit graph is shown in Figure 7 1
:
Expected Profit for Three-Bidder Bidding Game
(Bidders "1" and "2" underbid by 0.1 and 0.12 respectively)
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Figure 71
Bidder2 had lowest average profit than the others. It made 0.01 as opposed
to 0.0168 and 0.033 made by bidders "1" and "3" respectively. The average profit graph
is shown in Figure 72.
Total profit scheme was also different than previous experiments, but the
general trend, which is the more a bidder underbids the less profit it makes, was the same.
Bidder2 made the lowest profit, 20.3517 while bidderl and bidder3 made 33.7713 and
67.483 respectively in 2000 games. Bidders won 720, 851 and 429 games respectively.
Total profit curves are shown in Figure 73.
Overall results of the game are outlined in Table 52 in Appendix C.
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Average Expected Profit for Three-Bidder Bidding Game
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Total Profit for Three-Bidder Bidding Game
(Bidders "1 " and "2" underbid by 0.1 and 0.12 respectively)
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Figure 73
d. Experimentation With Five Bidders
The simulation was conducted with five bidders according to triangular
cost distribution within interval [0, 2] with a mode value of 2.
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During the simulation four different scenarios were analyzed. In the first
scenario, all bidders used the equilibrium strategy. In the second scenario, bidder 1
underbid while others used equilibrium strategy. In the third scenario, both bidders "1"
and "2" underbid while others used equilibrium strategy and in the last scenario, bidders
"1" and "2" underbid by different amounts while others used equilibrium strategy.
Figure 74 shows the results obtained from the simulation of which all
bidders used equilibrium strategy. As seen in the graph, there is a well-defined
equilibrium in the game as in the two and three-bidder bidding games. According to the
simulation, each winner's expected profit approached approximately 0.092 as the number
of games approached 1500. As the number of bidders increased, the expected profit from
bidding decreased, as it was the case in the three-bidder bidding game.
Expected Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
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Figure 74
Average expected profit graph is shown in Figure 75 and overall
simulation results obtained are shown in Tables 53 and 54 in Appendix C. One more
time, the average expected profits reinforced the game equilibrium. The average expected
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Average Expected Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
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Figure 75
The experiment resulted in very close total profits, ranging from 25.7489
to 28.8431, as seen in Table 54. Total profit graph is shown in Figure 76. The number of
games won by bidders was also very close to each other, ranging from 279 to 31 1.
Total Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
(All used equilibrium strategy)
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82
The second experiment, where bidderl underbid by 0.05 and others used
the equilibrium strategy, resulted in following:
Bidderl made a lower expected profit, 0.04, than others did, which was
0.093, as the number of games approached 1500. The expected profit graph is shown in
Figure 77.
Expected Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
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The average profit for bidderl approached 0.0109 while others did
between 0.0167 and 0.0178. The average profit curves are shown in Figure 78.
Bidderl won 402 games while others won the games almost equally,
ranging from 269 to 286. Total profit for bidderl was also lower than the others', 16.3539
as opposed to 25.1509-26.7629, even though bidderl won more games than the others
did. The total profit curves are graphically shown in Figure 79.
Overall results of the experiment are outlined in Tables 55 and 56 in
Appendix C.
83
Average Expected Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
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Total Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
(Bidderl underbid by 0.05)
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Figure 79
In the third scenario, both bidders "1" and "2" underbid by 0.05 while the
rest of the bidders used equilibrium strategy. Overall results of the experiment are shown
in Tables 57 and 58 in Appendix C. As for the expected profits, bidders "1" and "2"
made lower profits, approximately 0.041, than the rest did, 0.093, as shown in Figure 80:
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The average profit scheme resulted the same; bidders "1" and "2" made
0.009 while others did between 0.01487 and 0.01724 as seen in Figure 81:
Average Expected Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
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Total profit for bidders "1" and "2" also were lower than the others'
profits. They made 14.2425 and 14.7406 respectively, while others profit ranged from
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Figure 82
Bidders "1" and "2" won 313 and 329 games out of 1500 games. The rest
won the games 282-293 times. As it was the case in previous experiments, underbidding
bidders made lower profits, although they won more games than the equilibrium strategy
bidders.
In the last scenario, bidders "1" and "2" underbid by 0.05 and 0.075
respectively while others used equilibrium strategy. The underbidding bidders made
lower profits of 0.041 and 0.015 respectively while others made approximately 0.093.
The expected profit graph is shown in Figure 83.
The average profit for bidders "1" and "2" were 0.00997 and 0.0041 while
others' approached 0.015 in 2500 games as seen in Figure 84. The equilibrium strategy
bidders made higher expected and average profit than underbidding bidders did.
Bidders "1" and "2" won 582 and 674 games while the others won very
close number of games ranging from 402 to 424 as seen in Table 59 in Appendix C.
Despite bidders "1" and "2 won much more games than others, they made lower total
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profits in 2500 games. The lowest bidder, bidder2, made the lowest total profit, 10.194.
The second lowest total profit was bidder2's, 24.156. Finally, equilibrium strategy
bidders made very close total profits ranging from 36.97 to 39.499. Total profit curves
are shown in Figure 85 and overall results of the experiment are in Tables 59 and 60 in
Appendix C.
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Average Expected Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
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Total Profit for Five-Bidder Bidding Game
(Bidders "1" and "2" underbid by 0.05 and 0.075 respectively)
50
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Number of Bids (MOO)
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 x Bidder4 Bidder5
Figure 85
e. Experimentation With Ten Bidders
The simulation was conducted with ten bidders according to triangular
cost distribution within interval [0, 2] with a mode value of 2.
In these series of experiments, four different scenarios used to simulate the
bidding process. In the first scenario, all bidders used the equilibrium strategy. In the
second one, bidderl underbid while others used the equilibrium strategy again. In the
third one, both bidders "1" and "2" underbid by the same amount while all others used
the equilibrium strategy. Finally, in the last scenario, bidders "1", "2", '3" and "4"
underbid by different amounts while the rest used the equilibrium strategy.
The first experiment of which all used equilibrium strategy resulted in a
well-defined equilibrium. All bidders' expected profit approached approximately 0.048
as the number of games approached 1 500. The graphical representation of the expected
profit curves is shown in Figure 86. As can be seen in the overall results of the
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experiment in Tables 61 through 64 in Appendix C, introducing more bidders to the game
reduced the expected profit from bidding more.
Expected Profit for Ten-Bidder Bidding Game
(All used Equilibrium Strategy)
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The average expected profit graph is shown in Figure 87. The average
expected profit graph also reinforces the equilibrium of the game. In this simulation,
bidders' average expected profit approached 0.005 in 1500 games.
Average Expected Profit for Ten-Bidder Bidding Game
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As seen in Table 62, each bidder won the games approximately equal
number of times. Overall, bidders won in a range of 130 to 161 games each. Total profit
for bidders as seen in Figure 88, were almost the same, ranging between 6.2965 and 7.66.
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In the next experiment, bidder 1 underbid by 0.025 while others bid
according to the equilibrium strategy. As a result of 2500 games, bidderl's expected
profit decreased to 0.0225 while other bidders' remained at 0.048. The expected profit
graph is shown in Figure 89.
Average expected profits for the bidders also reinforced the same scheme
as the expected profit results had shown. Bidderl's average profit was 0.0026 while
others were almost the same, ranging from 0.0043 to 0.0052. Average expected profit
graph is shown in Figure 90.
Overall results of the experiment are shown in Tables 65 through 68 in
Appendix C.
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Bidderl won 289 of 2500 games while others won in a range of 226 to
270 games as shown in Table 66. Although bidderl won more games than the others
won, its total profit was 6.5026 which is much lower than the others' profits ranging from
10.859 to 12.876. Total profit graph for this experiment is shown in Figure 91.
91
Total Profit for Ten-Bidder Bidding Game
(Bidderl underbid by 0.025)
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In the third experiment, bidders "1" and "2" underbid by 0.025 while
others bid according to the equilibrium strategy. As a result of 2500 games, bidders "1"
and "2" made expected profits, 0.0225 and 0.023, while other bidders' remained at 0.048
again. The expected profit graph is shown in Figure 92:
Expected Profit for Ten-Bidder Bidding Game
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Average expected profits for the bidders also resulted in the same trend as
the expected profits did. Underbidding bidders' average profits were 0.00277 and
0.00248, while others were almost the same, ranging from 0.0043 to 0.0054, as
graphically shown in Figure 93.
Average Expected Profit for Ten-Bidder Game
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Bidders "1" and "2" won 184 and 161 games respectively while others
won in a range of 131 to 170 games. Total profits for underbidding bidders were 4.1538
and 3.7136, which are much lower than the others' profits ranging from 6.234 to 8.1608.
Total profit graph for this experiment is shown in Figure 94.
Overall results of the experiment are shown in Tables 69 through 72 in
Appendix C.
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In the last experiment, bidders "1", "2", "3" and "4" underbid by 0.03,
0.025, 0.02 and 0.015 respectively in 2000 games. The remaining six bidders used
equilibrium strategy. The underbidding bidders made lower profits, 0.0074, 0.0129,
0.0174 and 0.0225, than the equilibrium strategy bidders did, which was 0.048 again.
The expected profit curves are shown in Figure 95.
Expected Profit for Ten-Bidder Bidding Game
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Average profit results were almost identical to similar previous
experiments. The equilibrium strategy bidders made higher average profits as seen in
Figure 96. The underbidding bidders average profits were 0.001, 0.0018, 0.0021 and
0.0023 while equilibrium strategy bidders' ranged from 0.0036 to 0.0043.
Average Expected Profit for Ten-Bidder Bidding Game
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The underbidding bidders won more games than the others did. They won
the games in a range of 206 to 273 times while equilibrium strategy bidders won in a
range of 152 to 180 times. Despite this result, the equilibrium bidders made higher total
profits than underbidding bidders as seen in Table 75 in Appendix C. According to this,
underbidding bidders made profits; 1.9694, 3.5223, 4.2502 and 4.6414 respectively,
while others did in a range of 7.1935 to 8.7005. The total profit curves are graphically
shown in Figure 97.
Overall detailed results of the experiment are shown in Tables 73 through
76 in Appendix C.
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f. Experimentation With Fifteen Bidders
The simulation was conducted with fifteen bidders according to triangular
cost distribution within interval [0, 2] with a mode value of 2.
In these last series of experiments under triangular cost distribution, four
different scenarios used to simulate the bidding process. In the first scenario, all bidders
used equilibrium strategies. In the second one, bidderl underbid while others used the
equilibrium strategy again. Third experiment was conducted as bidders "1", "2" and "3"
underbid by the same amount while all others used the equilibrium strategy. Finally, in
the last scenario, bidders "1", "2", '3", "4" and "5" underbid by different amounts while
the rest used the equilibrium strategy.
The first experiment of which all used equilibrium strategies resulted in a
well-defined equilibrium. All bidders' expected profit approached 0.032 as the number of
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games approached 1500. The graphical representation of the expected profit results is
shown in Figure 98.
Expected Profit for Fifteen-Bidder Bidding Game
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As it was the result of the previous experiments, introducing more bidders
to the game reduced the expected profit from bidding more. The results of the experiment
are outlined in Tables 77 through 80 in Appendix C.
The average expected profit graph is shown in Figure 99. The average
expected profit graph also reinforces the equilibrium of the game. In this simulation,
bidders' average expected profit approached approximately 0.002 while the number of
games approached 1500.
As seen in Table 78, each bidder won the games approximately equal
number of times. Overall, bidders won in a range of 82 to 139 games each. Total profit
for bidders as seen in Figure 100, ranged between 2.6708 and 4.1422.
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Total Profit for Fifteen-Bidder Bidding Game
(All used equilibrium strategy)
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Figure 100
In the next experiment, bidderl underbid by 0.015 while others bid
according to the equilibrium strategy. As a result of 1500 games, bidder l's expected
profit decreased to 0.01735 while the other bidders' remained at 0.032. The expected
profit graph is shown in Figure 101.
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Figure 101
Average profit for the bidders also reinforced the same scheme as the
equilibrium game had shown. Bidderl's average profit was 0.0011 while others ranged
from 0.00174 to 0.00272, as graphically shown in Figure 102.
Average Expected Profit for Fifteen-Bidder Bidding Game
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Bidder 1 won 100 of 1500 games while others won in a range of 81 to 128
games as shown in Table 82 in Appendix C. Although bidder 1 underbid, it won less
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games than some of the others won. Total profit for bidder 1 was 1.735, which is lower
than the others' profits ranging from 2.6137 to 4.0855. Total profit graph for this
experiment is shown in Figure 103 and detailed results of the experiment are shown in
Tables 81 through 84 in Appendix C.
Total Profit for Fifteen-Bidder Bidding Game
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In the third experiment, bidders "1", "2" and "3" underbid by 0.02 while
others used equilibrium strategy in 2000 "games. As a result of the experiment,
underbidding bidders' expected profit approached 0.0125 while others' approached
0.032.The expected profit graph is shown in Figure 104.
Average expected profit results were parallel to the expected profit results.
Underbidding bidders' average profits approached 0.001 while others' approached
approximately 0.002 in 2000 games. This result along with all previous experiments
showed that there is indeed a strong equilibrium in contract games and any underbidding
bidder would get less profit than equilibrium strategy bidders. The average expected
profit graph is shown in Figure 105.
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Total profits for underbidding bidders, ranging from 2.0129 to 2.277, were
also lower than the equilibrium strategy bidders' total profits, ranging from 3.5074 to
4.3862. The underbidding bidders won 165 to 182 games as opposed to others won
games of 108 to 135. Total profit curves are shown in Figure 106 and the results of the
experiment are outlined in Tables 85 through 88 in Appendix C.
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In the last experiment with fifteen bidders, bidders "1", "2", "3", "4" and
"5" underbid by 0.025, 0.0225, 0.02, 0.0175 and 0.015 respectively, while others used
equilibrium strategy in 1 500 games. As a result of the experiment, underbidding bidders'
expected profit approached 0.0074, 0.0095, 0.012, 0.014 and 0.017 respectively, while
others' approached 0.032.The expected profit graph is shown in Figure 107.
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The average expected profit results were parallel to the expected profit
results. Underbidding bidders' average profits approached 0.0006, 0.0009, 0.00091,
0.0011 and 0.0011 respectively while others' approached a range between 0.0017 and
0.0023 in 2000 games. This result along with all previous experiments showed that there
is indeed a strong equilibrium in contract games. The deviant bidders lose profit even if
they win more games than the equilibrium strategy bidders. The average expected profit
graph for this experiment is shown in Figure 108.
Average Expected Profit for Fifteen-Bidder Bidding Game
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Total profits for underbidding bidders, ranging from 1.1038 to 2.2021,
were also lower than the equilibrium strategy bidders' total profits, ranging from 3.401
1
to 4.6884. The underbidding bidders won 127 to 186 games as opposed to others, who
won the games 108 to 135 times. Total profit curves are shown in Figure 109 and results
of the game are outlined in Tables 89 through 92 in Appendix C.
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After analyzing the results of experiments with both uniform and triangular cost
distributions, we can say:
1. The equilibrium strategy maximizes the bidders expected profit and
average expected profit. Underbidding bidders' both expected and average
expected profits are lower than the equilibrium strategy bidders' profits.
2. If one of the bidders underbid, it reduces not only its total profit but also
other bidders' total profits.
3. Underbidding bidders always won more games assuming they were
responsive and responsible bidders.
4. Changing the cost distribution did not effect the general trend in
simulations, but substantially altered the expected quantitative outcomes
of the simulated FPSB in all simulations. The difference between the
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expected profit outcomes resulted from the probability distributions'
characteristics.
5. Adding additional competitors to the game does not change the general
trend found in the games, but reduces both the expected and average
expected profits. In fact, the number of competing bidders is one of the
most influential factors in FPSB simulations.
6. Different scenarios used throughout the simulations showed that the more




This chapter of the thesis will review and discuss the research questions written in
Chapter I. In answering these questions, the findings of the experiments will be the
foundation for discussion and conclusions. Following this section, recommendations will
be provided and areas for further research will also be identified.
A. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary question for this research was: "How do profit maximizing bidders
choose their bids in a competitive environment? " In answering this question, discussing
and answering the subsidiary questions will be helpful, that is why, first the subsidiary
questions will be answered.
1. Answers to Subsidiary Questions
a. Subsidiary Question 1
"What are the equilibrium strategies of the bidders?" As it was analyzed
and discussed in Chapter II of the thesis, the bidding for contract game had been
identified as a static non-cooperative game with incomplete information. The theory of
contract games predicts that these games have an equilibrium. This thesis found a strong
and well-defined equilibrium in the games during the simulation and experimentation as
discussed in Chapter III.
This thesis used uniform and triangular production cost distributions for
bidders. Then, equilibrium strategies, also called "bidding functions", were developed in
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Chapter III, under these two distributions. These strategies were used to develop the
simulation programs and conduct the experimentation.
The first experiments were conducted under a uniform cost distribution
with several different numbers of bidders and scenarios. As the bidders used the
developed theoretical equilibrium strategy, the experiments resulted in very close
outcomes that showed the existence of a well-defined equilibrium in these games. This is
called symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
The resulting game equilibrium and the proven existence of equilibrium
strategy provide the opportunity of predicting the behavior of the prospective suppliers.
However, the reader should be careful about the probabilistic characteristics of the
simulated games. The simulation cannot predict the actual behavior of the bidders in a
particular bid, but it can approximate the general trend and expected average winning bid
with a reasonable accuracy.
•
b. Subsidiary Question 2
"Do the bidders have a dominant strategy in FPSB?" An equilibrium
strategy should maximize the bidders' profits simultaneously. If a strategy maximizes the
bidders' profits, no bidder is willing to deviate from this strategy. This is the equilibrium
of the game. This equilibrium condition was experimented with during the simulations
and found that whatever the number of underbidding bidders in a game, deviations from
the equilibrium strategy resulted in an expected loss for the underbidding bidders. In
some of the experiments, scenarios were set up as if all the bidders did not use the
equilibrium strategy and the result was they all made lower profits. The bidders choose
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their bids (i.e., their strategies) based on their assumptions of the decisions of other
bidders. That is, there is not a dominant strategy for the bidders in FPSB. The assumption
for the information symmetry made it possible to analyze only the symmetric Nash
equilibrium.
c. Subsidiary Question 3
"How does the number of bidders affect the outcome of the FPSB?
"
Number of bidders was found to be one of the most influential factors affecting the game
outcomes in FPSB.
Experiments were conducted with up to 15 bidders under both uniform
and triangular cost distributions. The simulation programs in Appendices A and B were
designed to experiment with up to 25 and 16 bidders respectively. As discussed
throughout Chapter III of the Thesis, as the number of bidders increased, bidders' profits
decreased. To be able to analyze this situation, a series of experiments were conducted
with different numbers of bidders. Figure 1 1 shows the results of these experiments. As
the Figure indicates, the bidders' expected profits decrease as the number of bidders
increases from two to fifteen.
In conclusion, the number of participants in FPSB significantly affects the
outcome by influencing the bidders' decisions in FPSB. The bidders consider it a
potential factor affecting the probability of winning the bidding game. The higher the
number of bids, the higher the probability of that any given bid will not be the lowest bid.
Therefore, expected bid price decreases as the number of bidders increases, though,
expected profit for the winners decreases.
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d. Subsidiary Question 4
"How does the cost distribution affect the outcome of the FPSB?"
Changing the production cost distribution did not affect the general pattern of the FPSB.
However, it had a significant effect on the value of bids and the bidders' expected profits.
To be able to compare the outcomes of the two simulations under these two distributions,
another experiment was conducted under uniform distribution over the cost interval
[0, 2] with two bidders. The bidders' expected profit was 0.667 under uniform cost
distribution when using equilibrium strategy. This is almost three times higher than the
equilibrium strategy profit of 0.22 under triangular distribution over the same cost
interval with mode [1].
The change in the cost distribution has a significant effect on the FPSB
outcomes. However, it is not just the cost distribution that affects the bidding outcomes;
bidders' perceptions about the other bidders' production costs, influences their bids as
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well. Because, as discussed in the first secondary question, bidders choose their bidding
strategies according to their guess on the other participants probable behavior and
production costs. This thesis assumed that the bidders' cost distributions are common
knowledge among the bidders and identical to each other. It did not analyze the potential
influence of bidders' cost assumptions on the other participants.
In reality, bidders do not have specific information about the other
participants' cost distributions. They have some perceptions about it. Sometimes they
develop their perceptions based on the signals received from other bidders. It is in the
senders interest to distort this information, mainly in an increasing direction. The bidders
have to be aware of this strategic misrepresentation.
d. Subsidiary Question 5
"How can the procuring agencies use the findings of "Game Theory" in
their acquisition practice? " The simulations revealed that the equilibrium strategy is the
strategy that maximizes the bidders' expected profits simultaneously. The suppliers will
most likely use this strategy when formulating their bids in an actual bidding. Procuring
agencies can use this finding to project the expected winning bid. The agencies can use
these projections to forecast the expected spending on procurement. If the procuring
agencies choose to negotiate with the offerors, they can develop negotiation positions and
prepare the negotiators. The essence of these projections is forecasting the accurate
expected cost range. In other words, this finding can help procuring agencies to develop
competitive ranges for the bids.
ill
Findings regarding the number of bidders and their effect on the expected
bid can be used to establish the number of bidders to be invited. Although, the benefits of
competition are known throughout the countries with free economy, there aren't many
defense industry firms developing unique defense systems, such as aircraft, ships,
missiles and so on. Therefore, the simulation of the FPSB can provide some insight
through analysis of bidders behavior under changing situations.
2. Primary Research Question and Discussion
Bidders in a FPSB have some information available to them on which they base
their bids. This thesis assumed symmetry of information among bidders. That is, all
bidders' production cost distributions are common knowledge and are identical.
However, the bidders' own production cost is private information. Another important
factor in building the FPSB model was the number of bidders.
Bidders consider their own production costs, other bidders' production cost
distribution and the number of competing bidders while preparing their bids. Since they
have their own production cost information, they estimate their production cost for a
given work while projecting their competitors' production costs based on experience,
signals from them etc. Based on these assumptions, it can also be said, in a competitive
world, bidders should know their potential competitors' bidding habits and production
potentials.
This thesis applied two probability distributions on the production costs, uniform
and triangular distributions. It is assumed that uniform cost distribution is applicable to
the production of standard, non-complex items while triangular cost distribution is
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applicable to more complex productions and where some firms have production
advantages over the competitors.
It is furthermore assumed that, bidders are risk neutral and act to maximize their
profits. It is this assumption that made it possible for us to construct the FPSB model and
derive the equilibrium bidding functions. Bidders want to maximize their profits but their
bid should be low enough to have a reasonable chance to win the award. This thesis
found that if the bidders act rationally (i.e., bid to maximize their profits), they should use
the equilibrium strategy. Simulation of FPSB also provided an opportunity for bidders to
analyze tradeoffs between profit maximizing and probability of winning the award.
One of the results of the experiments with the FPSB was underbidding bidders
won significantly more games than the equilibrium strategy bidders. This was the result
of the artificially low bids they chose. However, these bidders made lower profits than
the equilibrium strategy bidders. That is, equilibrium strategy bidders made higher profits
in less number of contracts. Therefore, they can devote their time to other areas, which
means they have more time to gain more profits.
First Price Sealed Bidding is an ancient market institution, which has been used
for thousands of years. Bidders' behavior in FPSB is determined by several factors and
perceptions. This thesis used the game theory approach in microeconomics to describe
and analyze this behavior. However, there are several different approaches in game
theory to construct different models or a model including many different approaches in
one simulation. The game simulation developed in this thesis is one of the methods to
explore the FPSB. However, simulation gives some insight to the reality and one should
not confuse the simulation with reality. Data resulted from the simulation give an average
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information about the real life. The model does not prescribe the bidders' behavior; it
forecasts and describes the average behavior expected from the players over time.
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH




The second price sealed bidding is one of the top areas for further research.
Simulation of the second price sealed bidding technique, and experimentation would
probably provide more insights to the auctioning theory. It can also be said that, since
second price sealed bidding is being experimented to be an alternative for FPSB because
of inefficiencies described as "winner's curse" and "buyer's angst"[Ref. 13], analysis of
this technique would surely be a valuable research.
2. The competitive range is a measure established by the buyer to influence the




SIMULATION PROGRAM WITH UNIFORM COST DISTRIBUTION
Sub Uniform-Simulation ()
' Uniform-Simulation Macro




ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "Write # of Bidders (n) [2,25]"
Range("A2").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "Write Lower Limit of Uniform Cost Dist. (k)"
Range("A3").Select











































































ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = MF(R[-4]C>=2, ,M,CostrV )"
Range("C5").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = ,'=IF(R[-4]C[-l]>=2, ," ,Cost2m ', )"
Range("D5").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(R[-4]C[-2]>=3, ,M,Cost3"*\ )"
Range("E5").Select





ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(R[-4]C[-4]>=5,m*Cost5m7" )"
Range("G5").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(R[-4]C[-5]>=6, m,Cost6 ,M'," m,M )
M
Range("H5").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = M-IF(R[-4]C[-6]>=7, ,,MCost7 ,, ","" ,M, )
M
Range("I5").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(R[-4]C[-7]>=8, m,Cost8"7MM,,, )
M
Range("J5").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl ="=IF(R[-4]C[-8]>-9,""Cost9" M , )"
Range("K5").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(R[-4]C[-9]>=10, ,, * ,CostlO ,, ^'MMM, )
,,
Range("L5").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(R[-4]C[-10]>=1 l,""Costl 1"","""")"
Range("M5").Select








ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(RlC2>=15, ,M,Costl5m\ )"
Range("Q5 M).Select
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ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(RlC2>=16,""Costl6"", ")'*
Range("R5"). Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(RlC2>=17, M "Costl7 ,M ', )"
Range("S5").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = ,,=IF(RlC2>=18, M "Costl8" ,7"" ,,y
Range("T5").Select




ActiveCell.FormulaRl C 1 = "=IF(R1 C2>=20,""Cost20"*\ )*'
Range("V5").Select








ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl ="=IF(RlC2>=23," MCost23 M ", ")"
Range("Y5").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl ="=IF(RlC2>=24,""Cost24 M^ , )"
Range("Z5").Select




ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl!RlC2>=2,""BiaTM\ )"
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Range("Bl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl!RlC2>=2,*"*Bid2 ,"\ )"
Range("Cl M ).Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl - "=IF(Sheetl IRlC^S^'BidS"",' )"
Range("Dl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl - "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=4," nBid4H7""" ,)
M
Range( MEl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = MF(Sheetl!RlC2>=5, ,mBid5"'', ')*'
Range("Fl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=6, M"Bid6"V )"
Range( MGl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = M=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=7,m,Bid7"", )"
Range("Hl").Select
ActiveCelLFormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=8, ,M,Bid8"7 )"
Range("Il").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=9, ,,,,Bid9 ,,,\ )"
Range("Jl").Select




ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl!RlC2>=ll,""Bidir", )"
Range("Ll").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl!RlC2>=12,""Bidl2 M ", )"
Range("Ml").Select
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ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl!RlC2>=13,""Bidl3"", ")"
Range("Nl M ).Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = M=IF(Sheetl!RlC2>=14, ,mBidl4 ,m , )"
Range("01 M ).Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = n=IF(Sheetl!RlC2>=15, ,M,Bidl5 M ", ")"
Range("Pl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl!RlC2>=16, m,Bidl6*"7" )*'
Range("Ql M ).Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = ,,=IF(Sheetl!RlC2>=17, m,Bidl7 M7""m )"
Range( MRl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = ,,=IF(Sheetl!RlC2>=18,•M,Bidl8' ,^ )"
Range("Sl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=19,*" ,Bidl9 ,M\ )"
Range("Tl M ).Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = M=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=20,,,HBid20,,,,s )"
Range("Ul"). Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl!RlC2>=21,""Bid21 M ", ")"
Range(*'Vl M).Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl ="=IF(Sheetl!RlC2>=22,""Bid22 ,,M , )"
Range("Wl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=23,""Bid23 ,,,\ )"
Range("Xl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=24,""Bid24 M ", )"
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Range("Yl").Select




ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl!RlC2>=2, M "Payoffl*M, ,"m"')"
Range("Bl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = M=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=2,""Payoff2'm , ,,, )
,,
Range("Cr).Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=3,""Payoff3 ,M\ )"
Range("Dl n).Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl!RlC2>=4,""Payoff4"", )"
Range("El").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=5, M"Payoff5 ,M7"m7'
Range("Fl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=6,""Payoff6"","" ,m )"
Range("Gl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = M=IF(Sheetl!RlC2>=7,""Payoff7 M,7 ')"
Range("Hl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=8, ,M,Payoff8"", )"
Range("Il").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=9," MPayoff9""," )"
Range("Jl").Select
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ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl IR^^KV'PayoffKrV" )"
Range("Kl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !R1C2>=1 l, H "Payoffl 1"", ")"
Range(**Ll").Select




ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=13,""Payoffl3"'7Hm *')"
Range("Nl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=14, n "Payoffl4m\ )"
Range("01 M).Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl!RlC2>=15,m,Payoffl5m\ )"
Range("Pl").Select




ActiveCelLFoimulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=17,m,Payofn7 ,,n ," )"
Range("Rl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl!RlC2>=18,m,Payoffl8 ,"\ )"
Range("Sl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=19,""Payoffl9" M , )"
Range("Tl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=20,""Payofi20 M ", )"
Range("Ul M ).Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=21,""PayofGl"", )"
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Range("Vl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=22,'mPayoff22 ,M\ )"
Range("Wl").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=23,,mPayoff23"7M,m') n
Range("Xl n).Select




ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=25,""Payoff25"Y )"















Sheetl !R2C2)*RAND()+Sheetl !R2C2),' )"
Range("F6").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(RlC2>=5,((Sheetl!R3C2-
Sheetl !R2C2)*RAND()+Sheetl !R2C2), )"
Range("G6").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(RlC2>=6,((Sheetl!R3C2-
Sheetl !R2C2)*RAND()+Sheetl !R2C2), )"
Range("H6").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(RlC2>=7,((Sheetl!R3C2-
Sheetl !R2C2)*RAND()+Sheetl !R2C2), )*'
Range( MI6").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(RlC2>=8,((Sheetl!R3C2-
Sheetl !R2C2)*RAND()+Sheetl !R2C2), ,M",M )"
Range( MJ6").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(RlC2>=9,((Sheetl!R3C2-
Sheetl !R2C2)*RAND()+Sheetl !R2C2), )"
Range("K6").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(RlC2>=10,((Sheetl!R3C2-
Sheetl !R2C2)*RAND()+Sheetl !R2C2), )"
Range( ML6*').Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(RlC2>=ll,((Sheetl!R3C2-




Sheetl !R2C2)*RAND()+Sheetl !R2C2), )"





Sheetl !R2C2)*RAND()+Sheetl !R2C2), )"
Range("P6").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(RlC2>=15,((Sheetl!R3C2-
Sheetl !R2C2)*RAND()+Sheetl !R2C2), )"
Range( MQ6").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(RlC2>=16,((Sheetl!R3C2-
Sheetl !R2C2)*RAND()+Sheetl !R2C2), )"
Range("R6").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(RlC2>=17,((Sheetl!R3C2-








Sheetl !R2C2)*RAND()+Sheetl !R2C2), )"
Range("U6").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(RlC2>=20,((Sheetl!R3C2-
Sheetl !R2C2)*RAND()+Sheetl !R2C2), )"
Range( MV6 M ).Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = M=IF(RlC2>=21,((Sheetl!R3C2-






Sheetl !R2C2)*RAND()+Sheetl !R2C2), )"
Range("Y6").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = M=IF(RlC2>=24,((Sheetl!R3C2-
Sheetl !R2C2)*RAND()+Sheetl !R2C2), )"
Range("Z6 M).Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "=IF(RlC2>=25,((Sheetl!R3C2-
Sheetl !R2C2)*RAND()+Sheetl !R2C2),' )"




































































"=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=13,((Sheetl !R3C2-Sheetl !R2C2)+(Sheetl !R1C2-




l)*Sheetl !R[5]C[1])/Sheetl !R1C2," )"
Range("02").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl =_





"=IF(Sheetl !R1 C2>=1 6,((Sheetl !R3C2-Sheetl !R2C2)+(Sheetl !R1 C2-
l)*Sheetl !R[5]C[1])/Sheetl !R1C2, )*'
Range("Q2").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl =_










=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=19,((Sheetl !R3C2-Sheetl !R2C2)+(Sheet 1 !R1C2-
l)*Sheetl !R[5]C[1])/Sheetl !R1C2, )"
Range("T2").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl =_









ActiveCell.FormulaRl C 1 =
_
"=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=22,((Sheetl !R3C2-Sheetl !R2C2)+(Sheetl !R1C2-
l)*Sheetl!R[5]C[l])/Sheetl!RlC2, )"
Range( MW2").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaR 1 C 1 =
_




"=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=24,((Sheetl !R3C2-Sheetl !R2C2)+(Sheetl !R1C2-
l)*Sheetl !R[5]C[1])/Sheetl !R1C2,*MMH, )
,,
Range("Y2").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRl C 1 =
_
"=IF(Sheetl !RlC2>=25,((Sheetl !R3C2-Sheetl !R2C2)+(Sheetl !R1C2-
l)*Sheetl!R[5]C[l])/Sheetl!RlC2, )"





















































































































































SIMULATION PROGRAM WITH TRIANGULAR COST DISTRIBUTION
Sub Triangular-Simulation()
' Triangular-Simulation Macro
' Macro recorded 9/1/97 by Suat Tozendemir
Application.ScreenUpdating = False
'Assigning variables
Dim h, m, k, n, num, randl, rand2, rand3, rand4, rand5, rand6, rand7 5 rand8, rand9,
costl, cost2, cost3, cost4, cost5, cost6, cost7, cost8, cost9, costlO, costl 1, costl2, costl3,
costH, costl 5, costl6 As Variant
Dim bidl, bidla, bidlb, bidlc, bid2, bid2a, bid2b, bid3, bid3a, bid3b, bid4, bid4a,
bid4b, bid5, bid5a, bid5b, bid6, bid6a, bid6b, bid7, bid7a, bid7b, bid8, bid8a, bid8b, bid9,
bid9a, bid9b, bidlO, bidlOa, bidlOb, bidl 1, bidl la, bidl lb, bidl 2, bidl2a, bidl2b, bidl3,
bidl3a, bidl3b, bid 14, bidHa, bidl4b, bidl 5, bidl5a, bidl5b, bidl 6, bidl6a, bidl6b As
Variant
Dim payoffl, payoff2, payofD, payoff4, payoffS, payoff6, payoff7, payoffB, payoff9,
payofflO, payoffl 1, payoffl 2, payoffl 3, payoffl 4, payoffl 5, payoffl 6 As Variant























n = 2 'number of bidders
Range("hl").Select
ActiveCell.Value = n
'start loop enter the number of required after "To"
num =
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ActiveCell.FormulaRl CI = " bidl
"
Range( ,,b4* ,).Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = " bid2"
Sheets("sheet4").Select
Range("a4").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = " payoff!"
Range("b4"). Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = " payoff2"
'computation of costl
randl = Rnd()
If randl < ((m - k) / (h - k)) Then
costl = ((randl * (h - k) * (m - k)) A 0.5) + 1
Else









If rand2 < ((m - k) / (h - k)) Then
cost2 = ((rand2 * (h - k) * (m - k)) A 0.5) + 1
Else






'computation of bid 1
bidla = (n-l) + 0.5
If costl <m Then
bidlb = n*k + (n- 1)* costl
bidlc = bidla * (h - k) * (m - k) - (k A 2) - (2 * costl * (n - 1) * k)
bidl - (bidlb + (bidlb A 2 + 2 * bidlc) A 0.5) / (2 * bidla)
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Else







If cost2 <m Then
bid2b = n*k + (n- 1) * cost2
bid2c = bidla * (h - k) * (m - k) - (k A 2) - (2 * cost2 * (n - 1) * k)
bid2 = (bid2b + (bid2b A 2 + 2 * bid2c) A 0.5) / (2 * bidla)
Else







If n >= 3 Then GoTo rowlO:
'defining the winner and its payoff
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If bid 1 <bid2Then


















ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = " bid3"
Sheets("sheet4").Select
Range("c4").Select




If rand3 < ((m - k) / (h - k)) Then
cost3 = ((rand3 * (h - k) * (m - k)) A 0.5) + 1
Else







If cost3 <m Then
bid3b = n*k + (n- 1) * cost3
bid3c = bidla * (h - k) * (m - k) - (k A 2) - (2 * cost3 * (n - 1) * k)
bid3 = (bid3b + (bid3b A 2 + 2 * bid3c) A 0.5) / (2 * bidla)
Else







If n >= 4 Then GoTo rowl 1
:
'Defining the winner and it's payoff
If bid 1 < bid2 And bidl < bid3 Then






If bid2 < bidl And bid2 < bid3 Then



















ActiveCell.FormulaR 1 C 1 = " bid4"
Sheets("sheet4").Select
Range("d4").Select
ActiveCelLFormulaRlCl = " payoff4"
'computation of cost4
rand4 = Rnd()
If rand4 < ((m - k) / (h - k)) Then
cost4 = ((rand4 * (h - k) * (m - k)) A 0.5) + 1
Else







If cost4 < m Then
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bid4b = n * k + (n - 1) * cost4
bid4c = bidla * (h - k) * (m - k) - (k A 2) - (2 * cost4 * (n - 1) * k)
bid4 = (bid4b + (bid4b A 2 + 2 * bid4c) A 0.5) / (2 * bidla)
Else






If n >= 5 Then GoTo rowl2:
'Defining the winner and it's payoff
If bid 1 < bid2 And bidl < bid3 And bidl < bid4 Then






If bid2 < bidl And bid2 < bid3 And bid2 < bid4 Then







If bid3 < bidl And bid3 < bid2 And bid3 < bid4 Then






















ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = " payoff5"
'computation of cost5
rand5 = Rnd()
If rand5 < ((m - k) / (h - k)) Then
cost5 = ((rand5 * (h - k) * (m - k)) A 0.5) + 1
Else







If cost5 < m Then
bid5b = n*k + (n- 1) * cost5
bid5c = bidla * (h - k) * (m - k) - (k A 2) - (2 * cost5 * (n - 1) * k)
bid5 = (bid5b + (bid5b A 2 + 2 * bid5c) A 0.5) / (2 * bidla)
Else







If n >= 6 Then GoTo rowl3:
'Defining the winner and it's payoff
If bidl < bid2 And bidl < bid3 And bidl < bid4 And bidl < bid5 Then






If bid2 < bidl And bid2 < bid3 And bid2 < bid4 And bid2 < bid5 Then






If bid3 < bidl And bid3 < bid2 And bid3 < bid4 And bid3 < bid5 Then







If bid4 < bidl And bid4 < bid2 And bid4 < bid3 And bid4 < bid5 Then



















ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = " bid6"
Sheets(*'sheet4 n).Select
Range( nf4 M).Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = *' payoff6"
'computation of cost6
rand6 = Rnd()
If rand6 < ((m - k) / (h - k)) Then
cost6 = ((rand6 * (h - k) * (m - k)) A 0.5) + 1
Else







If cost6 <m Then
bid6b = n * k + (n - 1) * cost6
bid6c = bidla * (h - k) * (m - k) - (k A 2) - (2 * cost6 * (n - 1) * k)
bid6 = (bid6b + (bid6b A 2 + 2 * bid6c) A 0.5) / (2 * bidla)
Else







If n >= 7 Then GoTo rowl4:
'Defining the winner and it's payoff
If bid 1 < bid2 And bidl < bid3 And bidl < bid4 And bidl < bid5 And bidl < bid6 Then






If bid2 < bidl And bid2 < bid3 And bid2 < bid4 And bid2 < bid5 And bid2 < bid6 Then






If bid3 < bidl And bid3 < bid2 And bid3 < bid4 And bid3 < bid5 And bid3 < bid6 Then







If bid4 < bidl And bid4 < bid2 And bid4 < bid3 And bid4 < bid5 And bid4 < bid6 Then






If bid5 < bidl And bid5 < bid2 And bid5 < bid3 And bid5 < bid4 And bid5 < bid6 Then
























If rand7 < ((m - k) / (h - k)) Then
cost7 = ((rand7 * (h - k) * (m - k)) A 0.5) + 1
Else








If cost7 <m Then
bid7b = n*k + (n- l)*cost7
bid7c = bidla * (h - k) * (m - k) - (k A 2) - (2 * cost7 * (n - 1) * k)
bid7 = (bid7b + (bid7b A 2 + 2 * bid7c) A 0.5) / (2 * bidla)
Else






If n >= 8 Then GoTo rowl5:
'Defining the winner and it's payoff
If bid 1 < bid2 And bidl < bid3 And bidl < bid4 And bidl < bid5 And bidl < bid6 And
bidl < bid7 Then







If bid2 < bidl And bid2 < bid3 And bid2 < bid4 And bid2 < bid5 And bid2 < bid6 And
bid2 < bid7 Then






If bid3 < bidl And bid3 < bid2 And bid3 < bid4 And bid3 < bid5 And bid3 < bid6 And
bid3 < bid7 Then






If bid4 < bidl And bid4 < bid2 And bid4 < bid3 And bid4 < bid5 And bid4 < bid6 And
bid4 < bid7 Then







If bid5 < bidl And bid5 < bid2 And bid5 < bid3 And bid5 < bid4 And bid5 < bid6 And
bid5 < bid7 Then





If bid6 < bidl And bid6 < bid2 And bid6 < bid3 And bid6 < bid4 And bid6 < bid5 And
bid6 < bid7 Then





















ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = " payoffB"
'computation of cost8
rand8 = Rnd()
If rand8 < ((m - k) / (h - k)) Then
cost8 = ((rand8 * (h - k) * (m - k)) A 0.5) + 1
Else








bid8b = n*k + (n- 1) * cost8
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bid8c = bidla * (h - k) * (m - k) - (k A 2) - (2 * cost8 * (n - 1) * k)
bid8 = (bid8b + (bid8b A 2 + 2 * bid8c) A 0.5) / (2 * bidla)
Else






If n >= 9 Then GoTo rowl6:
'Defining the winner and it's payoff
If bid 1 < bid2 And bidl < bid3 And bidl < bid4 And bidl < bid5 And bidl < bid6 And
bidl < bid7 And bidl < bid8 Then






If bid2 < bidl And bid2 < bid3 And bid2 < bid4 And bid2 < bid5 And bid2 < bid6 And
bid2 < bid7 And bid2 < bid8 Then







If bid3 < bidl And bid3 < bid2 And bid3 < bid4 And bid3 < bid5 And bid3 < bid6 And
bid3 < bid7 And bid3 < bid8 Then






If bid4 < bidl And bid4 < bid2 And bid4 < bid3 And bid4 < bid5 And bid4 < bid6 And
bid4 < bid7 And bid4 < bid8 Then






If bid5 < bidl And bid5 < bid2 And bid5 < bid3 And bid5 < bid4 And bid5 < bid6 And
bid5 < bid7 And bid5 < bid8 Then







If bid6 < bidl And bid6 < bid2 And bid6 < bid3 And bid6 < bid4 And bid6 < bid5 And
bid6 < bid7 And bid6 < bid8 Then






If bid7 < bidl And bid7 < bid2 And bid7 < bid3 And bid7 < bid4 And bid7 < bid5 And
bid7 < bid6 And bid7 < bid8 Then
















ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = " cost9"
Sheets("sheet3"). Select
Range( M i4").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = " bid9"
Sheets( Msheet4").Select
Range("i4").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = " payoff9"
'computation of cost9
rand9 = Rnd()
If rand9 < ((m - k) / (h - k)) Then
cost9 = ((rand9 * (h - k) * (m - k)) A 0.5) + 1
Else








If cost9 < m Then
bid9b = n*k + (n- 1) * cost9
bid9c = bidla * (h - k) * (m - k) - (k A 2) - (2 * cost9 * (n - 1) * k)
bid9 = (bid9b + (bid9b A 2 + 2 * bid9c) A 0.5) / (2 * bidla)
Else






If n >= 10 Then GoTo rowl7:
'Defining the winner and it's payoff
If bid 1 < bid2 And bidl < bid3 And bidl < bid4 And bidl < bid5 And bidl < bid6 And
bidl < bid7 And bidl < bid8 And bidl < bid9 Then







If bid2 < bidl And bid2 < bid3 And bid2 < bid4 And bid2 < bid5 And bid2 < bid6 And
bid2 < bid7 And bid2 < bid8 And bid2 < bid9 Then






If bid3 < bidl And bid3 < bid2 And bid3 < bid4 And bid3 < bid5 And bid3 < bid6 And
bid3 < bid7 And bid3 < bid8 And bid3 < bid9 Then






If bid4 < bidl And bid4 < bid2 And bid4 < bid3 And bid4 < bid5 And bid4 < bid6 And
bid4 < bid7 And bid4 < bid8 And bid4 < bid9 Then







If bid5 < bidl And bid5 < bid2 And bid5 < bid3 And bid5 < bid4 And bid5 < bid6 And
bid5 < bid7 And bid5 < bid8 And bid5 < bid9 Then






If bid6 < bidl And bid6 < bid2 And bid6 < bid3 And bid6 < bid4 And bid6 < bid5 And
bid6 < bid7 And bid6 < bid8 And bid6 < bid9 Then






If bid7 < bidl And bid7 < bid2 And bid7 < bid3 And bid7 < bid4 And bid7 < bid5 And
bid7 < bid6 And bid7 < bid8 And bid7 < bid9 Then







If bid8 < bidl And bid8 < bid2 And bid8 < bid3 And bid8 < bid4 And bid8 < bid5 And
bid8 < bid6 And bid8 < bid7 And bid8 < bid9 Then






















ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = " payofflO"
'computation of cost10
randlO = Rnd()
If rand 10 < ((m - k) / (h - k)) Then
costlO = ((randlO * (h - k) * (m - k)) A 0.5) + 1
Else






'computation of bid 10
If costlO <m Then
bidl0b = n*k + (n-l)* costlO
bidlOc = bidla * (h - k) * (m - k) - (k A 2) - (2 * costlO * (n - 1) * k)
bidlO = (bidlOb + (bidlOb A 2 + 2 * bidlOc) A 0.5) / (2 * bidla)
Else
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ActiveCell.Value = bid 10
If n >= 1 1 Then GoTo rowl8:
'Defining the winner and it's payoff
If bid 1 < bid2 And bidl < bid3 And bidl < bid4 And bidl < bid5 And bidl < bid6 And
bidl < bid7 And bidl < bid8 And bidl < bid9 And bidl < bidlO Then






If bid2 < bidl And bid2 < bid3 And bid2 < bid4 And bid2 < bid5 And bid2 < bid6 And
bid2 < bid7 And bid2 < bid8 And bid2 < bid9 And bid2 < bid 10 Then







If bid3 < bidl And bid3 < bid2 And bid3 < bid4 And bid3 < bid5 And bid3 < bid6 And
bid3 < bid7 And bid3 < bid8 And bid3 < bid9 And bid3 < bid 10 Then






If bid4 < bidl And bid4 < bid2 And bid4 < bid3 And bid4 < bid5 And bid4 < bid6 And
bid4 < bid7 And bid4 < bid8 And bid4 < bid9 And bid4 < bid 10 Then






If bid5 < bidl And bid5 < bid2 And bid5 < bid3 And bid5 < bid4 And bid5 < bid6 And
bid5 < bid7 And bid5 < bid8 And bid5 < bid9 And bid5 < bid 10 Then







If bid6 < bidl And bid6 < bid2 And bid6 < bid3 And bid6 < bid4 And bid6 < bid5 And
bid6 < bid7 And bid6 < bid8 And bid6 < bid9 And bid6 < bid 10 Then






If bid7 < bidl And bid7 < bid2 And bid7 < bid3 And bid7 < bid4 And bid7 < bid5 And
bid7 < bid6 And bid7 < bid8 And bid7 < bid9 And bid7 < bid 10 Then






If bid8 < bidl And bid8 < bid2 And bid8 < bid3 And bid8 < bid4 And bid8 < bid5 And
bid8 < bid6 And bid8 < bid7 And bid8 < bid9 And bid8 < bid 10 Then







If bid9 < bidl And bid9 < bid2 And bid9 < bid3 And bid9 < bid4 And bid9 < bid5 And
bid9 < bid6 And bid9 < bid7 And bid9 < bid8 And bid9 < bid 10 Then














ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = " costll"
Sheets("sheet3").Select
Range("k4").Select




ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "' payoffll"
'computation of cost 1
1
rand 11 = Rnd()
If rand 1 1< ((m - k) / (h - k)) Then
costl 1 = ((randl 1 * (h - k) * (m - k)) A 0.5) + 1
Else
costl 1 = h - ((1 - randl 1) * (h - k) * (h - m)) A 0.5
End If
'costl 1 to sheet2
Sheets("sheet2").Select
Range("k3"). Select
ActiveCell.Value = costl 1
'computation of bid 1
1
If cost 11 <m Then
bidllb = n*k + (n- 1) * costl 1
bidl lc = bidla * (h - k) * (m - k) - (k A 2) - (2 * costl 1 * (n - 1) * k)
bidl 1 = (bidl lb + (bidl lb A 2 + 2 * bidl lc) A 0.5) / (2 * bidla)
Else






ActiveCell.Value = bidl 1
If n >= 12 Then GoTo rowl9:
'Defining the winner and it's payoff
If bidl < bid2 And bidl < bid3 And bidl < bid4 And bidl < bid5 And bidl < bid6 And
bidl < bid7 And bidl < bid8 And bidl < bid9 And bidl < bidlO And bidl < bidl 1 Then






If bid2 < bidl And bid2 < bid3 And bid2 < bid4 And bid2 < bid5 And bid2 < bid6 And
bid2 < bid7 And bid2 < bid8 And bid2 < bid9 And bid2 < bid 10 And bid2 < bidl 1 Then







If bid3 < bidl And bid3 < bid2 And bid3 < bid4 And bid3 < bid5 And bid3 < bid6 And
bid3 < bid7 And bid3 < bid8 And bid3 < bid9 And bid3 < bid 10 And bid3 < bidl 1 Then






If bid4 < bidl And bid4 < bid2 And bid4 < bid3 And bid4 < bid5 And bid4 < bid6 And
bid4 < bid7 And bid4 < bid8 And bid4 < bid9 And bid4 < bid 10 And bid4 < bidl 1 Then






If bid5 < bidl And bid5 < bid2 And bid5 < bid3 And bid5 < bid4 And bid5 < bid6 And
bid5 < bid7 And bid5 < bid8 And bid5 < bid9 And bid5 < bidl And bid5 < bidl 1 Then







If bid6 < bidl And bid6 < bid2 And bid6 < bid3 And bid6 < bid4 And bid6 < bid5 And
bid6 < bid7 And bid6 < bid8 And bid6 < bid9 And bid6 < bid 10 And bid6 < bidl 1 Then






If bid7 < bidl And bid7 < bid2 And bid7 < bid3 And bid7 < bid4 And bid7 < bid5 And
bid7 < bid6 And bid7 < bid8 And bid7 < bid9 And bid7 < bid 10 And bid7 < bidl 1 Then






If bid8 < bidl And bid8 < bid2 And bid8 < bid3 And bid8 < bid4 And bid8 < bid5 And
bid8 < bid6 And bid8 < bid7 And bid8 < bid9 And bid8 < bid10 And bid8 < bidl 1 Then







If bid9 < bidl And bid9 < bid2 And bid9 < bid3 And bid9 < bid4 And bid9 < bid5 And
bid9 < bid6 And bid9 < bid7 And bid9 < bid8 And bid9 < bid 10 And bid9 < bidl 1 Then






If bidlO < bidl And bidlO < bid2 And bidlO < bid3 And bidlO < bid4 And bidlO < bid5








payoffl 1 = bidl 1 - costl 1
Sheets("sheet4").Select
Range("k3").Select











Sheets( Msheet4 ,, ). Select
Range("14").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = " payoffl2"
'computation of costl 2
randl2 = Rnd()
If randl2 < ((m - k) / (h - k)) Then
costl 2 = ((randl2 * (h - k) * (m - k)) A 0.5) + 1
Else





ActiveCell.Value = cost 12
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'computation of bid 12
If cost 12 <m Then
bidl2b = n*k + (n- l)*costl2
bidl2c = bidla * (h - k) * (m - k) - (k A 2) - (2 * costl2 * (n - 1) * k)
bidl2 = (bidl2b + (bidl2b A 2 + 2 * bidl2c) A 0.5) / (2 * bidla)
Else





ActiveCell.Value = bid 12
If n >= 13 Then GoTo row20:
'Defining the winner and it's payoff
If bid 1 < bid2 And bidl < bid3 And bidl < bid4 And bidl < bid5 And bidl < bid6 And
bidl < bid7 And bidl < bid8 And bidl < bid9 And bidl < bid 10 And bidl < bidl 1 And
bidl < bid 12 Then







If bid2 < bidl And bid2 < bid3 And bid2 < bid4 And bid2 < bid5 And bid2 < bid6 And
bid2 < bid7 And bid2 < bid8 And bid2 < bid9 And bid2 < bid 10 And bid2 < bidl 1 And
bid2<bidl2Then






If bid3 < bidl And bid3 < bid2 And bid3 < bid4 And bid3 < bid5 And bid3 < bid6 And
bid3 < bid7 And bid3 < bid8 And bid3 < bid9 And bid3 < bid 10 And bid3 < bidl 1 And
bid3<bidl2Then






If bid4 < bidl And bid4 < bid2 And bid4 < bid3 And bid4 < bid5 And bid4 < bid6 And
bid4 < bid7 And bid4 < bid8 And bid4 < bid9 And bid4 < bid 10 And bid4 < bidl 1 And
bid4<bidl2Then







If bid5 < bidl And bid5 < bid2 And bid5 < bid3 And bid5 < bid4 And bid5 < bid6 And
bid5 < bid7 And bid5 < bid8 And bid5 < bid9 And bid5 < bid 10 And bid5 < bidl 1 And
bid5<bidl2Then






If bid6 < bidl And bid6 < bid2 And bid6 < bid3 And bid6 < bid4 And bid6 < bid5 And
bid6 < bid7 And bid6 < bid8 And bid6 < bid9 And bid6 < bid 10 And bid6 < bidl 1 And
bid6<bidl2Then







If bid7 < bidl And bid7 < bid2 And bid7 < bid3 And bid7 < bid4 And bid7 < bid5 And
bid7 < bid6 And bid7 < bid8 And bid7 < bid9 And bid7 < bid 10 And bid7 < bidl 1 And
bid7<bidl2Then






If bid8 < bidl And bid8 < bid2 And bid8 < bid3 And bid8 < bid4 And bid8 < bid5 And
bid8 < bid6 And bid8 < bid7 And bid8 < bid9 And bid8 < bid 10 And bid8 < bidl 1 And
bid8<bidl2Then






If bid9 < bidl And bid9 < bid2 And bid9 < bid3 And bid9 < bid4 And bid9 < bid5 And
bid9 < bid6 And bid9 < bid7 And bid9 < bid8 And bid9 < bid 10 And bid9 < bidl 1 And
bid9<bidl2Then







If bidlO < bidl And bidlO < bid2 And bidlO < bid3 And bidlO < bid4 And bidlO < bid5
And bid 10 < bid6 And bidlO < bid7 And bid 10 < bid8 And bid 10 < bid9 And bidlO <







If bidl 1 < bidl And bidl 1 < bid2 And bidl 1 < bid3 And bidl 1 < bid4 And bidl 1 < bid5
And bidl 1 < bid6 And bidl 1 < bid7 And bidl 1 < bid8 And bidl 1 < bid9 And bidl 1 <
bidlO And bidl 1 < bidl2 Then
payoffl 1 = bidl 1 - costl 1
Sheets("sheet4"). Select
Range("k3 M ).Select
ActiveCell.Value = payoffl 1
GoTo row 100:
Else










ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = " costl3"
Sheets("sheet3").Select
Range(* ,m4 ,, ). Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = "• bidl3"
Sheets("sheet4").Select
Range("m4").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = " payoffB"
'computation of cost 1
3
randl3 = Rnd()
If rand 13 < ((m - k) / (h - k)) Then
costl3 = ((randl3 * (h - k) * (m - k)) A 0.5) + 1
Else







'computation of bid 13
If cost 13 < m Then
bidl3b = n*k + (n- 1) * costl3
bidl3c = bidla * (h - k) * (m - k) - (k A 2) - (2 * costl3 * (n - 1) * k)
bidl3 = (bidl3b + (bidl3b A 2 + 2 * bidl3c) A 0.5) / (2 * bidla)
Else






If n >= 14 Then GoTo row21:
'Defining the winner and it's payoff
If bid 1 < bid2 And bidl < bid3 And bidl < bid4 And bidl < bid5 And bidl < bid6 And
bidl < bid7 And bidl < bid8 And bidl < bid9 And bidl < bid 10 And bidl < bidl 1 And
bidl < bidl2 And bidl < bidl3 Then







If bid2 < bidl And bid2 < bid3 And bid2 < bid4 And bid2 < bid5 And bid2 < bid6 And
bid2 < bid7 And bid2 < bid8 And bid2 < bid9 And bid2 < bid 10 And bid2 < bidl 1 And
bid2 < bid 12 And bid2 < bid 13 Then






If bid3 < bidl And bid3 < bid2 And bid3 < bid4 And bid3 < bid5 And bid3 < bid6 And
bid3 < bid7 And bid3 < bid8 And bid3 < bid9 And bid3 < bid 10 And bid3 < bidl 1 And
bid3 < bidl2 And bid3 < bidl3 Then







If bid4 < bidl And bid4 < bid2 And bid4 < bid3 And bid4 < bid5 And bid4 < bid6 And
bid4 < bid7 And bid4 < bid8 And bid4 < bid9 And bid4 < bid 10 And bid4 < bidl 1 And
bid4 < bid 12 And bid4 < bid 13 Then






If bid5 < bidl And bid5 < bid2 And bid5 < bid3 And bid5 < bid4 And bid5 < bid6 And
bid5 < bid7 And bid5 < bid8 And bid5 < bid9 And bid5 < bid 10 And bid5 < bidl 1 And
bid5 < bid 12 And bid5 < bid 13 Then






If bid6 < bidl And bid6 < bid2 And bid6 < bid3 And bid6 < bid4 And bid6 < bid5 And
bid6 < bid7 And bid6 < bid8 And bid6 < bid9 And bid6 < bidlO And bid6 < bidl 1 And
bid6 < bid 12 And bid6 < bid 13 Then







If bid7 < bidl And bid7 < bid2 And bid7 < bid3 And bid7 < bid4 And bid7 < bid5 And
bid7 < bid6 And bid7 < bid8 And bid7 < bid9 And bid7 < bid 10 And bid7 < bidl 1 And
bid7 < bid 12 And bid7 < bid 13 Then






If bid8 < bidl And bid8 < bid2 And bid8 < bid3 And bid8 < bid4 And bid8 < bid5 And
bid8 < bid6 And bid8 < bid7 And bid8 < bid9 And bid8 < bid10 And bid8 < bidl 1 And
bid8 < bidl 2 And bid8 < bidl 3 Then







If bid9 < bidl And bid9 < bid2 And bid9 < bid3 And bid9 < bid4 And bid9 < bid5 And
bid9 < bid6 And bid9 < bid7 And bid9 < bid8 And bid9 < bid 10 And bid9 < bidl 1 And
bid9 < bid 12 And bid9 < bid 13 Then






If bidlO < bidl And bidlO < bid2 And bidlO < bid3 And bidlO < bid4 And bidlO < bid5
And bid 10 < bid6 And bid 10 < bid7 And bid 10 < bid8 And bid 10 < bid9 And bid 10 <
bidl 1 And bidlO < bidl2 And bidlO < bidl3 Then






If bidl 1 < bidl And bidl 1 < bid2 And bidl 1 < bid3 And bidl 1 < bid4 And bidl 1 < bid5
And bidl 1 < bid6 And bidl 1 < bid7 And bidl 1 < bid8 And bidl 1 < bid9 And bidl 1 <
bidlO And bidl 1 < bidl2 And bidl 1 < bidl3 Then




ActiveCell.Value = payoffl 1
GoTo row 100:
End If
If bid 12 < bidl And bid 12 < bid2 And bid 12 < bid3 And bid 12 < bid4 And bid 12 < bid5
And bidl 2 < bid6 And bidl 2 < bid7 And bidl 2 < bid8 And bidl 2 < bid9 And bidl 2 <
bidlO And bidl2 < bidl 1 And bidl2 < bidl 3 Then
payoffl 2 = bid 12 - cost 12
Sheets( Msheet4 M).Select
Range( M 13").Select
ActiveCell.Value = payoffl 2
GoTo row 100:
Else
payoffl 3 = bidl 3 - cost13
Sheets("sheet4").Select
Range("m3").Select












ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = " payoffl4"
'computation of cost 14
randl4 = Rnd()
If rand 14 < ((m - k) / (h - k)) Then
costH = ((randH * (h - k) * (m - k)) A 0.5) + 1
Else
costl4 = h - ((1 - randl4) * (h - k) * (h - m)) A 0.5
End If
'cost 14 to sheet2
Sheets("sheet2").Select
Range("n3").Select
ActiveCell.Value = cost 14
'computation of bid 1
4
If cost 14 <mThen
bidl4b = n * k + (n - 1) * costl4
bidl4c = bidla * (h - k) * (m - k) - (k A 2) - (2 * costl4 * (n - 1) * k)
bidl4 = (bidHb + (bidl4b A 2 + 2 * bidl4c) A 0.5) / (2 * bidla)
Else
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ActiveCell.Value = bid 14
If n >= 15 Then GoTo row22:
'Defining the winner and it's payoff
If bid 1 < bid2 And bidl < bid3 And bidl < bid4 And bidl < bid5 And bidl < bid6 And
bidl < bid7 And bidl < bid8 And bidl < bid9 And bidl < bid 10 And bidl < bidl 1 And
bidl < bidl2 And bidl < bidl3 And bidl < bidl4 Then






If bid2 < bidl And bid2 < bid3 And bid2 < bid4 And bid2 < bid5 And bid2 < bid6 And
bid2 < bid7 And bid2 < bid8 And bid2 < bid9 And bid2 < bid 10 And bid2 < bidl 1 And
bid2 < bidl2 And bid2 < bidl3 And bid2 < bidl4 Then







If bid3 < bidl And bid3 < bid2 And bid3 < bid4 And bid3 < bid5 And bid3 < bid6 And
bid3 < bid7 And bid3 < bid8 And bid3 < bid9 And bid3 < bid 10 And bid3 < bidl 1 And
bid3 < bid 12 And bid3 < bid 13 And bid3 < bid 14 Then






If bid4 < bidl And bid4 < bid2 And bid4 < bid3 And bid4 < bid5 And bid4 < bid6 And
bid4 < bid7 And bid4 < bid8 And bid4 < bid9 And bid4 < bid 10 And bid4 < bidl 1 And
bid4 < bid 12 And bid4 < bid 13 And bid4 < bid 14 Then






If bid5 < bidl And bid5 < bid2 And bid5 < bid3 And bid5 < bid4 And bid5 < bid6 And
bid5 < bid7 And bid5 < bid8 And bid5 < bid9 And bid5 < bid 10 And bid5 < bidl 1 And
bid5 < bid 12 And bid5 < bidl 3 And bid5 < bid 14 Then
196
payoff5 = bid5 - cost5





If bid6 < bidl And bid6 < bid2 And bid6 < bid3 And bid6 < bid4 And bid6 < bid5 And
bid6 < bid7 And bid6 < bid8 And bid6 < bid9 And bid6 < bid 10 And bid6 < bidl 1 And
bid6 < bid 12 And bid6 < bid 13 And bid6 < bid 14 Then






If bid7 < bidl And bid7 < bid2 And bid7 < bid3 And bid7 < bid4 And bid7 < bid5 And
bid7 < bid6 And bid7 < bid8 And bid7 < bid9 And bid7 < bid 10 And bid7 < bidl 1 And
bid7 < bidl2 And bid7 < bidl3 And bid7 < bidl4 Then







If bid8 < bidl And bid8 < bid2 And bid8 < bid3 And bid8 < bid4 And bid8 < bid5 And
bid8 < bid6 And bid8 < bid7 And bid8 < bid9 And bid8 < bid 10 And bid8 < bidl 1 And
bid8 < bid 12 And bid8 < bid 13 And bid8 < bid 14 Then






If bid9 < bidl And bid9 < bid2 And bid9 < bid3 And bid9 < bid4 And bid9 < bid5 And
bid9 < bid6 And bid9 < bid7 And bid9 < bid8 And bid9 < bid 10 And bid9 < bidl 1 And
bid9 < bid 12 And bid9 < bid 13 And bid9 < bid 14 Then






If bid 1 < bid 1 And bid 1 < bid2 And bid 1 < bid3 And bid 1 < bid4 And bid 1 < bid5
And bidlO < bid6 And bidlO < bid7 And bidlO < bid8 And bidlO < bid9 And bidlO <
bidl 1 And bidlO < bidl2 And bidlO < bidl3 And bidlO < bidl4 Then







If bidl 1< bidl And bidl 1 < bid2 And bidl 1 < bid3 And bidl 1 < bid4 And bidl 1 < bid5
And bidl 1< bid6 And bidl 1 < bid7 And bidl 1 < bid8 And bidl 1 < bid9 And bidl 1 <
bidlO And bidl 1 < bidl2 And bidl 1 < bidl 3 And bidl 1 < bidl4 Then
payoffl 1 = bidl 1 - costl 1
Sheets("sheet4").Select
Range("k3").Select
ActiveCell.Value = payoffl 1
GoTorowlOO:
End If
If bidl 2 < bidl And bidl2 < bid2 And bidl2 < bid3 And bidl2 < bid4 And bidl2 < bid5
And bidl2 < bid6 And bidl2 < bid7 And bidl2 < bid8 And bidl2 < bid9 And bidl2 <
bidlO And bidl2 < bidl 1 And bidl2 < bidl3 And bidl2 < bidl4 Then








If bid 1 3 < bid 1 And bid 1 3 < bid2 And bid 1 3 < bid3 And bid 1 3 < bid4 And bid 1 3 < bid5
And bid 13 < bid6 And bid 13 < bid7 And bid 13 < bid8 And bid 13 < bid9 And bid 13 <
bidlO And bidl3 < bidl 1 And bidl3 < bidl2 And bidl3 < bidl4 Then






















ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = " payoffl5"
'computation of cost 15
randl5 = Rnd()
If rand 15 < ((m - k) / (h - k)) Then
costl5 = ((randl5 * (h - k) * (m - k)) A 0.5) + 1
Else
costl5 = h - ((1 - randl5) * (h - k) * (h - m)) A 0.5
End If




'computation of bid 1
5
If cost 15 <mThen
bidl5b = n*k + (n-l)*costl5
bidl5c = bidla * (h - k) * (m - k) - (k A 2) - (2 * costl5 * (n - 1) * k)
bidl5 = (bidl5b + (bidl5b A 2 + 2 * bidl5c) A 0.5) / (2 * bidla)
Else






ActiveCell.Value = bid 15
If n >= 16 Then GoTo row23:
'Defining the winner and it's payoff
If bid 1 < bid2 And bidl < bid3 And bidl < bid4 And bidl < bid5 And bidl < bid6 And
bidl < bid7 And bidl < bid8 And bidl < bid9 And bidl < bid 10 And bidl < bidl 1 And
bidl < bidl2 And bidl < bidl3 And bidl < bidl4 And bidl < bidl5 Then






If bid2 < bidl And bid2 < bid3 And bid2 < bid4 And bid2 < bid5 And bid2 < bid6 And
bid2 < bid7 And bid2 < bid8 And bid2 < bid9 And bid2 < bid 10 And bid2 < bidl 1 And
bid2 < bid 12 And bid2 < bid 13 And bid2 < bid 14 And bid2 < bid 15 Then







If bid3 < bidl And bid3 < bid2 And bid3 < bid4 And bid3 < bid5 And bid3 < bid6 And
bid3 < bid7 And bid3 < bid8 And bid3 < bid9 And bid3 < bid 10 And bid3 < bidl 1 And
bid3 < bid 12 And bid3 < bid 13 And bid3 < bid 14 And bid3 < bidl 5 Then






If bid4 < bidl And bid4 < bid2 And bid4 < bid3 And bid4 < bid5 And bid4 < bid6 And
bid4 < bid7 And bid4 < bid8 And bid4 < bid9 And bid4 < bid 10 And bid4 < bidl 1 And
bid4 < bid 12 And bid4 < bid 13 And bid4 < bid 14 And bid4 < bid 15 Then






If bid5 < bidl And bid5 < bid2 And bid5 < bid3 And bid5 < bid4 And bid5 < bid6 And
bid5 < bid7 And bid5 < bid8 And bid5 < bid9 And bid5 < bid 10 And bid5 < bidl 1 And
bid5 < bidl2 And bid5 < bidl3 And bid5 < bidl4 And bid5 < bidl5 Then







If bid6 < bidl And bid6 < bid2 And bid6 < bid3 And bid6 < bid4 And bid6 < bid5 And
bid6 < bid7 And bid6 < bid8 And bid6 < bid9 And bid6 < bid 10 And bid6 < bidl 1 And
bid6 < bid 12 And bid6 < bid 13 And bid6 < bid 14 And bid6 < bid 15 Then






If bid7 < bidl And bid7 < bid2 And bid7 < bid3 And bid7 < bid4 And bid7 < bid5 And
bid7 < bid6 And bid7 < bid8 And bid7 < bid9 And bid7 < bid 10 And bid7 < bidl 1 And
bid7 < bid 12 And bid7 < bid 13 And bid7 < bid 14 And bid7 < bid 15 Then







If bid8 < bidl And bid8 < bid2 And bid8 < bid3 And bid8 < bid4 And bid8 < bid5 And
bid8 < bid6 And bid8 < bid7 And bid8 < bid9 And bid8 < bid 10 And bid8 < bidl 1 And
bid8 < bid 12 And bid8 < bid 13 And bid8 < bid 14 And bid8 < bid 15 Then






If bid9 < bidl And bid9 < bid2 And bid9 < bid3 And bid9 < bid4 And bid9 < bid5 And
bid9 < bid6 And bid9 < bid7 And bid9 < bid8 And bid9 < bidlO And bid9 < bidl 1 And
bid9 < bidl2 And bid9 < bidl3 And bid9 < bidl4 And bid9 < bidl5 Then






If bidlO < bidl And bidlO < bid2 And bidlO < bid3 And bidlO < bid4 And bidlO < bid5
And bidlO < bid6 And bidlO < bid7 And bidlO < bid8 And bidlO < bid9 And bidlO <








If bid 1 1< bidl And bidl 1< bid2 And bidl 1 < bid3 And bid 1 1 < bid4 And bidl 1< bid5
And bidl 1< bid6 And bidl 1< bid7 And bidl 1 < bid8 And bidl 1 < bid9 And bidl 1 <
bidlO And bidl 1 < bid 12 And bidl 1 < bidl 3 And bidl 1 < bidl4 And bidl 1 <bidl5Then
payoffl 1 = bidl 1 - costl 1
Sheets( Msheet4"). Select
Range("k3").Select
ActiveCell.Value = payoffl 1
GoTo row100:
End If
If bidl 2 < bidl And bidl2 < bid2 And bidl2 < bid3 And bidl2 < bid4 And bidl2 < bid5
And bidl 2 < bid6 And bidl 2 < bid7 And bidl 2 < bid8 And bidl 2 < bid9 And bidl 2 <
bidlO And bidl2 < bidl 1 And bidl2 < bidl3 And bidl2 < bidl4 And bidl2 < bidl5 Then
payoffl 2 = bid 12 - cost 12
Sheets("sheet4"). Select
Range( M 13").Select




If bid 1 3 < bid 1 And bid 1 3 < bid2 And bid 1 3 < bid3 And bid 1 3 < bid4 And bid 1 3 < bid5
And bid 1 3 < bid6 And bid 1 3 < bid7 And bid 1 3 < bid8 And bid 1 3 < bid9 And bid 1 3 <
bidlO And bidl3 < bidl 1 And bidl3 < bidl2 And bidl3 < bidl4 And bidl3 < bidl5 Then






If bidl4 < bidl And bidl4 < bid2 And bidl4 < bid3 And bidl4 < bid4 And bidl4 < bid5
And bidl4 < bid6 And bidl4 < bid7 And bidl4 < bid8 And bidl4 < bid9 And bidl4 <
bidlO And bidl4 < bidl 1 And bidl4 < bidl2 And bidl4 < bidl3 And bidl4 < bidl5 Then
















ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl =" costl6 M
Sheets("sheet3").Select
Range("p4").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = " bidl6"
Sheets("sheet4 n).Select
Range("p4").Select
ActiveCell.FormulaRlCl = " payoffl6"
'computation of cost 16
randl6 = Rnd()
If randl6 < ((m - k) / (h - k)) Then
costl6 = ((randl6 * (h - k) * (m - k)) A 0.5) + 1
Else
costl6 = h - ((1 - randl6) * (h - k) * (h - m)) A 0.5
End If
'cost 16 to sheet2
Sheets("sheet2").Select
Range("p3").Select
ActiveCell.Value = cost 16
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'computation of bid 16
If cost 16 <m Then
bidl6b = n*k + (n- 1) * costl6
bidl6c = bidla * (h - k) * (m - k) - (k A 2) - (2 * costl6 * (n - 1) * k)
bidl6 = (bidl6b + (bidl6b A 2 + 2 * bidl6c) A 0.5) / (2 * bidla)
Else





ActiveCell.Value = bid 16
'Defining the winner and it's payoff
If bidl < bid2 And bidl < bid3 And bidl < bid4 And bidl < bid5 And bidl < bid6 And
bidl < bid7 And bidl < bid8 And bidl < bid9 And bidl < bid 10 And bidl < bidl 1 And
bidl < bidl2 And bidl < bidl3 And bidl < bidl4 And bidl < bidl5 And bidl < bidl6
Then







If bid2 < bidl And bid2 < bid3 And bid2 < bid4 And bid2 < bid5 And bid2 < bid6 And
bid2 < bid7 And bid2 < bid8 And bid2 < bid9 And bid2 < bid 10 And bid2 < bidl 1 And
bid2 < bidl2 And bid2 < bidl3 And bid2 < bidl4 And bid2 < bidl5 And bid2 < bidl6
Then






If bid3 < bidl And bid3 < bid2 And bid3 < bid4 And bid3 < bid5 And bid3 < bid6 And
bid3 < bid7 And bid3 < bid8 And bid3 < bid9 And bid3 < bid 10 And bid3 < bidl 1 And
bid3 < bidl2 And bid3 < bidl3 And bid3 < bidl4 And bid3 < bidl5 And bid3 < bidl6
Then
payofB = bid3 - cost3





If bid4 < bidl And bid4 < bid2 And bid4 < bid3 And bid4 < bid5 And bid4 < bid6 And
bid4 < bid7 And bid4 < bid8 And bid4 < bid9 And bid4 < bid 10 And bid4 < bidl 1 And
bid4 < bid 12 And bid4 < bidl 3 And bid4 < bidl 4 And bid4 < bid 15 And bid4 < bid 16
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Then






If bid5 < bidl And bid5 < bid2 And bid5 < bid3 And bid5 < bid4 And bid5 < bid6 And
bid5 < bid7 And bid5 < bid8 And bid5 < bid9 And bid5 < bidl And bid5 < bidl 1 And
bid5 < bidl2 And bid5 < bidl3 Andbid5 < bidl4 And bid5 < bidl5 And bid5 < bidl6
Then






If bid6 < bidl And bid6 < bid2 And bid6 < bid3 And bid6 < bid4 And bid6 < bid5 And
bid6 < bid7 And bid6 < bid8 And bid6 < bid9 And bid6 < bid 10 And bid6 < bidl 1 And
bid6 < bid 1 2 And bid6 < bid 1 3 And bid6 < bid 1 4 And bid6 < bid 1 5 And bid6 < bid 1
6
Then







If bid7 < bidl And bid7 < bid2 And bid7 < bid3 And bid7 < bid4 And bid7 < bid5 And
bid7 < bid6 And bid7 < bid8 And bid7 < bid9 And bid7 < bid 10 And bid7 < bidl 1 And
bid7 < bid 12 And bid7 < bid 13 And bid7 < bid 14 And bid7 < bid 15 And bid7 < bid 16
Then






If bid8 < bidl And bid8 < bid2 And bid8 < bid3 And bid8 < bid4 And bid8 < bid5 And
bid8 < bid6 And bid8 < bid7 And bid8 < bid9 And bid8 < bid 10 And bid8 < bidl 1 And
bid8 < bid 12 And bid8 < bid 13 And bid8 < bid 14 And bid8 < bidl 5 And bid8 < bid 16
Then







If bid9 < bidl And bid9 < bid2 And bid9 < bid3 And bid9 < bid4 And bid9 < bid5 And
bid9 < bid6 And bid9 < bid7 And bid9 < bid8 And bid9 < bid 10 And bid9 < bidl 1 And
bid9 < bid 12 And bid9 < bid 13 And bid9 < bid 14 And bid9 < bid 15 And bid9 < bid 16
Then






If bidlO < bidl And bidlO < bid2 And bidlO < bid3 And bid 10 < bid4 And bidlO < bid5
And bid 10 < bid6 And bid 10 < bid7 And bid 10 < bid8 And bid 10 < bid9 And bid 10 <








If bidl 1 < bidl And bidl 1 < bid2 And bidl 1 < bid3 And bidl 1 < bid4 And bidl 1 < bid5
And bidl 1 < bid6 And bidl 1 < bid7 And bidl 1 < bid8 And bidl 1 < bid9 And bidl 1 <
213
bidlO And bidl 1 < bidl2 And bidl 1 < bidl3 And bidl 1 < bidl4 And bidl 1 < bidl5 And
bid 11 < bid 16 Then
payoffl 1 = bidl 1 - costl 1
Sheets("sheet4").Select
Range( nk3").Select
ActiveCell.Value = payoffl 1
GoTo row 100:
End If
If bidl 2 < bidl And bidl2 < bid2 And bidl2 < bid3 And bidl2 < bid4 And bidl2 < bid5
And bidl2 < bid6 And bidl2 < bid7 And bidl2 < bid8 And bidl2 < bid9 And bidl2 <
bidlO And bidl2 < bidl 1 And bidl2 < bidl3 And bidl2 < bidl4 And bidl2 < bidl5 And
bidl2<bidl6Then
payoffl 2 = bid 12 - cost 12
Sheets("sheet4 M ).Select
Range("13").Select
ActiveCell.Value = payoffl 2
GoTorowlOO:
End If
If bidl 3 < bidl And bidl 3 < bid2 And bidl 3 < bid3 And bidl 3 < bid4 And bidl 3 < bid5
And bidl 3 < bid6 And bidl 3 < bid7 And bidl 3 < bid8 And bidl 3 < bid9 And bidl 3 <
bidlO And bidl3 < bidl 1 And bidl3 < bidl2 And bidl3 < bidl4 And bidl3 < bidl5 And
bidl3<bidl6Then







If bid 14 < bidl And bid 14 < bid2 And bid 14 < bid3 And bid 14 < bid4 And bid 14 < bid5
And bidl 4 < bid6 And bidl 4 < bid7 And bidl 4 < bid8 And bid 14 < bid9 And bid 14 <
bidlO And bidl4 < bidl 1 And bidl4 < bidl2 And bidl4 < bidl3 And bidl4 < bidl5 And
bidl4<bidl6Then






If bidl 5 < bidl And bidl5 < bid2 And bidl5 < bid3 And bidl5 < bid4 And bidl5 < bid5
And bidl 5 < bid6 And bidl 5 < bid7 And bidl 5 < bid8 And bidl 5 < bid9 And bidl 5 <
bidlO And bidl5 < bidl 1 And bidl5 < bidl2 And bidl5 < bidl3 And bidl5 < bidl4 And
bidl5<bidl6Then
















































For I = 1 To 3 'loop 3 times.






RESULTS OF THE COMPUTER SIMULATIONS
A. UNIFORM COST DISTRIBUTION
1. Two-Bidder Bidding Game
Scenario 1 . Both bidders used equilibrium strategy.
#of
games
Expected Profit # ofGames Won Total Profit Ave. Exp. Profit
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2
100 0.34764 0.34379 44 56 15.2961 19.2524 0.15296 0.19252
200 0.3365 0.32693 92 108 30.9579 35.308 0.15479 0.17654
300 0.33524 0.3373 144 156 48.2748 52.6193 0.16092 0.1754
400 0.33433 0.33199 202 198 67.5337 65.7344 0.16883 0.16434
500 0.33716 0.33486 239 261 80.5803 87.3994 0.16116 0.1748
600 0.33828 0.33584 289 311 97.7642 104.447 0.16294 0.17408
700 0.33779 0.33627 334 366 112.823 123.077 0.16118 0.17582
800 0.33656 0.3337 385 415 129.575 138.486 0.16197 0.17311
900 0.33654 0.336 435 465 146.394 156.242 0.16266 0.1736
1000 0.33346 0.33578 480 520 160.061 174.604 0.16006 0.1746
1100 0.32966 0.33415 521 579 171.751 193.471 0.15614 0.17588
1200 0.33086 0.33339 576 624 190.578 208.036 0.15881 0.17336
1300 0.33128 0.33411 637 663 211.025 221.512 0.16233 0.17039
1400 0.33158 0.33237 682 718 226.135 238.644 0.16153 0.17046
1500 0.33274 0.33028 731 769 243.236 253.983 0.16216 0.16932
1600 0.33395 0.33071 780 820 260.48 271.182 0.1628 0.16949
1700 0.33452 0.3313 826 874 276.315 289.555 0.16254 0.17033
1800 0.33299 0.33111 872 928 290.369 307.267 0.16132 0.1707
1900 0.33349 0.33235 928 972 309.479 323.041 0.16288 0.17002
2000 0.33326 0.33288 982 1018 327.263 338.872 0.16363 0.16944
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Scenario 2. Bidderl underbid by 0.2 while bidder2 used equilibrium strategy.
#of
games
Expected Profit # of Games Won Total Profit Ave. Exp. Profit
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2
100 0.08862 0.38873 77 23 6.824 8.94082 0.06824 0.08941
200 0.08651 0.40146 159 41 13.7548 16.46 0.06877 0.0823
300 0.087 0.39823 239 61 20.792 24.2921 0.06931 0.08097
400 0.08602 0.39419 318 82 27.3553 32.3235 0.06839 0.08081
500 0.08643 0.39843 396 104 34.2254 41.4365 0.06845 0.08287
600 0.08903 0.39825 468 132 41.6643 52.5689 0.06944 0.08761
700 0.08518 0.39929 553 147 47.1067 58.6958 0.0673 0.08385
800 0.08239 0.40089 637 163 52.4801 65.3448 0.0656 0.08168
900 0.08197 0.40151 724 176 59.3467 70.6651 0.06594 0.07852
1000 0.08459 0.4002 807 193 68.2648 77.2383 0.06826 0.07724
1100 0.08464 0.39952 885 215 74.9079 85.8959 0.0681 0.07809
1200 0.08703 0.3999 971 229 84.5068 91.5763 0.07042 0.07631
1300 0.08366 0.39966 1052 248 88.0134 99.1149 0.0677 0.07624
1400 0.08614 0.40073 1139 261 98.114 104.59 0.07008 0.07471
1500 0.0856 0.40128 1221 279 104.514 111.956 0.06968 0.07464
Table2




Expected Profit # of Games Won Total Profit Ave. Exp. Profit
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2
100 0.2245 0.2025 50 50 11.227 10.126 0.1123 0.1013
200 0.2272 0.1958 98 102 22.263 19.971 0.1113 0.0999
300 0.2296 0.2018 148 152 33.981 30.68 0.1133 0.1023
400 0.2295 0.2168 190 210 43.604 45.53 0.109 0.1138
500 0.2319 0.2194 244 256 56.58 56.175 0.1132 0.1124
600 0.226 0.2202 299 301 67.579 66.281 0.1126 0.1105
700 0.2274 0.2215 350 350 79.593 77.532 0.1137 0.1108
800 0.2276 0.223 405 395 92.184 88.093 0.1152 0.1101
900 0.2297 0.2274 452 448 103.84 101.85 0.1154 0.1132
1000 0.2301 0.2277 501 499 115.28 113.64 0.1153 0.1136
1100 0.231 0.2308 546 554 126.12 127.86 0.1147 0.1162
1200 0.2299 0.2309 590 610 135.61 140.84 0.113 0.1174
1300 0.2318 0.233 640 660 148.35 153.79 0.1141 0.1183
1400 0.2302 0.2349 695 705 159.96 165.63 0.1143 0.1183
1500 0.2306 0.2316 742 758 171.08 175.54 0.1141 0.117
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2. Three-Bidder Bidding Game
Scenario 1 . All bidders used equilibrium strategy.
#of
games
Expected Profit Number of Games Won Total Profit Ave. Expected Profit
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3
100 0.2498 0.251 0.2405 37 23 40 9.2416 5.7734 9.6207 0.0924 0.0577 0.0962
200 0.251 0.2509 0.2536 70 55 75 17.568 13.798 19.018 0.0878 0.069 0.0951
300 0.2532 0.2517 0.2537 104 92 104 26.33 23.156 26.382 0.0878 0.0772 0.0879
400 0.2517 0.2509 0.2504 135 125 140 33.98 31.361 35.06 0.0849 0.0784 0.0876
500 0.2549 0.254 0.2459 164 156 180 41.81 39.63 44.266 0.0836 0.0793 0.0885
600 0.2558 0.2517 0.2465 196 185 219 50.13 46.572 53.98 0.0836 0.0776 0.09
700 0.2554 0.2488 0.2476 226 224 250 57.727 55.721 61.905 0.0825 0.0796 0.0884
800 0.2537 0.2488 0.2472 265 253 282 67.22 62.946 69.719 0.084 0.0787 0.0871
900 0.2539 0.249 0.2465 306 288 306 77.703 71.719 75.414 0.0863 0.0797 0.0838
1000 0.2533 0.249 0.2483 338 321 341 85.628 79.944 84.678 0.0856 0.0799 0.0847
1100 0.2541 0.2481 0.2492 372 355 373 94.537 88.082 92.951 0.0859 0.0801 0.0845
1200 0.2541 0.2485 0.2485 412 383 405 104.68 95.189 100.66 0.0872 0.0793 0.0839
1300 0.252 0.2492 0.2498 451 413 436 113.67 102.91 108.93 0.0874 0.0792 0.0838
1400 0.2519 0.2501 0.2494 490 449 461 123.44 112.32 114.97 0.0882 0.0802 0.0821
1500 0.2513 0.2498 0.2499 524 486 490 131.7 121.42 122.45 0.0878 0.0809 0.0816
1600 0.2514 0.2482 0.2507 557 519 524 140.05 128.81 131.39 0.0875 0.0805 0.0821
1700 0.2515 0.2487 0.2501 582 562 556 146.39 139.76 139.06 0.0861 0.0822 0.0818
1800 0.251 0.2493 0.251 612 597 591 153.6 148.85 148.36 0.0853 0.0827 0.0824
1900 0.2501 0.25 0.2514 643 623 634 160.82 155.77 159.37 0.0846 0.082 0.0839
2000 0.25 0.2494 0.2513 683 652 665 170.72 162.6 167.13 0.0854 0.0813 0.0836
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Scenario 2. Bidder 1 underbid by 0.1 while others used equilibrium strategy.
#of
games
Expected Profit Number of Games Won Total Profit Average Expected Profit
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3
100 0.1293 0.2497 0.2543 42 26 32 5.4323 6.4931 8.1382 0.0543 0.0649 0.0814
200 0.1261 0.249 0.2563 89 57 54 1 1 .222 14.193 13.839 0.0561 0.071 0.0692
300 0.1293 0.2494 0.2545 128 90 82 16.546 22.446 20.867 0.0552 0.0748 0.0696
400 0.1319 0.2519 0.2542 172 116 112 22.694 29.216 28.47 0.0567 0.073 0.0712
500 0.1311 0.2512 0.2537 213 149 138 27.914 37.433 35.004 0.0558 0.0749 0.07
600 0.1318 0.2512 0.2553 260 175 165 34.275 43.959 42.12 0.0571 0.0733 0.0702
700 0.1307 0.2507 0.2584 302 201 197 39.477 50.383 50.914 0.0564 0.072 0.0727
800 0.1301 0.2501 0.2579 352 228 220 45.786 57.023 56.729 0.0572 0.0713 0.0709
900 0.1307 0.254 0.2586 402 256 242 52.557 65.016 62.585 0.0584 0.0722 0.0695
1000 0.1292 0.2565 0.2588 439 285 276 56.707 73.111 71.431 0.0567 0.0731 0.0714
1100 0.1302 0.2579 0.2598 492 307 301 64.076 79.169 78.189 0.0583 0.072 0.0711
1200 0.1278 0.2572 0.2586 544 331 325 69.55 85.141 84.057 0.058 0.071 0.07
1300 0.1294 0.2568 0.2589 583 363 354 75.466 93.212 91.633 0.0581 0.0717 0.0705
1400 0.1296 0.2559 0.2584 632 386 382 81.933 98.773 98.723 0.0585 0.0706 0.0705
1500 0.1302 0.2578 0.2595 680 412 408 88.502 106.2 105.87 0.059 0.0708 0.0706
Table 5
Scenario 3. Bidders "1" and "2" underbid by 0.1 and 0.15 respectively, while
others used equilibrium strategy.
#of
games
Expected Profit Number of Games Won Total Profit Average Expected Profit
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3
100 0.1208 0.0815 0.2891 32 51 17 3.8649 4.1544 4.9149 0.0386 0.0415 0.0491
200 0.141 0.0976 0.2812 72 92 36 10.151 8.9808 10.124 0.0508 0.0449 0.0506
300 0.1425 0.0953 0.2715 112 134 54 15.962 12.774 14.659 0.0532 0.0426 0.0489
400 0.1435 0.0925 0.2671 149 185 66 21.381 17.106 17.63 0.0535 0.0428 0.0441
500 0.1457 0.092 0.2652 184 232 84 26.8 21.35 22.273 0.0536 0.0427 0.0445
600 0.1463 0.0912 0.2656 218 284 98 31.892 25.888 26.029 0.0532 0.0431 0.0434
700 0.1438 0.0904 0.2689 260 319 121 37.38 28.827 32.535 0.0534 0.0412 0.0465
800 0.1445 0.0894 0.2654 295 361 144 42.628 32.269 38.212 0.0533 0.0403 0.0478
900 0.1437 0.0898 0.2643 333 404 163 47.861 36.282 43.083 0.0532 0.0403 0.0479
1000 0.144 0.0893 0.2634 369 457 174 53.121 40.823 45.84 0.0531 0.0408 0.0458
1100 0.1447 0.0882 0.2643 402 510 188 58.189 44.973 49.68 0.0529 0.0409 0.0452
1200 0.1456 0.087 0.2656 441 555 204 64.193 48.277 54.175 0.0535 0.0402 0.0451
1300 0.1456 0.0875 0.2641 476 600 224 69.319 52.518 59.157 0.0533 0.0404 0.0455
1400 0.1444 0.0866 0.2637 508 649 243 73.347 56.211 64.072 0.0524 0.0402 0.0458
1500 0.1441 0.0857 0.2645 541 703 256 77.961 60.255 67.722 0.052 0.0402 0.0451
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3. Five-Bidder Bidding Game
Scenario 1 . All bidders used equilibrium strategy.
#of
games
Expected Profit Number of Games Won
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidders Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5
100 0.16454 0.16666 0.16219 0.16679 0.14863 23 24 18 20 15
200 0.16428 0.16866 0.16528 0.16976 0.16478 42 44 29 44 41
300 0.16326 0.16577 0.16625 0.16859 0.16719 60 71 48 69 52
400 0.16242 0.16581 0.16628 0.17011 0.16849 78 95 63 92 72
500 0.16003 0.16653 0.16856 0.17027 0.16734 94 114 91 108 93
600 0.16297 0.16639 0.16682 0.16953 0.16519 116 134 109 128 113
700 0.16416 0.16618 0.16642 0.16798 0.16598 131 157 123 156 133
800 0.16533 0.16724 0.16768 0.16829 0.16704 142 176 143 179 160
900 0.16544 0.16813 0.16729 0.16763 0.16794 155 202 167 198 178
1000 0.16481 0.16728 0.16799 0.16717 0.16784 181 220 186 219 194
1100 0.16429 0.16714 0.1677 0.16772 0.16637 202 237 205 239 217
1200 0.16452 0.16698 0.1681 0.16658 0.16665 222 254 229 259 236
1300 0.16376 0.16536 0.16885 0.16611 0.16682 239 277 249 277 258
1400 0.16377 0.16549 0.1686 0.16555 0.16746 257 296 275 290 282




Total Profit Average Expected Profit
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5
100 3.78435 3.99975 2.91939 3.33584 2.22947 0.03784 0.04 0.02919 0.03336 0.02229
200 6.8999 7.42123 4.79326 7.46951 6.75599 0.0345 0.03711 0.02397 0.03735 0.03378
300 9.79589 11.7695 7.98008 11.633 8.69383 0.03265 0.03923 0.0266 0.03878 0.02898
400 12.6686 15.7516 10.4759 15.6505 12.1314 0.03167 0.03938 0.02619 0.03913 0.03033
500 15.0424 18.9843 15.3387 18.3891 15.5623 0.03008 0.03797 0.03068 0.03678 0.03112
600 18.9044 22.2961 18.1839 21.6998 18.6661 0.03151 0.03716 0.03031 0.03617 0.03111
700 21.5047 26.0895 20.4691 26.2051 22.0758 0.03072 0.03727 0.02924 0.03744 0.03154
800 23.4768 29.4339 23.978 30.1234 26.7261 0.02935 0.03679 0.02997 0.03765 0.03341
900 25.6432 33.9621 27.9375 33.1909 29.8928 0.02849 0.03774 0.03104 0.03688 0.03321
1000 29.8303 36.8021 31.2462 36.6109 32.5607 0.02983 0.0368 0.03125 0.03661 0.03256
1100 33.1857 39.6125 34.379 40.0854 36.1022 0.03017 0.03601 0.03125 0.03644 0.03282
1200 36.523 42.4118 38.4945 43.1446 39.3303 0.03044 0.03534 0.03208 0.03595 0.03278
1300 39.1395 45.8051 42.0424 46.0134 43.039 0.03011 0.03523 0.03234 0.03539 0.03311
1400 42.0897 48.9861 46.3654 48.009 47.2229 0.03006 0.03499 0.03312 0.03429 0.03373
1500 45.383 51.889 49.4582 51.3496 51.3498 0.03026 0.03459 0.03297 0.03423 0.03423
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Scenario 2. Bidderl underbid by 0.09 while others used equilibrium strategy.
#of
games
Expected Profit Number of Games Won
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5
100 0.06662 0.17163 0.17003 0.17628 0.16915 28 24 9 24 15
200 0.06989 0.17244 0.16765 0.17623 0.17016 60 43 35 38 24
300 0.07082 0.17034 0.16696 0.17415 0.16936 103 56 47 54 40
400 0.07035 0.16842 0.16934 0.17014 0.16941 131 68 62 81 58
500 0.07073 0.16872 0.16992 0.16733 0.16788 159 93 79 100 69
600 0.07168 0.16837 0.16862 0.16918 0.16675 194 107 98 116 85
700 0.07025 0.16775 0.16787 0.16809 0.16647 226 122 112 137 103
800 0.07072 0.16788 0.16867 0.16895 0.16595 249 141 132 154 124
900 0.07063 0.168J2 0.1685 0.16932 0.16621 281 161 146 171 141
1000 0.07025 0.16908 0.16885 0.16975 0.16656 309 181 162 192 156
1100 0.07056 0.16932 0.16916 0.16919 0.16647 jj-> 201 175 216 175
1200 0.07043 0.16962 0.16974 0.16872 0.16617 359 219 189 242 191
1300 0.07031 0.16934 0.1697 0.16821 0.16634 390 235 206 256 213
1400 0.07078 0.16962 0.16917 0.16864 0.16708 416 251 232 275 226




Total Profit Average Expected Profit
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidders Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5
100 1.86533 4.11905 1.5303 4.23083 2.53728 0.01865 0.04119 0.0153 0.0423
1
0.02537
200 4.19321 7.415 5.86764 6.69662 4.08382 0.02097 0.03708 0.02934 0.03348 0.02042
300 7.29441 9.53898 7.84725 9.4039 6.77447 0.02431 0.0318 0.02616 0.03135 0.02258
400 9.21626 11.4524 10.4992 13.7811 9.82578 0.02304 0.02863 0.02625 0.03445 0.02456
500 11.2464 15.6913 13.4236 16.7329 11.5839 0.02249 0.03138 0.02685 0.03347 0.02317
600 13.9068 18.0155 16.525 19.6243 14.1736 0.02318 0.03003 0.02754 0.03271 0.02362
700 15.8768 20.4652 18.8009 23.029 17.1465 0.02268 0.02924 0.02686 0.0329 0.02449
800 17.6103 23.6715 22.2644 26.0181 20.5779 0.02201 0.02959 0.02783 0.03252 0.02572
900 19.8471 27.0666 24.6006 28.9534 23.4349 0.02205 0.03007 0.02733 0.03217 0.02604
1000 21.7079 30.6035 27.3544 32.5928 25.9828 0.02171 0.0306 0.02735 0.03259 0.02598
1100 23.4981 34.0336 29.6034 36.5454 29.1322 0.02136 0.03094 0.02691 0.03322 0.02648
1200 25.2851 37.1476 32.0818 40.8302 31.7392 0.02107 0.03096 0.02673 0.03403 0.02645
1300 27.4214 39.7955 34.9583 43.0621 35.43 0.02109 0.03061 0.02689 0.03312 0.02725
1400 29.4465 42.5757 39.2472 46.3758 37.7599 0.02103 0.03041 0.02803 0.03313 0.02697
1500 31.3722 46.2656 42.152 49.2516 40.4257 0.02091 0.03084 0.0281 0.03283 0.02695
Table 10
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Expected Profit Number of Games Won
Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5
100 0.0401 0.0465 0.1724 0.1725 0.1584 33 31 14 13 9
200 0.0379 0.0416 0.1713 0.1719 0.1691 69 63 27 26 15
300 0.0392 0.0424 0.1743 0.1675 0.1695 103 93 45 38 21
400 0.0361 0.0409 0.1715 0.167 0.1704 133 123 60 50 34
500 0.0347 0.0412 0.1721 0.168 0.1668 164 147 76 66 47
600 0.0359 0.0405 0.1727 0.1691 0.1688 194 174 89 84 59
700 0.0359 0.0413 0.1727 0.1695 0.1675 222 198 102 100 78
800 0.0362 0.0402 0.1719 0.1677 0.1684 254 224 116 112 94
900 0.0377 0.0407 0.1726 0.1668 0.1693 280 259 132 126 103
1000 0.0382 0.0409 0.1735 0.1659 0.1692 312 282 149 142 115
1100 0.0386 0.0414 0.1737 0.1667 0.1696 339 315 159 155 132
1200 0.0382 0.0405 0.1734 0.1668 0.1695 365 348 175 171 141
1300 0.0377 0.0405 0.1739 0.1668 0.1695 390 378 186 191 155
1400 0.0374 0.0408 0.174 0.1672 0.1705 416 404 195 206 179





Total Profit Average Expected Profit
Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5
100 1.3238 1.4415 2.4138 2.2427 1.426 0.0132 0.0144 0.0241 0.0224 0.0143
200 2.617 2.6196 4.6238 4.4683 2.5366 0.0131 0.0131 0.0231 0.0223 0.0127
300 4.0397 3.943 7.8443 6.3651 3.5598 0.0135 0.0131 0.0261 0.0212 0.0119
400 4.7984 5.0304 10.289 8.3486 5.7927 0.012 0.0126 0.0257 0.0209 0.0145
500 5.6849 6.0596 13.08 11.086 7.8381 0.0114 0.0121 0.0262 0.0222 0.0157
600 6.9729 7.0388 15.372 14.205 9.96 0.0116 0.0117 0.0256 0.0237 0.0166
700 7.9641 8.1723 17.619 16.945 13.062 0.0114 0.0117 0.0252 0.0242 0.0187
800 9.1951 8.9943 19.939 18.781 15.834 0.0115 0.0112 0.0249 0.0235 0.0198
900 10.543 10.552 22.78 21.021 17.438 0.0117 0.0117 0.0253 0.0234 0.0194
1000 11.928 11.535 25.846 23.552 19.452 0.0119 0.0115 0.0258 0.0236 0.0195
1100 13.089 13.04 27.614 25.843 22.39 0.0119 0.0119 0.0251 0.0235 0.0204
1200 13.945 14.103 30.352 28.516 23.898 0.0116 0.0118 0.0253 0.0238 0.0199
1300 14.705 15.319 32.348 31.851 26.28 0.0113 0.0118 0.0249 0.0245 0.0202
1400 15.56 16.483 33.92 34.439 30.528 0.0111 0.0118 0.0242 0.0246 0.0218
1500 16.992 17.737 36.004 36.711 32.21 0.0113 0.0118 0.024 0.0245 0.0215
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Expected Profit Number of Games Won
Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 BidderS
100 0.03643 0.05744 0.16193 0.17741 0.17095 27 26 12 15 20
200 0.03835 0.05811 0.15915 0.17442 0.17133 67 52 23 28 30
300 0.03658 0.05538 0.16932 0.17086 0.16876 100 73 40 40 47
400 0.03551 0.05884 0.16984 0.17093 0.17146 126 102 55 56 61
500 0.037 0.05921 0.17139 0.16949 0.16925 162 126 71 66 75
600 0.03765 0.05914 0.16879 0.17093 0.16926 192 151 86 82 89
700 0.03853 0.05805 0.16947 0.1708 0.1674 222 175 96 100 107
800 0.03876 0.05844 0.16828 0.17028 0.16738 254 206 108 112 120
900 0.03837 0.05973 0.1689 0.17135 0.16791 286 233 123 125 133
1000 0.03819 0.06077 0.16959 0.17109 0.16783 312 263 143 137 145
1100 0.03838 0.06081 0.16839 0.17055 0.16755 336 293 158 156 157
1200 0.03836 0.06074 0.16743 0.16996 0.16707 364 329 170 166 171
1300 0.03828 0.06148 0.16815 0.17076 0.1684 389 360 183 181 187
1400 0.03794 0.06174 0.16842 0.17058 0.1691 420 388 198 193 201




Total Profit Average Expected Profit
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5
100 0.98357 1.49353 1.94317 2.66117 3.41902 0.00984 0.01494 0.01943 0.02661 0.03419
200 2.56972 3.02163 3.66044 4.88385 5.13989 0.01285 0.01511 0.0183 0.02442 0.0257
300 3.65787 4.04251 6.77262 6.83429 7.93155 0.01219 0.01348 0.02258 0.02278 0.02644
400 4.47372 6.00132 9.34147 9.57231 10.4589 0.01118 0.015 0.02335 0.02393 0.02615
500 5.99464 7.46092 12.1687 11.1864 12.6938 0.01199 0.01492 0.02434 0.02237 0.02539
600 7.22792 8.93027 14.5162 14.0162 15.0637 0.01205 0.01488 0.02419 0.02336 0.02511
700 8.55258 10.1589 16.2691 17.0796 17.9118 0.01222 0.01451 0.02324 0.0244 0.02559
800 9.84624 12.0397 18.1744 19.0711 20.0857 0.01231 0.01505 0.02272 0.02384 0.02511
900 10.9743 13.9162 20.7746 21.4188 22.3324 0.01219 0.01546 0.02308 0.0238 0.02481
1000 11.9163 15.9819 24.251 23.439 24.335 0.01192 0.01598 0.02425 0.02344 0.02434
1100 12.894 17.8186 26.6053 26.6054 26.3049 0.01172 0.0162 0.02419 0.02419 0.02391
1200 13.964 19.9833 28.4625 28.2132 28.5691 0.01164 0.01665 0.02372 0.02351 0.02381
1300 14.8911 22.1316 30.7718 30.9067 31.4907 0.01145 0.01702 0.02367 0.02377 0.02422
1400 15.9334 23.9558 33.3479 32.9222 33.9893 0.01138 0.01711 0.02382 0.02352 0.02428
1500 16.9386 25.4564 35.57 35.5231 36.8405 0.01129 0.01697 0.02371 0.02368 0.02456
Table 14
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4. Ten-Bidder Bidding Game




Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 BidderlO
100 0.09112 0.09513 0.09277 0.08994 0.09006 0.09359 0.09605 0.08883 0.09575 0.09416
200 0.09293 0.09383 0.09253 0.08893 0.08917 0.09301 0.09231 0.0906 0.09409 0.09204
300 0.09073 0.09231 0.09183 0.09026 0.09108 0.09319 0.09291 0.08972 0.09291 0.09213
400 0.09113 0.09248 0.09146 0.0912 0.09054 0.09162 0.09195 0.09003 0.09274 0.09095
500 0.09044 0.0911 0.09131 0.09097 0.09059 0.09203 0.09134 0.09072 0.09238 0.09069
600 0.0903
1
0.091 0.09096 0.09122 0.09134 0.09126 0.09172 0.09106 0.09246 0.09055
700 0.09064 0.09087 0.09094 0.09137 0.09112 0.09169 0.09185 0.09104 0.09196 0.08951
800 0.09087 0.08979 0.09078 0.09138 0.0908 0.09167 0.09219 0.09123 0.09209 0.08976
900 0.09029 0.09 0.09076 0.09113 0.09112 0.09112 0.09196 0.09171 0.09178 0.08987
1000 0.09053 0.09067 0.09086 0.09085 0.09075 0.09142 0.09207 0.09149 0.0918 0.09006
1100 0.09063 0.09107 0.091 0.091 0.09098 0.091 0.09228 0.09176 0.09185 0.09006
1200 0.0908 0.0906 0.09101 0.09054 0.09089 0.09087 0.09198 0.09151 0.0916 0.0904
1300 0.09109 0.09057 0.09092 0.09065 0.09045 0.09077 0.092 0.09169 0.0915 0.09062
1400 0.09062 0.09083 0.09073 0.09086 0.09036 0.09075 0.09192 0.09169 0.09138 0.09093




Number of Games Won
Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 BidderlO
100 4 7 15 13 10 12 12 9 9 9
200 20 18 33 18 15 21 23 20 18 14
300 26 28 44 29 23 31 38 25 32 24
400 39 36 50 35 31 46 50 40 41 32
500 49 46 53 45 36 58 62 59 53 39
600 58 52 64 57 47 68 72 67 63 52
700 65 60 76 71 53 78 80 78 77 62
800 74 68 90 79 59 88 90 89 89 74
900 83 75 104 92 66 100 102 99 99 80
1000 100 86 112 98 79 111 110 107 105 92
1100 108 100 117 106 90 124 115 121 118 101
1200 118 112 123 124 105 132 126 125 126 109
1300 128 121 134 130 117 145 138 136 135 116
1400 138 136 143 141 127 151 147 144 146 127






Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 Bidder 10
100 0.36447 0.66594 1.39152 1.16916 0.90062 1.12302 1.15263 0.79944 0.86173 0.84748
200 1.85865 1.68889 3.05351 1.60077 1.33759 1.95321 2.12315 1.81191 1.69357 1.28859
300 2.359 2.58456 4.04047 2.6176 2.09487 2.889 3.53074 2.24301 2.97322 2.21122
400 3.55404 3.32931 4.57305 3.19207 2.80681 4.21455 4.59773 3.60111 3.80216 2.91044
500 4.43143 4.1904 4.83954 4.09343 3.26114 5.33768 5.66285 5.35238 4.89608 3.53674
600 5.23824 4.73194 5.82116 5.19937 4.29282 6.20598 6.60383 6.1012 5.82523 4.70863
700 5.89172 5.45218 6.91164 6.48759 4.82919 7.1518 7.34794 7.10141 7.08082 5.54992
800 6.72469 6.10603 8.17038 7.21896 5.35732 8.06681 8.29743 8.11988 8.19575 6.64225
900 7.49384 6.74991 9.43952 8.3841 6.01359 9.11161 9.38034 9.07973 9.08594 7.18936
1000 9.05273 7.79752 10.1761 8.90353 7.16935 10.1471 10.1281 9.78926 9.63874 8.28518
1100 9.78817 9.10718 10.6469 9.64636 8.18797 11.2845 10.6117 11.1035 10.8383 9.09649
1200 10.7149 10.1476 11.1938 11.2271 9.5439 11.9948 11.5901 11.439 11.5421 9.85373
1300 11.6596 10.9591 12.1827 11.7844 10.5822 13.1619 12.696 12.4697 12.3525 10.5117
1400 12.5058 12.3523 12.9742 12.8115 11.4753 13.7026 13.5125 13.2031 13.3417 11.5482





Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidders Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 Bidder 10
100 0.00364 0.00666 0.01392 0.01169 0.00901 0.01123 0.01153 0.00799 0.00862 0.00847
200 0.00929 0.00844 0.01527 0.008 0.00669 0.00977 0.01062 0.00906 0.00847 0.00644
300 0.00786 0.00862 0.01347 0.00873 0.00698 0.00963 0.01177 0.00748 0.00991 0.00737
400 0.00889 0.00832 0.01143 0.00798 0.00702 0.01054 0.01149 0.009 0.00951 0.00728
500 0.00886 0.00838 0.00968 0.00819 0.00652 0.01068 0.01133 0.0107 0.00979 0.00707
600 0.00873 0.00789 0.0097 0.00867 0.00715 0.01034 0.01101 0.01017 0.00971 0.00785
700 0.00842 0.00779 0.00987 0.00927 0.0069 0.01022 0.0105 0.01014 0.01012 0.00793
800 0.00841 0.00763 0.01021 0.00902 0.0067 0.01008 0.01037 0.01015 0.01024 0.0083
900 0.00833 0.0075 0.01049 0.00932 0.00668 0.01012 0.01042 0.01009 0.0101 0.00799
1000 0.00905 0.0078 0.01018 0.0089 0.00717 0.01015 0.01013 0.00979 0.00964 0.00829
1100 0.0089 0.00828 0.00968 0.00877 0.00744 0.01026 0.00965 0.01009 0.00985 0.00827
1200 0.00893 0.00846 0.00933 0.00936 0.00795 0.01 0.00966 0.00953 0.00962 0.00821
1300 0.00897 0.00843 0.00937 0.00906 0.00814 0.01012 0.00977 0.00959 0.0095 0.00809
1400 0.00893 0.00882 0.00927 0.00915 0.0082 0.00979 0.00965 0.00943 0.00953 0.00825
1500 0.00883 0.00885 0.00913 0.00889 0.00841 0.00983 0.00962 0.0095 0.00951 0.00843
Table 18
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Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 BidderlO
100 0.00514 0.09302 0.09079 0.08799 0.08817 0.09169 0.09593 0.09138 0.09197 0.09342
200 0.00556 0.09198 0.0918 0.08977 0.09045 0.09098 0.09227 0.09086 0.09054 0.09195
300 0.00626 0.0922 0.09096 0.09052 0.09039 0.09062 0.09317 0.09185 0.09212 0.09238
400 0.00646 0.09209 0.08904 0.0908 0.09035 0.09163 0.09308 0.09202 0.09194 0.09299
500 0.00691 0.0918 0.08943 0.08893 0.09127 0.09159 0.09222 0.09158 0.09157 0.09238
600 0.00679 0.09056 0.08903 0.08979 0.09046 0.09199 0.09158 0.09116 0.09181 0.09199
700 0.00669 0.09045 0.08957 0.09026 0.09115 0.09132 0.09133 0.09111 0.0913 0.09234
800 0.0066 0.0909 0.08945 0.0897 0.09075 0.09107 0.09126 0.09113 0.09191 0.09232
900 0.00631 0.09131 0.08964 0.08976 0.09122 0.09098 0.09108 0.09073 0.09185 0.0921
1000 0.0061 0.09141 0.08971 0.09028 0.09134 0.09065 0.09115 0.09087 0.09189 0.09166
1100 0.00613 0.09149 0.08945 0.09 0.09128 0.0911 0.09117 0.09083 0.09194 0.09138
1200 0.00585 0.09163 0.08972 0.08994 0.09123 0.09123 0.09147 0.09087 0.0916 0.09148
1300 0.00573 0.09173 0.08947 0.09007 0.09125 0.091 0.09143 0.09095 0.09159 0.09146
1400 0.0057 0.09175 0.08909 0.0903 0.09145 0.09108 0.09131 0.09108 0.0918 0.09147




Number of Games Won
Bidder
1
Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidders Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 BidderlO
100 16 6 14 12 8 8 5 16 8 7
200 39 20 18 16 15 18 19 21 13 21
300 67 27 23 23 30 23 27 27 24 29
400 89 33 31 29 39 35 36 35 36 37
500 107 41 44 40 46 45 47 44 41 45
600 127 54 52 47 58 48 54 54 50 56
700 144 66 64 55 67 58 61 58 62 65
800 164 76 69 68 76 65 72 64 74 72
900 184 88 77 79 82 77 80 71 84 78
1000 201 99 84 89 88 86 88 84 90 91
1100 218 106 92 100 99 95 97 93 98 102
1200 241 114 105 107 105 104 106 96 107 115
1300 263 120 117 114 114 115 113 108 118 118
1400 280 133 125 122 124 121 121 118 131 125






Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 Bidderl
100 0.08227 0.55815 1.27104 1.05591 0.70533 0.73352 0.47967 1 .46209 0.73574 0.65395
200 0.2168 1.83969 1.65233 1.43626 1.35675 1.63769 1.7532 1.90813 1.177 1.93085
300 0.41948 2.48947 2.09202 2.08201 2.71156 2.08419 2.51553 2.48002 2.21092 2.67904
400 0.57537 3.03899 2.76039 2.63334 3.52349 3.20692 3.35073 3.22073 3.30999 3.44077
500 0.7399 3.76385 3.93479 3.55736 4.19862 4.1216 4.33455 4.02967 3.75436 4.15711
600 0.86196 4.89001 4.62954 4.22018 5.24678 4.41557 4.94537 4.92287 4.59046 5.15165
700 0.96295 5.96987 5.73229 4.96409 6.10724 5.29641 5.57137 5.28447 5.66082 6.00224
800 1.08181 6.90815 6.17194 6.09935 6.89696 5.91981 6.57098 5.83244 6.80157 6.64673
900 1.16102 8.03528 6.90199 7.09119 7.48035 7.0056 7.28668 6.44167 7.71524 7.18398
1000 1.22677 9.0494 7.53529 8.03523 8.03804 7.7961 8.02141 7.63322 8.27021 8.34094
1100 1.33619 9.6978 8.22963 8.99963 9.03629 8.65438 8.84384 8.44676 9.01027 9.32058
1200 1.40924 10.4462 9.42101 9.62364 9.57904 9.48842 9.69541 8.72344 9.80094 10.5199
1300 1.50682 11.0071 10.4675 10.2685 10.403 10.4653 10.3315 9.82239 10.8077 10.7927
1400 1.59586 12.2033 11.1363 11.017 11.3399 11.0212 11.0486 10.7472 12.026 11.4333





Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 Bidderl
100 0.00082 0.00558 0.01271 0.01056 0.00705 0.00734 0.0048 0.01462 0.00736 0.00654
200 0.00108 0.0092 0.00826 0.00718 0.00678 0.00819 0.00877 0.00954 0.00588 0.00965
300 0.0014 0.0083 0.00697 0.00694 0.00904 0.00695 0.00839 0.00827 0.00737 0.00893
400 0.00144 0.0076 0.0069 0.00658 0.00881 0.00802 0.00838 0.00805 0.00827 0.0086
500 0.00148 0.00753 0.00787 0.00711 0.0084 0.00824 0.00867 0.00806 0.00751 0.00831
600 0.00144 0.00815 0.00772 0.00703 0.00874 0.00736 0.00824 0.0082 0.00765 0.00859
700 0.00138 0.00853 0.00819 0.00709 0.00872 0.00757 0.00796 0.00755 0.00809 0.00857
800 0.00135 0.00864 0.00771 0.00762 0.00862 0.0074 0.00821 0.00729 0.0085 0.00831
900 0.00129 0.00893 0.00767 0.00788 0.00831 0.00778 0.0081 0.00716 0.00857 0.00798
1000 0.00123 0.00905 0.00754 0.00804 0.00804 0.0078 0.00802 0.00763 0.00827 0.00834
1100 0.00121 0.00882 0.00748 0.00818 0.00821 0.00787 0.00804 0.00768 0.00819 0.00847
1200 0.00117 0.00871 0.00785 0.00802 0.00798 0.00791 0.00808 0.00727 0.00817 0.00877
1300 0.00116 0.00847 0.00805 0.0079 0.008 0.00805 0.00795 0.00756 0.0083
1
0.0083
1400 0.00114 0.00872 0.00795 0.00787 0.0081 0.00787 0.00789 0.00768 0.00859 0.00817
1500 0.00112 0.00874 0.00797 0.00767 0.00814 0.00839 0.00798 0.00753 0.00857 0.00809
Table 22
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Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 Bidder 10
100 0.0069 0.00508 0.08713 0.09506 0.0893 0.09447 0.09273 0.09156 0.09101 0.08796
200 0.00631 0.00699 0.0894 0.09528 0.09013 0.0895 0.0925 0.09322 0.08887 0.09069
300 0.00566 0.00538 0.09056 0.0946 0.09155 0.08877 0.09193 0.09229 0.08911 0.09041
400 0.00619 0.00632 0.09124 0.09303 0.09134 0.08973 0.0912 0.0905 0.08962 0.09098
500 0.00644 0.00542 0.09155 0.09318 0.09039 0.08971 0.09106 0.09141 0.08811 0.08934
600 0.00635 0.00562 0.09071 0.09291 0.09099 0.08972 0.09021 0.09106 0.08837 0.0898
700 0.00551 0.00597 0.09085 0.09235 0.09108 0.08994 0.09001 0.09116 0.08899 0.09044
800 0.00524 0.00563 0.09123 0.09236 0.09148 0.08994 0.09014 0.08999 0.08914 0.0906
900 0.0054 0.00529 0.09094 0.09243 0.09121 0.08989 0.08983 0.08946 0.08906 0.0908
1000 0.00542 0.00549 0.09114 0.09246 0.09135 0.09019 0.08997 0.08945 0.08852 0.09066
1100 0.00544 0.00597 0.0909 0.09199 0.09119 0.09034 0.09029 0.08968 0.08875 0.09103
1200 0.00518 0.0059 0.09127 0.09199 0.09062 0.09063 0.09017 0.09004 0.08922 0.09116
1300 0.0054 0.00604 0.09133 0.09189 0.09079 0.09083 0.0904 0.09026 0.08912 0.09117
1400 0.0053 0.00587 0.09157 0.09138 0.09068 0.09114 0.09059 0.09005 0.08925 0.0914




Number of Games Won
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 Bidder 10
100 14 11 13 9 9 11 11 10 4 8
200 29 24 19 19 14 25 21 17 12 20
300 52 38 31 29 21 33 27 25 19 25
400 62 60 39 40 31 43 34 33 23 35
500 80 72 50 51 37 52 44 44 30 40
600 99 93 54 58 42 67 50 50 36 51
700 121 110 62 65 48 74 61 52 47 60
800 134 133 71 73 53 80 70 62 54 70
900 154 154 74 78 62 85 83 71 63 76
1000 171 172 82 80 74 95 93 81 69 83
1100 193 189 92 92 80 100 99 90 74 91
1200 214 201 102 102 92 108 103 98 83 97
1300 229 224 112 107 98 117 115 105 91 102
1400 245 244 126 120 104 124 119 110 100 108






Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 BidderlO
100 0.09658 0.0559 1.13263 0.85553 0.80368 1.03914 1.02007 0.91562 0.36403 0.70368
200 0.18295 0.1677 1.69859 1.81037 1.26181 2.23741 1 .94247 1.58467 1.06643 1.81385
300 0.29439 0.20431 2.80727 2.74341 1.92257 2.92945 2.48223 2.30737 1.69313 2.26036
400 0.38381 0.37924 3.55817 3.72134 2.83163 3.85857 3.10085 2.98647 2.06136 3.18438
500 0.51543 0.39029 4.57772 4.75219 3.34436 4.66516 4.00676 4.02223 2.64321 3.57366
600 0.62906 0.5229 4.89855 5.38859 3.82165 6.01145 4.5106 4.55298 3.18118 4.57999
700 0.66642 0.65634 5.63294 6.00272 4.37197 6.6556 5.49034 4.74017 4.18233 5.4264
800 0.70277 0.74877 6.47719 6.7423 4.84855 7.19507 6.30998 5.57959 4.81357 6.3419
900 0.83192 0.81442 6.72959 7.2098 5.65485 7.64059 7.45624 6.35173 5.61103 6.90056
1000 0.92757 0.94454 7.47348 7.39663 6.76023 8.56834 8.36761 7.24546 6.10775 7.52453
1100 1 .04945 1.12836 8.3629 8.46345 7.29519 9.03396 8.93866 8.07154 6.56717 8.28415
1200 1.10751 1.18626 9.30985 9.38258 8.33709 9.7885 9.28735 8.8241 7.40553 8.84255
1300 1.23628 1.35282 10.2292 9.83216 8.8973 10.6271 10.396 9.47734 8.10997 9.2994
1400 1.29956 1.43238 11.538 10.9661 9.43076 11.3019 10.7808 9.90596 8.92511 9.87132







Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 BidderlO
100 0.00097 0.00056 0.01133 0.00856 0.00804 0.01039 0.0102 0.00916 0.00364 0.00704
200 0.00091 0.00084 0.00849 0.00905 0.00631 0.01119 0.00971 0.00792 0.00533 0.00907
300 0.00098 0.00068 0.00936 0.00914 0.00641 0.00976 0.00827 0.00769 0.00564 0.00753
400 0.00096 0.00095 0.0089 0.0093 0.00708 0.00965 0.00775 0.00747 0.00515 0.00796
500 0.00103 0.00078 0.00916 0.0095 0.00669 0.00933 0.00801 0.00804 0.00529 0.00715
600 0.00105 0.00087 0.00816 0.00898 0.00637 0.01002 0.00752 0.00759 0.0053 0.00763
700 0.00095 0.00094 0.00805 0.00858 0.00625 0.00951 0.00784 0.00677 0.00597 0.00775
800 0.00088 0.00094 0.0081 0.00843 0.00606 0.00899 0.00789 0.00697 0.00602 0.00793
900 0.00092 0.0009 0.00748 0.00801 0.00628 0.00849 0.00828 0.00706 0.00623 0.00767
1000 0.00093 0.00094 0.00747 0.0074 0.00676 0.00857 0.00837 0.00725 0.00611 0.00752
1100 0.00095 0.00103 0.0076 0.00769 0.00663 0.00821 0.00813 0.00734 0.00597 0.00753
1200 0.00092 0.00099 0.00776 0.00782 0.00695 0.00816 0.00774 0.00735 0.00617 0.00737
1300 0.00095 0.00104 0.00787 0.00756 0.00684 0.00817 0.008 0.00729 0.00624 0.00715
1400 0.00093 0.00102 0.00824 0.00783 0.00674 0.00807 0.0077 0.00708 0.00638 0.00705
1500 0.00097 0.00102 0.00823 0.00789 0.0069 0.00807 0.00772 0.00703 0.00648 0.00675
Table 26
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Scenario 4. Bidders "1", "2", "3" and "4" underbid by 0.0825, 0.075, 0.0675




Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 Bidder 10
100 0.00438 0.01511 0.02549 0.03139 0.09044 0.09141 0.0904 0.09346 0.09334 0.09358
200 0.00531 0.01504 0.02509 0.03153 0.09143 0.09182 0.09034 0.09366 0.09419 0.09193
300 0.0057 0.01487 0.02396 0.0315 0.0899 0.09286 0.09107 0.09282 0.09311 0.09154
400 0.0058 0.01475 0.02309 0.03118 0.09076 0.09159 0.09056 0.09125 0.0918 0.09113
500 0.00641 0.01522 0.02346 0.03042 0.09005 0.09229 0.09167 0.09095 0.09156 0.09123
600 0.00659 0.0154 0.02348 0.0298 0.0902 0.09289 0.09134 0.09132 0.09094 0.09016
700 0.00722 0.01477 0.02328 0.02954 0.09041 0.09268 0.09115 0.09169 0.09064 0.09119
800 0.00735 0.01475 0.02315 0.0297 0.09024 0.09178 0.09099 0.09221 0.09063 0.09139
900 0.00724 0.01446 0.02297 0.02963 0.09068 0.09198 0.09114 0.09206 0.09042 0.09168
1000 0.00708 0.01478 0.02316 0.02964 0.09132 0.09212 0.09149 0.09242 0.09042 0.09152
1100 0.00658 0.01468 0.02282 0.02978 0.09141 0.09219 0.0916 0.09264 0.09059 0.0914
1200 0.00647 0.0147 0.02279 0.02967 0.09085 0.09215 0.09156 0.09277 0.09113 0.09135
1300 0.00641 0.0146 0.02274 0.02991 0.09093 0.09192 0.09112 0.09292 0.09064 0.09142
1400 0.00652 0.01461 0.02284 0.03008 0.09088 0.09189 0.09126 0.09278 0.09069 0.09157




Number of Games Won
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 Bidderl
100 17 13 19 11 6 4 7 8 7 8
200 34 34 30 24 11 13 14 14 10 16
300 52 50 48 32 14 23 22 20 16 23
400 72 66 60 43 20 29 30 28 21 31
500 91 87 75 50 28 36 36 34 29 34
600 106 98 90 67 37 47 45 36 34 40
700 119 117 104 82 44 55 48 42 40 49
800 133 133 113 99 51 63 56 49 46 57
900 146 147 127 115 57 68 62 57 57 64
1000 162 159 144 128 66 72 71 64 62 72
1100 183 174 159 139 68 75 81 69 71 81
1200 194 185 171 157 75 83 89 74 78 94
1300 206 199 189 170 81 88 103 81 82 101
1400 218 217 201 188 90 100 111 85 85 105






Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 Bidder 10
100 0.07439 0.19648 0.48422 0.34525 0.54263 0.36564 0.6328 0.74772 0.65339 0.74866
200 0.18063 0.51132 0.7526 0.75671 1.00576 1.1937 1.26479 1.31117 0.94192 1.47084
300 0.29617 0.7434 1.1502 1.00801 1.25853 2.1358 2.00348 1.85648 1.4898 2.10546
400 0.41783 0.97346 1.38517 1.34073 1.81517 2.65622 2.71694 2.55498 1.92773 2.82496
500 0.58352 1.32379 1.75984 1.52112 2.52148 3.32242 3.30009 3.09222 2.65533 3.10198
600 0.69871 1.50964 2.11354 1.99679 3.33729 4.36588 4.11028 3.28768 3.09212 3.60628
700 0.85964 1.7284 2.42152 2.42201 3.97815 5.09724 4.37543 3.85107 3.62554 4.46824
800 0.97816 1.96132 2.61539 2.94001 4.60218 5.78207 5.09556 4.51851 4.16914 5.20947
900 1.05636 2.1251 2.91662 3.40688 5.16878 6.25492 5.65067 5.24715 5.15374 5.86763
1000 1.14669 2.35022 3.33472 3.79456 6.02686 6.63269 6.49585 5.91476 5.60589 6.58973
1100 1.20407 2.55394 3.62889 4.13939 6.21596 6.91459 7.41957 6.39214 6.43161 7.40303
1200 1.25503 2.7186 3.89789 4.65837 6.81354 7.64863 8.14909 6.86484 7.1079 8.58648
1300 1.32103 2.90502 4.29724 5.08494 7.36513 8.08872 9.38583 7.52654 7.43223 9.23342
1400 1.4216 3.17035 4.59082 5.65596 8.17886 9.18902 10.1296 7.88653 7.70834 9.61527





Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 Bidderl
100 0.00074 0.00196 0.00484 0.00345 0.00543 0.00366 0.00633 0.00748 0.00653 0.00749
200 0.0009 0.00256 0.00376 0.00378 0.00503 0.00597 0.00632 0.00656 0.00471 0.00735
300 0.00099 0.00248 0.00383 0.00336 0.0042 0.00712 0.00668 0.00619 0.00497 0.00702
400 0.00104 0.00243 0.00346 0.00335 0.00454 0.00664 0.00679 0.00639 0.00482 0.00706
500 0.00117 0.00265 0.00352 0.00304 0.00504 0.00664 0.0066 0.00618 0.00531 0.0062
600 0.00116 0.00252 0.00352 0.00333 0.00556 0.00728 0.00685 0.00548 0.00515 0.00601
700 0.00123 0.00247 0.00346 0.00346 0.00568 0.00728 0.00625 0.0055 0.00518 0.00638
800 0.00122 0.00245 0.00327 0.00368 0.00575 0.00723 0.00637 0.00565 0.00521 0.00651
900 0.00117 0.00236 0.00324 0.00379 0.00574 0.00695 0.00628 0.00583 0.00573 0.00652
1000 0.00115 0.00235 0.00333 0.00379 0.00603 0.00663 0.0065 0.00591 0.00561 0.00659
1100 0.00109 0.00232 0.0033 0.00376 0.00565 0.00629 0.00675 0.00581 0.00585 0.00673
1200 0.00105 0.00227 0.00325 0.00388 0.00568 0.00637 0.00679 0.00572 0.00592 0.00716
1300 0.00102 0.00223 0.00331 0.00391 0.00567 0.00622 0.00722 0.00579 0.00572 0.0071
1400 0.00102 0.00226 0.00328 0.00404 0.00584 0.00656 0.00724 0.00563 0.00551 0.00687
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B. TRIANGULAR COST DISTRIBUTION
1. Two-Bidder Bidding Game
Scenario 1 . Both bidders used equilibrium strategy.
#of
games
Expected Profit # of Games Won Total Profit Ave. Exp. Profit
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2
100 0.206219 0.238089 49 51 10.10471 12.14254 0.101047 0.121425
200 0.214211 0.238282 92 108 19.70744 25.73446 0.098537 0.128672
300 0.221497 0.228089 131 169 29.01608 38.5471 0.09672 0.12849
400 0.226884 0.221775 179 221 40.61228 49.01231 0.101531 0.122531
500 0.223304 0.221598 224 276 50.02017 61.16102 0.10004 0.122322
600 0.223888 0.220807 278 322 62.2409 71.09995 0.103735 0.1185
700 0.224465 0.222031 336 364 75.42034 80.81943 0.107743 0.115456
800 0.224813 0.220863 378 422 84.97923 93.20432 0.106224 0.116505
900 0.223285 0.221015 429 471 95.78906 104.0983 0.106432 0.115665
1000 0.223027 0.221912 479 521 106.8301 115.6162 0.10683 0.115616
1100 0.221668 0.222563 535 565 118.5924 125.7482 0.107811 0.114317
1200 0.221597 0.221951 575 625 127.4181 138.7192 0.106182 0.115599
1300 0.221923 0.22262 621 679 137.8139 151.1589 0.106011 0.116276
1400 0.222089 0.223333 669 731 148.5776 163.2562 0.106127 0.116612
1500 0.220204 0.223635 725 775 159.6482 173.3172 0.106432 0.115545
1600 0.220878 0.223417 782 818 172.7268 182.7552 0.107954 0.114222
1700 0.220718 0.222405 827 873 182.5334 194.1595 0.107373 0.114211
1800 0.221144 0.223524 871 929 192.6167 207.6536 0.107009 0.115363
1900 0.221703 0.22439 931 969 206.4058 217.4339 0.108635 0.114439
2000 0.221375 0.224752 976 1024 216.0625 230.1461 0.108031 0.115073
2100 0.221022 0.224139 1023 1077 226.1053 241.3976 0.107669 0.114951
2200 0.221547 0.224441 1074 1126 237.9419 252.7204 0.108155 0.114873
2300 0.222452 0.224167 1130 1170 251.3706 262.2757 0.109292 0.114033
2400 0.222262 0.224398 1178 1222 261.8242 274.2143 0.109093 0.114256
2500 0.222308 0.223598 1231 1269 273.6609 283.7462 0.109464 0.113498
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Scenario 2. Bidderl underbid by 0.15 while bidder2 used equilibrium strategy.
#of
games
Expected Profit # of Games Won Total Profit Ave. Exp. Profit
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2
100 0.062809 0.256952 68 32 4.271004 8.222466 0.04271 0.082225
200 0.045651 0.252716 143 57 6.528056 14.40484 0.03264 0.072024
300 0.042422 0.251165 209 91 8.866159 22.85599 0.029554 0.076187
400 0.043888 0.248662 288 112 12.63972 27.85014 0.031599 0.069625
500 0.046166 0.245824 359 141 16.57369 34.66119 0.033147 0.069322
600 0.048138 0.245034 433 167 20.84361 40.92069 0.034739 0.068201
700 0.045984 0.245149 498 202 22.90004 49.52015 0.032714 0.070743
800 0.046905 0.244969 572 228 26.82973 55.85291 0.033537 0.069816
900 0.046433 0.244144 646 254 29.99544 62.01265 0.033328 0.068903
1000 0.04572 0.24415 707 293 32.32439 71.53586 0.032324 0.071536
1100 0.045926 0.244085 778 322 35.73045 78.59541 0.032482 0.07145
1200 0.046346 0.24425 849 351 39.34792 85.73181 0.03279 0.071443
1300 0.048115 0.244711 924 376 44.45839 92.01122 0.034199 0.070778
1400 0.048381 0.244242 992 408 47.99432 99.65085 0.034282 0.071179
1500 0.048138 0.243496 1068 432 51.41143 105.1904 0.034274 0.070127
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Expected Profit # of Games Won Total Profit Ave.Exp. Profit
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2
100 0.113678 0.112292 47 53 5.342864 5.951497 0.053429 0.059515
200 0.12326 0.121317 98 102 12.07945 12.37434 0.060397 0.061872
300 0.129273 0.120065 154 146 19.90808 17.52956 0.06636 0.058432
400 0.126543 0.122567 202 198 25.56173 24.26822 0.063904 0.060671
500 0.125876 0.118776 255 245 32.09846 29.10015 0.064197 0.0582
600 0.127644 0.121315 299 301 38.16551 36.5157 0.063609 0.06086
700 0.127994 0.120436 351 349 44.92607 42.03215 0.06418 0.060046
800 0.125206 0.120689 393 407 49.20592 49.12057 0.061507 0.061401
900 0.125597 0.121691 451 449 56.64446 54.63906 0.062938 0.06071
1000 0.123275 0.120888 501 499 61.76094 60.32298 0.061761 0.060323
1100 0.122718 0.120584 547 553 67.12702 66.68284 0.061025 0.060621
1200 0.122694 0.121073 597 603 73.24847 73.00698 0.06104 0.060839
1300 0.12317 0.121394 654 646 80.55314 78.42025 0.061964 0.060323
1400 0.121684 0.122553 705 695 85.78711 85.17436 0.061277 0.060839
1500 0.121015 0.122933 755 745 91.36622 91.58526 0.060911 0.061057
1600 0.121948 0.121706 808 792 98.53395 96.39112 0.061584 0.060244
1700 0.122473 0.122582 860 840 105.3271 102.9691 0.061957 0.06057
1800 0.121631 0.122916 914 886 111.1707 108.9035 0.061762 0.060502
1900 0.121133 0.122171 968 932 . 117.2568 113.8637 0.061714 0.059928
2000 0.121426 0.122314 1019 981 123.7332 119.9902 0.061867 0.059995
2100 0.120975 0.122718 1072 1028 129.6853 126.1544 0.061755 0.060074
2200 0.121425 0.123081 1122 1078 136.2389 132.6812 0.061927 0.06031
2300 0.120909 0.123714 1160 1140 140.255 141.0338 0.06098 0.061319
2400 0.120884 0.123577 1210 1190 146.2696 147.0561 0.060946 0.061273
2500 0.121266 0.123949 1259 1241 152.6738 153.8211 0.06107 0.061528
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2. Three-Bidder Bidding Game
Scenario 1 . All bidders used equilibrium strategy.
#of
games
Expected Profit Number of Games Won Total Profit Average Expected Profit
Bidder
1
Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidders Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidders
100 0.14 0.1468 0.1514 35 30 35 4.9012 4.4051 5.299 0.049 0.0441 0.053
200 0.1491 0.1463 0.1554 74 61 65 11.032 8.9265 10.099 0.0552 0.0446 0.0505
300 0.1469 0.1485 0.1535 113 93 94 16.595 13.807 14.433 0.0553 0.046 0.0481
400 0.1452 0.1479 0.15 146 128 126 21.205 18.936 18.901 0.053 0.0473 0.0473
500 0.1465 0.147 0.1471 172 170 158 25.206 24.993 23.237 0.0504 0.05 0.0465
600 0.1486 0.1478 0.1477 215 200 185 31.958 29.551 27.321 0.0533 0.0493 0.0455
700 0.1486 0.147 0.1485 241 231 228 35.825 33.954 33.865 0.0512 0.0485 0.0484
800 0.1495 0.1481 0.1497 280 256 264 41.862 37.917 39.527 0.0523 0.0474 0.0494
900 0.1504 0.1488 0.1501 310 287 303 46.618 42.698 45.493 0.0518 0.0474 0.0505
1000 0.1499 0.1491 0.1506 339 325 336 50.822 48.467 50.613 0.0508 0.0485 0.0506
1100 0.1499 0.1488 0.1508 380 353 367 56.955 52.519 55.351 0.0518 0.0477 0.0503
1200 0.1486 0.1495 0.1504 414 374 412 61.525 55.924 61.975 0.0513 0.0466 0.0516
1300 0.1472 0.1492 0.1501 449 407 444 66.084 60.724 66.64 0.0508 0.0467 0.0513
1400 0.1479 0.1501 0.15 479 445 476 70.853 66.777 71.378 0.0506 0.0477 0.051
1500 0.1473 0.1495 0.15
.
510 479 511 75.134 71.621 76.653 0.0501 0.0477 0.0511
1600 0.1479 0.1495 0.1498 551 509 540 81.481 76.085 80.877 0.0509 0.0476 0.0505
1700 0.1483 0.149 0.1501 581 537 582 86.177 80.022 87.363 0.0507 0.0471 0.0514
1800 0.1484 0.1493 0.1505 618 561 621 91.697 83.757 93.472 0.0509 0.0465 0.0519
1900 0.1491 0.1496 0.1508 642 598 660 95.72 89.475 99.503 0.0504 0.0471 0.0524
2000 0.1488 0.1496 0.1511 675 635 690 100.41 94.983 104.24 0.0502 0.0475 0.0521
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Scenario 2. Bidderl underbid by 0.1 while others used equilibrium strategy.
#of
games
Expected Profit Number of Games Won Total Profit Average Expected Profit
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3
100 0.0454 0.1467 0.1594 47 29 24 2.1341 4.2538 3.8264 0.0213 0.0425 0.0383
200 0.0428 0.1491 0.1548 92 48 60 3.9393 7.1574 9.2883 0.0197 0.0358 0.0464
300 0.0452 0.1541 0.1508 136 78 86 6.1407 12.017 12.967 0.0205 0.0401 0.0432
400 0.0424 0.1519 0.151 177 106 117 7.4977 16.1 17.672 0.0187 0.0403 0.0442
500 0.0414 0.1534 0.1512 229 132 139 9.4821 20.25 21.02 0.019 0.0405 0.042
600 0.0407 0.1521 0.1521 273 161 166 11.098 24.485 25.254 0.0185 0.0408 0.0421
700 0.0426 0.1512 0.1534 322 187 191 13.703 28.274 29.295 0.0196 0.0404 0.0419
800 0.0413 0.153 0.1533 380 206 214 15.696 31.527 32.813 0.0196 0.0394 0.041
900 0.0402 0.1524 0.1528 428 233 239 17.184 35.505 36.511 0.0191 0.0395 0.0406
1000 0.0399 0.1526 0.151 467 268 265 18.626 40.904 40.021 0.0186 0.0409 0.04
1100 0.0407 0.1526 0.152 520 296 284 21.161 45.175 43.166 0.0192 0.0411 0.0392
1200 0.0405 0.1516 0.153 559 323 318 22.638 48.961 48.669 0.0189 0.0408 0.0406
1300 0.0414 0.1522 0.1534 607 345 348 25.13 52.521 53.38 0.0193 0.0404 0.0411
1400 0.0419 0.1526 0.1536 646 373 381 27.054 56.934 58.53 0.0193 O.0407 0.0418
1500 0.0416 0.1529 0.1541 687 405 408 28.554 61.925 62.879 0.019 0.0413 0.0419
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Scenario 3. Bidders "1" and "2" underbid by 0.1 and 0.12 respectively.
#of
games
Expected Profit Number ofGames Won Total Profit Average Expected Profit
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3
100 0.0465 0.0272 0.1513 27 47 26 1.2558 1.2775 3.9342 0.0126 0.0128 0.0393
200 0.0514 0.0226 0.1559 61 88 51 3.1362 1.9853 7.9525 0.0157 0.0099 0.0398
300 0.0527 0.02 0.1581 98 120 82 5.1683 2.3989 12.968 0.0172 0.008 0.0432
400 0.0516 0.0229 0.1587 134 158 108 6.9093 3.6177 17.139 0.0173 0.009 0.0428
500 0.0488 0.0244 0.1587 169 201 130 8.2412 4.9023 20.635 0.0165 0.0098 0.0413
600 0.0496 0.0223 0.1581 207 245 148 10.276 5.4653 23.401 0.0171 0.0091 0.039
700 0.049 0.024 0.1583 238 294 168 11.667 7.0605 26.591 0.0167 0.0101 0.038
800 0.048 0.0228 0.1573 285 331 184 13.679 7.5342 28.945 0.0171 0.0094 0.0362
900 0.048 0.0237 0.1579 320 378 202 15.369 8.9754 31.902 0.0171 0.01 0.0354
1000 0.0481 0.0241 0.1575 357 414 229 17.156 9.9641 36.077 0.0172 0.01 0.0361
1100 0.0471 0.0229 0.1567 397 456 247 18.712 10.462 38.703 0.017 0.0095 0.0352
1200 0.0463 0.0233 0.1582 429 502 269 19.867 11.687 42.562 0.0166 0.0097 0.0355
1300 0.0466 0.0236 0.1575 466 543 291 21.709 12.84 45.841 0.0167 0.0099 0.0353
1400 0.0469 0.0237 0.1577 505 591 304 23.705 14.011 47.947 0.0169 0.01 0.0342
1500 0.0469 0.0237 0.1578 535 639 326 25.093 15.152 51.438 0.0167 0.0101 0.0343
1600 0.0461 0.0237 0.1573 573 681 346 26.395 16.116 54.424 0.0165 0.0101 0.034
1700 0.0456 0.0234 0.1575 611 716 373 27.877 16.759 58.73 0.0164 0.0099 0.0345
1800 0.0461 0.0236 0.1574 643 763 394 29.635 17.99 62.018 0.0165 0.01 0.0345
1900 0.0467 0.0237 0.1569 681 804 415 31.798 19.074 65.118 0.0167 0.01 0.0343
2000 0.0469 0.0239 0.1573 720 851 429 33.771 20.352 67.483 0.0169 0.0102 0.0337
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3. Five-Bidder Bidding Game
Scenario 1. All bidders used equilibrium strategy.
#of
games
Expected Profit Number of Games Won
Bidder
1
Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidders
100 0.08749 0.09988 0.08972 0.08912 0.08875 15 15 23 25 22
200 0.09069 0.09436 0.09066 0.08947 0.09082 33 42 40 36 49
300 0.09114 0.09304 0.08912 0.09072 0.09182 54 60 64 53 69
400 0.09091 0.09187 0.08984 0.09145 0.09122 75 79 80 80 86
500 0.09193 0.09233 0.09091 0.0921 0.0911 103 96 95 102 104
600 0.09242 0.09207 0.09159 0.09272 0.0919 121 119 117 123 120
700 0.09259 0.09162 0.09119 0.09293 0.09108 140 142 136 150 132
800 0.093 0.09141 0.09153 0.09219 0.09193 158 161 153 171 157
900 0.09308 0.09191 0.09097 0.09184 0.09189 174 193 172 186 175
1000 0.09271 0.0922 0.09133 0.0914 0.09166 187 217 185 211 200
1100 0.0922 0.09201 0.09114 0.09156 0.09124 207 232 205 235 221
1200 0.09179 0.09208 0.09112 0.09221 0.09101 223 248 228 254 247
1300 0.09218 0.09218 0.0908 0.0927 0.09128 241 264 253 275 267
1400 0.09201 0.09252 0.09098 0.09276 0.0916 260 288 276 291 285




Total Profit Average Expected Profit
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5
100 1.31239 1.4982 2.06353 2.22795 1.9524 0.01312 0.01498 0.02064 0.02228 0.01952
200 2.99263 3.96305 3.62641 3.22092 4.45015 0.01496 0.01982 0.01813 0.0161 0.02225
300 4.92172 5.58251 5.70388 4.80836 6.33535 0.01641 0.01861 0.01901 0.01603 0.02112
400 6.81839 7.25786 7.18723 7.31595 7.84471 0.01705 0.01814 0.01797 0.01829 0.01961
500 9.46874 8.86324 8.63624 9.394 9.47491 0.01894 0.01773 0.01727 0.01879 0.01895
600 11.1831 10.9568 10.7161 1 1 .4043 11.0286 0.01864 0.01826 0.01786 0.01901 0.01838
700 12.962 13.0094 12.4024 13.9388 12.0229 0.01852 0.01858 0.01772 0.01991 0.01718
800 14.6941 14.7163 14.0046 15.7645 14.4335 0.01837 0.0184 0.01751 0.01971 0.01804
900 16.1953 17.738 15.6474 17.0824 16.081 0.01799 0.01971 0.01739 0.01898 0.01787
1000 17.3369 20.0068 16.8958 19.2861 18.3316 0.01734 0.02001 0.0169 0.01929 0.01833
1100 19.0863 21.3458 18.6837 21.5154 20.1631 0.01735 0.01941 0.01699 0.01956 0.01833
1200 20.4695 22.8358 20.7747 23.4201 22.4783 0.01706 0.01903 0.01731 0.01952 0.01873
1300 22.2152 24.3365 22.9722 25.4933 24.3709 0.01709 0.01872 0.01767 0.01961 0.01875
1400 23.9232 26.6467 25.1104 26.9925 26.107 0.01709 0.01903 0.01794 0.01928 0.01865
1500 25.749 28.6512 27.083 28.8432 27.8236 0.01717 0.0191 0.01806 0.01923 0.01855
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Scenario 2. Bidder 1 underbid by 0.05 while others used equilibrium strategy.
#of
games
Expected Profit Number of Games Won
Bidder
1
Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5
100 0.04421 0.09189 0.09409 0.09356 0.09471 30 10 19 16 25
200 0.0402 0.09197 0.09405 0.09558 0.09412 60 32 32 32 44
300 0.03931 0.091 0.09468 0.0967 0.09561 91 43 59 48 59
400 0.03921 0.09139 0.09439 0.09708 0.09486 121 56 80 70 73
500 0.03991 0.0924 0.09421 0.09613 0.09473 153 68 99 83 97
600 0.04001 0.09305 0.0939 0.09602 0.09366 178 92 117 100 113
700 0.03954 0.09377 0.09422 0.09533 0.09413 202 110 135 117 136
800 0.03992 0.09342 0.09442 0.09456 0.09438 227 129 153 133 158
900 0.03993 0.09268 0.09455 0.09397 0.09399 248 155 166 153 178
1000 0.04028 0.09278 0.09415 0.09391 0.09371 276 178 178 176 192
1100 0.04022 0.09247 0.09395 0.09392 0.09334 309 195 190 195 211
1200 0.04026 0.09232 0.09388 0.09381 0.0937 331 209 215 213 232
1300 0.04046 0.09232 0.0939 0.09372 0.09322 359 228 228 230 255
1400 0.04062 0.09252 0.09393 0.09332 0.09326 383 250 250 244 273




Total Profit Average Expected Profit
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5
100 1.32642 0.91892 1.78778 1.49689 2.36768 0.01326 0.00919 0.01788 0.01497 0.02368
200 2.41209 2.94303 3.00973 3.0584 4.1414 0.01206 0.01472 0.01505 0.01529 0.02071
300 3.57749 3.91316 5.58639 4.64137 5.64104 0.01192 0.01304 0.01862 0.01547 0.0188
400 4.74467 5.11773 7.55149 6.79533 6.92446 0.01186 0.01279 0.01888 0.01699 0.01731
500 6.10665 6.28286 9.32679 7.97881 9.1889 0.01221 0.01257 0.01865 0.01596 0.01838
600 7.12091 8.56039 10.9868 9.60236 10.5832 0.01187 0.01427 0.01831 0.016 0.01764
700 7.98719 10.3145 12.7194 11.1532 12.8018 0.01141 0.01474 0.01817 0.01593 0.01829
800 9.06094 12.0515 14.4462 12.5765 14.912 0.01133 0.01506 0.01806 0.01572 0.01864
900 9.90244 14.3655 15.6957 14.377 16.7295 0.011 0.01596 0.01744 0.01597 0.01859
1000 11.1185 16.5152 16.7589 16.528 17.9917 0.01112 0.01652 0.01676 0.01653 0.01799
1100 12.4287 18.0318 17.8513 18.3153 19.6943 0.0113 0.01639 0.01623 0.01665 0.0179
1200 13.3257 19.2948 20.1846 19.9812 21.739 0.0111 0.01608 0.01682 0.01665 0.01812
1300 14.5249 21.0483 21.4086 21.5563 23.7717 0.01117 0.01619 0.01647 0.01658 0.01829
1400 15.5561 23.1292 23.4823 22.7698 25.4607 0.01111 0.01652 0.01677 0.01626 0.01819
1500 16.3539 25.3116 25.2892 25.1509 26.7629 0.0109 0.01687 0.01686 0.01677 0.01784
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Expected Profit Number of Games Won
Bidder
1
Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5
100 0.04182 0.04036 0.088 0.09277 0.09275 27 29 20 11 13
200 0.03974 0.04107 0.08954 0.09311 0.09657 49 53 33 29 36
300 0.03946 0.04074 0.09098 0.09213 0.09617 78 80 49 42 51
400 0.03927 0.04122 0.09188 0.09232 0.09596 106 104 69 59 62
500 0.03935 0.04016 0.09139 0.09209 0.09636 127 134 83 79 77
600 0.03903 0.03931 0.0911 0.0908 0.09563 155 153 98 94 100
700 0.03934 0.03983 0.09116 0.09162 0.09517 175 168 120 114 123
800 0.03969 0.04073 0.0923 0.09217 0.09458 192 195 141 135 137
900 0.0403 0.04085 0.09292 0.09221 0.09454 213 216 161 155 155
1000 0.0405 0.04059 0.09299 0.09215 0.09436 244 241 179 168 168
1100 0.04056 0.04073 0.09256 0.09218 0.09368 270 258 196 186 190
1200 0.04049 0.04052 0.09215 0.09219 0.09389 285 279 224 202 210
1300 0.04055 0.04099 0.09218 0.09242 0.09421 305 312 239 212 232
1400 0.04099 0.04085 0.0922 0.09223 0.09391 327 338 255 226 254




Total Profit Average Expected Profit
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5
100 1.12904 1.1705 1.76 1.02048 1.20575 0.01129 0.0117 0.0176 0.0102 0.01206
200 1.94749 2.1767 2.95472 2.7002 3.47652 0.00974 0.01088 0.01477 0.0135 0.01738
300 3.0778 3.25927 4.45789 3.86953 4.90488 0.01026 0.01086 0.01486 0.0129 0.01635
400 4.16245 4.28717 6.34 5.44716 5.94929 0.01041 0.01072 0.01585 0.01362 0.01487
500 4.99722 5.38145 7.58527 7.27489 7.42006 0.00999 0.01076 0.01517 0.01455 0.01484
600 6.05031 6.01496 8.9278 8.5356 9.56324 0.01008 0.01002 0.01488 0.01423 0.01594
700 6.88429 6.69195 10.9387 10.4452 11.7063 0.00983 0.00956 0.01563 0.01492 0.01672
800 7.62075 7.943
1
13.014 12.4435 12.9572 0.00953 0.00993 0.01627 0.01555 0.0162
900 8.58449 8.82439 14.9603 14.2931 14.653 0.00954 0.0098 0.01662 0.01588 0.01628
1000 9.88266 9.78181 16.6443 15.4819 15.853 0.00988 0.00978 0.01664 0.01548 0.01585
1100 10.9506 10.5072 18.1409 17.1449 17.7996 0.00996 0.00955 0.01649 0.01559 0.01618
1200 11.5403 11.304 20.6423 18.6217 19.7171 0.00962 0.00942 0.0172 0.01552 0.01643
1300 12.3685 12.7889 22.0318 19.5933 21.8564 0.00951 0.00984 0.01695 0.01507 0.01681
1400 13.4044 13.8081 23.5105 20.8441 23.8539 0.00957 0.00986 0.01679 0.01489 0.01704
1500 14.2425 14.7406 25.0985 22.3112 25.8637 0.0095 0.00983 0.01673 0.01487 0.01724
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Scenario 4. Bidders "1" and "2" underbid by 0.05 and 0.075 respectively while
others used equilibrium strategy.
#of
games
Expected Profit Number of Games Won
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5
100 0.04674 0.01812 0.09244 0.09663 0.09607 23 21 18 18 20
200 0.04745 0.01615 0.09205 0.09375 0.09433 47 45 35 34 39
300 0.04605 0.01695 0.09205 0.09358 0.09387 69 74 50 52 55
400 0.04549 0.01678 0.09322 0.09323 0.0948 98 103 64 69 66
500 0.04366 0.0169 0.09281 0.09297 0.09354 115 128 83 90 84
600 0.04315 0.01636 0.09278 0.09343 0.09352 135 162 96 99 108
700 0.04304 0.01631 •0.09118 0.09336 0.09353 162 184 114 114 126
800 0.04235 0.01569 0.0917 0.09339 0.09326 186 210 128 138 138
900 0.04258 0.01595 0.09214 0.09333 0.09312 220 235 139 154 152
1000 0.04268 0.01605 0.09241 0.09372 0.0934 240 262 160 172 166
1100 0.04271 0.01578 0.0922 0.09374 0.09267 259 292 175 199 175
1200 0.04299 0.01542 0.09233 0.09339 0.09318 280 320 187 215 198
1300 0.04292 0.01548 0.09201 0.09318 0.09315 301 359 203 224 213
1400 0.04268 0.01557 0.0922 0.09289 0.09282 316 390 214 242 238
1500 0.0423 0.01542 0.09206 0.09289 0.09245 341 410 231 266 252
1600 0.04209 0.01544 0.09215 0.09321 0.09213 359 431 251 281 278
1700 0.04221 0.01556 0.09185 0.09359 0.09224 385 448 273 302 292
1800 0.04209 0.0158 0.09205 0.09362 0.09236 406 480 293 316 305
1900 0.04228 0.0158 0.09213 0.09362 0.09244 431 506 310 333 320
2000 0.04225 0.01572 0.09188 0.09362 0.09246 458 538 328 343 333
2100 0.04202 0.01575 0.09189 0.0936 0.09287 480 564 341 361 354
2200 0.04184 0.01574 0.09194 0.09347 0.09296 507 594 356 374 369
2300 0.04177 0.0157 0.09206 0.09346 0.09302 534 621 375 390 380
2400 0.0417 0.01549 0.09195 0.09336 0.09321 555 652 388 410 395





Total Profit Average Expected Profit
Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 BidderS
100 1.075 0.3805 1.664 1.7394 1.9214 0.0107 0.0038 0.0166 0.0174 0.0192
200 2.23 0.7269 3.2216 3.1875 3.6791 0.0111 0.0036 0.0161 0.0159 0.0184
300 3.1777 1.2542 4.6025 4.866 5.1628 0.0106 0.0042 0.0153 0.0162 0.0172
400 4.4579 1.7284 5.9661 6.4331 6.2567 0.0111 0.0043 0.0149 0.0161 0.0156
500 5.0208 2.1638 7.7036 8.3677 7.857 0.01 0.0043 0.0154 0.0167 0.0157
600 5.8259 2.6507 8.9067 9.2495 10.1 0.0097 0.0044 0.0148 0.0154 0.0168
700 6.973 3.0006 10.395 10.643 11.785 0.01 0.0043 0.0148 0.0152 0.0168
800 7.8774 3.2954 11.738 12.888 12.869 0.0098 0.0041 0.0147 0.0161 0.0161
900 9.3682 3.7474 12.807 14.372 14.154 0.0104 0.0042 0.0142 0.016 0.0157
1000 10.243 4.2043 14.785 16.12 15.505 0.0102 0.0042 0.0148 0.0161 0.0155
1100 11.062 4.6091 16.135 18.655 16.218 0.0101 0.0042 0.0147 0.017 0.0147
1200 12.037 4.9337 17.266 20.078 18.45 0.01 0.0041 0.0144 0.0167 0.0154
1300 12.919 5.5556 18.677 20.872 19.84 0.0099 0.0043 0.0144 0.0161 0.0153
1400 13.488 6.073 19.73 22.48 22.091 0.0096 0.0043 0.0141 0.0161 0.0158
1500 14.424 6.3237 21.267 24.71 23.297 0.0096 0.0042 0.0142 0.0165 0.0155
1600 15.111 6.6525 23.131 26.192 25.612 0.0094 0.0042 0.0145 0.0164 0.016
1700 16.253 6.9694 25.076 28.265 26.934 0.0096 0.0041 0.0148 0.0166 0.0158
1800 17.091 7.5816 26.971 29.584 28.17 0.0095 0.0042 0.015 0.0164 0.0156
1900 18.222 7.9954 28.559 31.175 29.582 0.0096 0.0042 0.015 0.0164 0.0156
2000 19.351 8.4585 30.138 32.11 30.788 0.0097 0.0042 0.0151 0.0161 0.0154
2100 20.169 8.882 31.333 33.79 32.874 0.0096 0.0042 0.0149 0.0161 0.0157
2200 21.213 9.3467 32.73 34.96 34.303 0.0096 0.0042 0.0149 0.0159 0.0156
2300 22.307 9.749 34.521 36.45 35.347 0.0097 0.0042 0.015 0.0158 0.0154
2400 23.142 10.101 35.676 38.278 36.818 0.0096 0.0042 0.0149 0.0159 0.0153
2500 24.156 10.194 36.97 39.499 38.961 0.0097 0.0041 0.0148 0.0158 0.0156
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4. Ten-Bidder Bidding Game




Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 Bidder 10
100 0.05026 0.04687 0.04906 0.04925 0.04982 0.04808 0.04671 0.04911 0.04737 0.04993
200 0.04791 0.04597 0.04851 0.0481 0.04933 0.04775 0.04745 0.04825 0.04707 0.04938
300 0.04808 0.04694 0.04849 0.04783 0.04937 0.04743 0.04838 0.04786 0.04694 0.04899
400 0.04804 0.0471 0.04762 0.04784 0.04914 0.04709 0.04823 0.0478 0.04762 0.04851
500 0.04847 0.04723 0.04772 0.04777 0.04895 0.04723 0.04824 0.04806 0.04763 0.0482
600 0.04827 0.04735 0.04794 0.04781 0.0489 0.0474 0.04805 0.04825 0.04723 0.04842
700 0.04818 0.04775 0.04799 0.04817 0.04894 0.04773 0.04798 0.04817 0.0475 0.0486
800 0.04776 0.0478 0.04767 0.0481 0.04876 0.04778 0.04811 0.04817 0.04758 0.0485
900 0.0478 0.04747 0.04763 0.0482 0.04882 0.04794 0.04779 0.04802 0.04773 0.04866
1000 0.04775 0.04758 0.0473 0.04825 0.04868 0.04752 0.04799 0.04804 0.04776 0.04871
1100 0.04769 0.04772 0.04731 0.04844 0.04869 0.04764 0.04809 0.04808 0.04782 0.04864
1200 0.04776 0.04784 0.04738 0.04835 0.04865 0.0477 0.04788 0.04818 0.04795 0.04861
1300 0.04773 0.04783 0.04759 0.04809 0.04851 0.04774 0.04779 0.04807 0.04798 0.04821
1400 0.04758 0.04787 0.04772 0.04814 0.0485 0.04778 0.0478 0.0478 0.04778 0.04824




Number of Games Won
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 Bidderl
100 3 10 13 11 8 9 11 10 11 14
200 14 22 23 19 17 22 22 18 19 24
300 25 30 34 28 24 35 30 32 26 36
400 33 40 47 34 31 46 40 44 40 45
500 44 48 62 45 38 54 53 52 51 53
600 61 60 68 53 46 66 61 63 57 65
700 72 69 84 63 51 81 70 7! 66 73
800 84 78 94 67 65 94 79 81 76 82
900 94 87 104 75 76 108 89 88 86 93
1000 107 100 113 85 79 122 99 103 93 99
1100 117 113 122 97 87 132 107 116 97 112
1200 126 128 130 110 97 139 117 126 106 121
1300 136 136 139 121 105 153 128 137 113 132
1400 153 145 150 132 115 161 137 143 120 144






Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 Bidder 10
100 0.15079 0.4687 0.63781 0.54174 0.39859 0.43274 0.51377 0.4911 0.52107 0.69908
200 0.67075 1.01141 1.11579 0.91394 0.83867 1 .05043 1.04391 0.86841 0.89432 1.18501
300 1.20193 1.40814 1.64852 1.33925 1.18478 1.65995 1.45142 1.53138 1.22045 1.76347
400 1.58536 1.88405 2.23817 1.62651 1.5232 2.16622 1.92932 2.10319 1.90461 2.18315
500 2.13288 2.26682 2.95892 2.14976 1.86006 2.55046 2.55657 2.49924 2.42891 2.55475
600 2.94422 2.84113 3.25965 2.53367 2.24959 3.12811 2.9312 3.03944 2.69183 3.14708
700 3.46909 3.29466 4.03112 3.03458 2.49581 3.86584 3.35857 3.42031 3.13471 3.54814
800 4.01204 3.72815 4.48109 3.22297 3.16916 4.49151 3.80043 3.902 3.61583 3.97693
900 4.49303 4.12965 4.95399 3.61473 3.71014 5.17737 4.25317 4.22602 4.10521 4.52576
1000 5.10881 4.75789 5.34487 4.10115 3.84593 5.79802 4.75128 4.94776 4.44183 4.8218
1100 5.58027 5.39242 5.77149 4.69851 4.23619 6.28816 5.14514 5.57671 4.63856 5.44733
1200 6.01733 6.12402 6.15977 5.31874 4.71887 6.63022 5.60246 6.07045 5.08234 5.88167
1300 6.49161 6.50554 6.615 5.81876 5.09331 7.30392 6.1175 6.5852 5.42129 6.36337
1400 7.28042 6.94089 7.15868 6.35497 5.57765 7.69201 6.5487 6.83476 5.73393 6.94706





Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 Bidder 10
100 0.00151 0.00469 0.00638 0.00542 0.00399 0.00433 0.00514 0.00491 0.00521 0.00699
200 0.00335 0.00506 0.00558 0.00457 0.00419 0.00525 0.00522 0.00434 0.00447 0.00593
300 0.00401 0.00469 0.0055 0.00446 0.00395 0.00553 0.00484 0.0051 0.00407 0.00588
400 0.00396 0.00471 0.0056 0.00407 0.00381 0.00542 0.00482 0.00526 0.00476 0.00546
500 0.00427 0.00453 0.00592 0.0043 0.00372 0.0051 0.00511 0.005 0.00486 0.00511
600 0.00491 0.00474 0.00543 0.00422 0.00375 0.00521 0.00489 0.00507 0.00449 0.00525
700 0.00496 0.00471 0.00576 0.00434 0.00357 0.00552 0.0048 0.00489 0.00448 0.00507
800 0.00502 0.00466 0.0056 0.00403 0.00396 0.00561 0.00475 0.00488 0.00452 0.00497
900 0.00499 0.00459 0.0055 0.00402 0.00412 0.00575 0.00473 0.0047 0.00456 0.00503
1000 0.00511 0.00476 0.00534 0.0041 0.00385 0.0058 0.00475 0.00495 0.00444 0.00482
1100 0.00507 0.0049 0.00525 0.00427 0.00385 0.00572 0.00468 0.00507 0.00422 0.00495
1200 0.00501 0.0051 0.00513 0.00443 0.00393 0.00553 0.00467 0.00506 0.00424 0.0049
1300 0.00499 0.005 0.00509 0.00448 0.00392 0.00562 0.00471 0.00507 0.00417 0.00489
1400 0.0052 0.00496 0.00511 0.00454 0.00398 0.00549 0.00468 0.00488 0.0041 0.00496
1500 0.00511 0.00489 0.00494 0.00466 0.0042 0.00545 0.0046 0.00485 0.00425 0.00501
Table 64
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Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 BidderlO
100 0.0217 0.0507 0.0494 0.0483 0.0481 0.047 0.0479 0.0472 0.0484 0.049
200 0.0217 0.0489 0.0486 0.0486 0.0466 0.0473 0.0479 0.0474 0.0486 0.0483
300 0.0212 0.0492 0.0478 0.0479 0.0475 0.0465 0.0478 0.0469 0.0487 0.0469
400 0.022 0.0488 0.0479 0.0483 0.0475 0.047 0.0477 0.0474 0.0485 0.0472
500 0.022 0.0488 0.0479 0.0482 0.0473 0.0476 0.0481 0.0476 0.0483 0.0477
600 0.0221 0.0488 0.0478 0.0483 0.0473 0.0471 0.0478 0.0477 0.0484 0.048
700 0.0221 0.0487 0.0475 0.0486 0.0473 0.0471 0.0478 0.0477 0.048 0.0478
800 0.0223 0.0484 0.0474 0.0486 0.047 0.0472 0.048 0.0473 0.0481 0.0477
900 0.0223 0.0483 0.0474 0.0485 0.0468 0.0474 0.048 0.0476 0.0483 0.0479
1000 0.0225 0.0483 0.0477 0.0484 0.0467 0.0476 0.0479 0.0475 0.0482 0.0478
1100 0.0225 0.0484 0.0476 0.0483 0.0468 0.0477 0.048 0.0475 0.0482 0.0477
1200 0.0223 0.0485 0.0476 0.0483 0.0469 0.0477 0.0481 0.0476 0.0483 0.0478
1300 0.0224 0.0484 0.0477 0.048 0.0469 0.0476 0.048 0.0476 0.0479 0.0477
1400 0.0225 0.0485 0.0478 0.0481 0.0472 0.0476 0.048 0.0477 0.0478 0.0477
1500 0.0225 0.0485 0.0479 0.0483 0.0472 0.0476 0.048 0.0477 0.0478 0.0476
1600 0.0224 0.0483 0.048 0.0482 0.0473 0.0477 0.048 0.0476 0.0478 0.0476
1700 0.0225 0.0483 0.048 0.0483 0.0472 0.0476 0.0477 0.0477 0.0478 0.0476
1800 0.0226 0.0483 0.0479 0.0483 0.0472 0.0476 0.0476 0.0477 0.0479 0.0477
1900 0.0225 0.0484 0.0478 0.0483 0.0472 0.0477 0.0477 0.0478 0.0479 0.0476
2000 0.0224 0.0484 0.0477 0.0484 0.0472 0.0477 0.0477 0.0479 0.048 0.0477
2100 0.0225 0.0483 0.0477 0.0485 0.0473 0.0477 0.0477 0.0479 0.0479 0.0477
2200 0.0226 0.0484 0.0479 0.0485 0.0474 0.0476 0.0475 0.048 0.048 0.0476
2300 0.0225 0.0484 0.0479 0.0484 0.0474 0.0476 0.0477 0.048 0.048 0.0476
2400 0.0225 0.0484 0.048 0.0484 0.0474 0.0476 0.0478 0.048 0.0479 0.0477





Number of Games Won
Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 Bidderl
100 15 14 7 10 6 10 11 8 10 9
200 25 28 13 16 16 22 22 18 21 19
300 36 41 22 25 35 35 29 22 27 28
400 45 51 38 39 42 42 39 30 39 35
500 53 66 47 54 58 50 46 32 48 46
600 64 75 55 64 64 70 57 40 55 56
700 75 84 71 77 70 80 65 50 64 64
800 88 93 85 87 77 88 69 63 76 74
900 101 107 93 97 84 99 79 74 82 84
1000 112 116 105 108 94 109 85 85 94 92
1100 120 124 113 123 101 124 97 93 104 101
1200 130 133 118 132 113 135 111 100 116 112
1300 144 138 126 145 119 145 122 114 127 120
1400 159 151 136 151 133 155 127 123 134 131
1500 178 160 146 162 140 169 131 132 141 141
1600 195 165 153 170 149 182 138 139 157 152
1700 206 172 163 177 165 194 148 146 168 161
1800 218 178 179 189 172 206 157 155 174 172
1900 227 188 192 197 189 216 164 166 182 179
2000 235 196 204 211 197 225 174 175 197 186
2100 245 208 212 226 210 229 180 184 205 201
2200 257 213 222 235 216 238 193 198 220 208
2300 265 228 235 245 223 248 205 207 229 215
2400 276 238 244 249 233 259 219 218 238 226








Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 Bidder 10
100 0.3252 0.7101 0.3456 0.4828 0.2889 0.47 0.5274 0.3779 0.484 0.4409
200 0.5418 1.3688 0.6314 0.7774 0.7451 1.0417 1.0531 0.8524 1.0197 0.917
300 0.7647 2.0162 1.0508 1.1968 1.664 1.6284 1.385 1.0314 1.3143 1.3142
400 0.9903 2.4872 1.8188 1.8827 1.9937 1.976 1.8622 1.4217 1.8899 1.6521
500 1.1665 3.2196 2.2519 2.6004 2.7447 2.3804 2.2107 1.5224 2.3201 2.1941
600 1.4152 3.6569 2.6297 3.0931 3.0268 3.3003 2.7218 1.9075 2.6632 2.6859
700 1.6568 4.0934 3.376 3.7438 3.3123 3.7692 3.1079 2.3841 3.0716 3.0565
800 1.9617 4.4979 4.0272 4.2296 3.6161 4.1525 3.3095 2.9784 3.6586 3.5308
900 2.2565 5.1641 4.4109 4.7027 3.9282 4.693 3.79 3.5209 3.9626 4.0257
1000 2.5205 5.6029 5.0042 5.2256 4.3928 5.1862 4.0703 4.0382 4.5313 4.401
1100 2.6953 5.9997 5.382 5.936 4.7301 5.9183 4.6528 4.4207 5.0124 4.821
1200 2.9012 6.4525 5.615 6.3691 5.2963 6.4429 5.3356 4.7587 5.6063 5.3497
1300 3.2297 6.6856 6.0123 6.9659 5.577 6.9054 5.8584 5.4236 6.0865 5.7283
1400 3.5791 7.3168 6.5073 7.258 6.2721 7.3733 6.1007 5.8692 6.4063 6.2494
1500 4.0011 7.7628 6.9986 7.8166 6.6119 8.0409 6.293 6.2929 6.7457 6.7108
1600 4.372 7.9771 7.3455 8.2025 7.0534 8.678 6.6245 6.6109 7.5113 7.2307
1700 4.6287 8.3098 7.8207 8.5468 7.7884 9.2265 7.0657 6.9613 8.0355 7.663
1800 4.9233 8.5942 8.5704 9.1217 8.1113 9.8048 7.4765 7.3946 8.33 8.1996
1900 5.1088 9.0943 9.1807 9.5111 8.9199 10.3 7.819 7.9405 8.7265 8.5292
2000 5.2698 9.4777 9.7404 10.217 9.2893 10.736 8.297 8.3835 9.4467 8.8703
2100 5.514 10.057 10.122 10.956 9.9334 10.925 8.5882 8.8097 9.829 9.5834
2200 5.8054 10.307 10.629 11.393 10.235 11.329 9.1767 9.5034 10.566 9.9025
2300 5.9633 11.04 11.259 11.856 10.573 11.815 9.7797 9.9395 10.988 10.24
2400 6.2043 11.518 11.716 12.044 11.042 12.341 10.463 10.473 11.397 10.779






Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 Bidderl
100 0.0033 0.0071 0.0035 0.0048 0.0029 0.0047 0.0053 0.0038 0.0048 0.0044
200 0.0027 0.0068 0.0032 0.0039 0.0037 0.0052 0.0053 0.0043 0.0051 0.0046
300 0.0025 0.0067 0.0035 0.004 0.0055 0.0054 0.0046 0.0034 0.0044 0.0044
400 0.0025 0.0062 0.0045 0.0047 0.005 0.0049 0.0047 0.0036 0.0047 0.0041
500 0.0023 0.0064 0.0045 0.0052 0.0055 0.0048 0.0044 0.003 0.0046 0.0044
600 0.0024 0.0061 0.0044 0.0052 0.005 0.0055 0.0045 0.0032 0.0044 0.0045
700 0.0024 0.0058 0.0048 0.0053 0.0047 0.0054 0.0044 0.0034 0.0044 0.0044
800 0.0025 0.0056 0.005 0.0053 0.0045 0.0052 0.0041 0.0037 0.0046 0.0044
900 0.0025 0.0057 0.0049 0.0052 0.0044 0.0052 0.0042 0.0039 0.0044 0.0045
1000 0.0025 0.0056 0.005 0.0052 0.0044 0.0052 0.0041 0.004 0.0045 0.0044
1100 0.0025 0.0055 0.0049 0.0054 0.0043 0.0054 0.0042 0.004 0.0046 0.0044
1200 0.0024 0.0054 0.0047 0.0053 0.0044 0.0054 0.0044 0.004 0.0047 0.0045
1300 0.0025 0.0051 0.0046 0.0054 0.0043 0.0053 0.0045 0.0042 0.0047 0.0044
1400 0.0026 0.0052 0.0046 0.0052 0.0045 0.0053 0.0044 0.0042 0.0046 0.0045
1500 0.0027 0.0052 0.0047 0.0052 0.0044 0.0054 0.0042 0.0042 0.0045 0.0045
1600 0.0027 0.005 0.0046 0.0051 0.0044 0.0054 0.0041 0.0041 0.0047 0.0045
1700 0.0027 0.0049 0.0046 0.005 0.0046 0.0054 0.0042 0.0041 0.0047 0.0045
1800 0.0027 0.0048 0.0048 0.0051 0.0045 0.0054 0.0042 0.0041 0.0046 0.0046
1900 0.0027 0.0048 0.0048 0.005 0.0047 0.0054 0.0041 0.0042 0.0046 0.0045
2000 0.0026 0.0047 0.0049 0.0051 0.0046 0.0054 0.0041 0.0042 0.0047 0.0044
2100 0.0026 0.0048 0.0048 0.0052 0.0047 0.0052 0.0041 0.0042 0.0047 0.0046
2200 0.0026 0.0047 0.0048 0.0052 0.0047 0.0051 0.0042 0.0043 0.0048 0.0045
2300 0.0026 0.0048 0.0049 0.0052 0.0046 0.0051 0.0043 0.0043 0.0048 0.0045
2400 0.0026 0.0048 0.0049 0.005 0.0046 0.0051 0.0044 0.0044 0.0047 0.0045
2500 0.0026 0.0048 0.0049 0.0049 0.0046 0.0052 0.0044 0.0043 0.0047 0.0045
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Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 BidderlO
100 0.02212 0.02373 0.0487 0.04898 0.04677 0.04714 0.04748 0.04981 0.04578 0.04711
200 0.02207 0.02381 0.04921 0.04882 0.04797 0.04861 0.04696 0.04608 0.04735 0.04866
300 0.02203 0.02328 0.04903 0.04859 0.04752 0.04817 0.04762 0.04588 0.04626 0.04945
400 0.02199 0.02298 0.04873 0.04901 0.04763 0.04793 0.04801 0.04686 0.04673 0.04955
500 0.02202 0.02291 0.04886 0.04915 0.04775 0.048 0.04788 0.04694 0.04698 0.04901
600 0.02221 0.02302 0.04853 0.04893 0.04787 0.04827 0.04792 0.04724 0.04711 0.04875
700 0.02252 0.02285 0.04854 0.04893 0.0474 0.04813 0.04795 0.04763 0.04707 0.04831
800 0.0222 0.02259 0.0484 0.04866 0.0473 0.04784 0.04791 0.0479 0.0475 0.04763
900 0.02237 0.02287 0.04826 0.04872 0.04741 0.04787 0.04804 0.0478 0.04752 0.04761
1000 0.02255 0.02265 0.04837 0.04875 0.0472 0.0478 0.04805 0.04791 0.04768 0.04773
1100 0.02244 0.02273 0.04801 0.0488 0.04731 0.04779 0.04809 0.04796 0.04773 0.04773
1200 0.02234 0.023 0.04818 0.04861 0.04743 0.04798 0.04811 0.04813 0.04788 0.04792
1300 0.02246 0.02301 0.04827 0.04866 0.04725 0.04801 0.04806 0.0479 0.04758 0.04791
1400 0.02247 0.02297 0.04822 0.04879 0.04738 0.048 0.04798 0.04787 0.04757 0.04771




Number of Games Won
Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 BidderlO
100 11 15 8 14 11 6 13 7 8 7
200 22 23 18 21 24 19 18 23 14 18
300 34 31 28 36 35 28 31 29 21 27
400 44 39 35 45 46 40 43 40 35 33
500 57 49 47 55 51 48 51 47 48 47
600 72 56 58 68 61 55 59 63 56 52
700 84 64 67 80 71 66 67 75 61 65
800 100 73 73 93 73 78 72 85 74 79
900 112 92 83 99 86 87 78 95 80 88
1000 122 103 93 106 98 93 94 108 89 94
1100 139 117 110 114 105 95 102 120 95 103
1200 147 133 119 123 111 102 110 139 106 110
1300 157 143 132 131 117 114 121 148 116 121
1400 169 150 144 142 128 126 128 157 123 133






Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidders Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 BidderlO
100 0.24331 0.35598 0.3896 0.68573 0.51442 0.28283 0.61725 0.34869 0.36623 0.32979
200 0.4856 0.54767 0.88579 1.02517 1.15136 0.92353 0.84526 1.05989 0.66284 0.87587
300 0.74908 0.72159 1.37281 1.74907 1.66318 1.34871 1.47631 1.33042 0.97153 1.33509
400 0.96776 0.89614 1.70571 2.20533 2.19088 1.91717 2.06425 1.87429 1.63549 1.63505
500 1.25502 1.12266 2.29643 2.70325 2.43527 2.304 2.44196 2.20628 2.25522 2.30336
600 1.59923 1.28921 2.81496 3.32723 2.91996 2.65465 2.82752 2.97594 2.63821 2.53521
700 1.89195 1.46243 3.25206 3.91403 3.36545 3.17633 3.21252 3.57201 2.87118 3.14025
800 2.21981 1.64926 3.53285 4.52538 3.45279 3.73164 3.44953 4.07183 3.51474 3.76287
900 2.50595 2.10389 4.00517 4.82356 4.07686 4.1649 3.74683 4.54129 3.80147 4.18985
1000 2.75127 2.33287 4.49838 5.167 4.62512 4.44522 4.51633 5.17454 4.24391 4.48682
1100 3.11969 2.65933 5.28077 5.56285 4.96761 4.53987 4.90521 5.75562 4.53427 4.91599
1200 3.28444 3.05956 5.73341 5.97865 5.26508 4.89431 5.29241 6.68969 5.07568 5.27066
1300 3.5257 3.29036 6.37126 6.37396 5.52846 5.4737 5.81544 7.08965 5.51965 5.79725
1400 3.79716 3.44557 6.94326 6.92853 6.06497 6.04738 6.14142 7.5158 5.85118 6.34563





Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 BidderlO
100 0.00243 0.00356 0.0039 0.00686 0.00514 0.00283 0.00617 0.00349 0.00366 0.0033
200 0.00243 0.00274 0.00443 0.00513 0.00576 0.00462 0.00423 0.0053 0.00331 0.00438
300 0.0025 0.00241 0.00458 0.00583 0.00554 0.0045 0.00492 0.00443 0.00324 0.00445
400 0.00242 0.00224 0.00426 0.00551 0.00548 0.00479 0.00516 0.00469 0.00409 0.00409
500 0.00251 0.00225 0.00459 0.00541 0.00487 0.00461 0.00488 0.00441 0.00451 0.00461
600 0.00267 0.00215 0.00469 0.00555 0.00487 0.00442 0.00471 0.00496 0.0044 0.00423
700 0.0027 0.00209 0.00465 0.00559 0.00481 0.00454 0.00459 0.0051 0.0041 0.00449
800 0.00277 0.00206 0.00442 0.00566 0.00432 0.00466 0.00431 0.00509 0.00439 0.0047
900 0.00278 0.00234 0.00445 0.00536 0.00453 0.00463 0.00416 0.00505 0.00422 0.00466
1000 0.00275 0.00233 0.0045 0.00517 0.00463 0.00445 0.00452 0.00517 0.00424 0.00449
1100 0.00284 0.00242 0.0048 0.00506 0.00452 0.00413 0.00446 0.00523 0.00412 0.00447
1200 0.00274 0.00255 0.00478 0.00498 0.00439 0.00408 0.00441 0.00557 0.00423 0.00439
1300 0.00271 0.00253 0.0049 0.0049 0.00425 0.00421 0.00447 0.00545 0.00425 0.00446
1400 0.00271 0.00246 0.00496 0.00495 0.00433 0.00432 0.00439 0.00537 0.00418 0.00453
1500 0.00277 0.00248 0.00488 0.00486 0.00417 0.00435 0.00451 0.00544 0.00416 0.00459
Table 72
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Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 BidderlO
100 0.0082 0.0149 0.0152 0.022 0.0484 0.0499 0.0496 0.0493 0.0475 0.0477
200 0.0082 0.0136 0.016 0.0228 0.0478 0.0472 0.0496 0.0492 0.0481 0.0456
300 0.0076 0.0133 0.0173 0.0231 0.0483 0.047 0.0472 0.049 0.048 0.0466
400 0.0079 0.0128 0.0172 0.023 0.0484 0.047 0.0481 0.0487 0.0484 0.0471
500 0.0079 0.0128 0.0169 0.0231 0.0484 0.047 0.0477 0.0486 0.0482 0.0476
600 0.0078 0.0131 0.0169 0.0227 0.0484 0.0472 0.048 0.0489 0.0482 0.047
700 0.0079 0.0129 0.0171 0.0226 0.0485 0.0477 0.0483 0.0488 0.0482 0.0473
800 0.0078 0.0129 0.017 0.0228 0.0487 0.0477 0.0483 0.0489 0.0484 0.0473
900 0.0077 0.013 0.017 0.0225 0.0484 0.0479 0.0485 0.0489 0.0483 0.0475
1000 0.0077 0.0128 0.0169 0.0226 0.048 0.0478 0.0483 0.0488 0.0482 0.0474
1100 0.0078 0.0129 0.017 0.0225 0.0479 0.0479 0.0484 0.0487 0.0482 0.0475
1200 0.0078 0.0128 0.0171 0.0225 0.0479 0.048 0.0483 0.0487 0.0482 0.0475
1300 0.0077 0.013 0.0172 0.0224 0.0479 0.0481 0.0482 0.0486 0.0482 0.0475
1400 0.0075 0.013 0.0173 0.0224 0.048 0.0481 0.0482 0.0486 0.0481 0.0474
1500 0.0074 0.013 0.0174 0.0224 0.0481 0.0482 0.0479 0.0487 0.0481 0.0474
1600 0.0073 0.0131 0.0174 0.0225 0.0481 0.0483 0.048 0.0486 0.0481 0.0473
1700 0.0074 0.013 0.0174 0.0226 0.0481 0.0482 0.0478 0.0487 0.0482 0.0473
1800 0.0074 0.0129 0.0174 0.0224 0.0479 0.048 0.0477 0.0485 0.0481 0.0471
1900 0.0074 0.013 0.0175 0.0225 0.0477 0.048 0.0478 0.0486 0.0482 0.0473





Number of Games Won
Bidder
1
Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 BidderlO
100 7 11 15 11 10 10 6 15 5 10
200 22 25 23 24 16 18 14 23 16 19
300 32 43 36 35 25 27 21 29 26 26
400 40 57 47 41 34 34 31 42 36 38
500 52 68 64 50 38 44 42 52 47 43
600 68 80 79 60 42 52 53 59 55 52
700 77 93 92 68 49 61 67 67 69 57
800 93 106 105 77 55 76 73 72 78 65
900 110 118 117 84 71 85 84 78 86 67
1000 125 137 129 95 83 92 88 82 93 76
1100 139 149 143 109 90 104 94 94 98 80
1200 151 161 155 126 95 109 102 104 109 88
1300 161 174 168 134 107 118 109 117 115 97
1400 181 181 179 144 121 128 116 121 126 103
1500 201 195 185 156 131 137 120 127 133 115
1600 215 210 202 169 135 144 124 135 142 124
1700 225 224 213 176 142 154 139 145 152 130
1800 239 235 232 185 145 165 147 154 160 138
1900 250 255 235 200 159 176 154 161 166 144






Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 Bidder 10
100 0.0573 0.1639 0.2282 0.2416 0.4837 0.4988 0.2973 0.7399 0.2376 0.4774
200 0.1795 0.3398 0.3688 0.5468 0.7651 0.8502 0.6947 1.1314 0.7699 0.8655
300 0.2446 0.5729 0.6244 0.8086 1.208 1.2691 0.9914 1.4207 1.249 1.2108
400 0.3148 0.7275 0.8063 0.945 1.6456 1.5979 1.4897 2.0459 1.7411 1.7914
500 0.411 0.8681 1.0833 1.1554 1.8378 2.0672 2.0049 2.5295 2.2653 2.0449
600 0.5273 1.0449 1.3385 1.3649 2.0328 2.4532 2.5422 2.8828 2.6517 2.4442
700 0.606 1.1976 1.5771 1.536 2.3743 2.9091 3.2364 3.2723 3.3269 2.6967
800 0.7282 1.3654 1.7808 1.7523 2.6761 3.6278 3.5295 3.5211 3.7738 3.0774
900 0.8452 1.5333 1.9847 1.8923 3.4358 4.068 4.0741 3.8108 4.1546 3.1794
1000 0.9587 1.7545 2.1758 2.1503 3.9857 4.4017 4.2535 4.002 4.4862 3.6047
1100 1.0906 1.9154 2.436 2.457 4.3113 4.977 4.5508 4.5732 4.7201 3.7971
1200 1.1722 2.0667 2.6498 2.8404 4.5538 5.2305 4.9311 5.0645 5.2541 4.1835
1300 1.2348 2.2678 2.8897 2.9959 5.1273 5.6795 5.2534 5.6898 5.5403 4.6117
1400 1.3578 2.3604 3.0952 3.2268 5.8035 6.1622 5.5878 5.8856 6.0622 4.8814
1500 1.4857 2.5406 3.2198 3.4992 6.3051 6.6027 5.7517 6.18 6.3968 5.451
1600 1.5725 2.7434 3.5155 3.8005 6.4965 6.951 5.949 6.5631 6.8297 5.8683
1700 1.6575 2.9125 3.6983 3.9721 6.8242 7.4179 6.6387 7.062 7.3214 6.1503
1800 1.7591 3.0343 4.0452 4.1413 6.943
1
7.9245 7.0067 7.4717 7.696 6.5066
1900 1.8505 3.3144 4.1048 4.5068 7.5811 8.4559 7.3549 7.8192 7.9965 6.8099








Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidder4 Bidder5 Bidder6 Bidder7 Bidder8 Bidder9 Bidder 10
100 0.0006 0.0016 0.0023 0.0024 0.0048 0.005 0.003 0.0074 0.0024 0.0048
200 0.0009 0.0017 0.0018 0.0027 0.0038 0.0043 0.0035 0.0057 0.0038 0.0043
300 0.0008 0.0019 0.0021 0.0027 0.004 0.0042 0.0033 0.0047 0.0042 0.004
400 0.0008 0.0018 0.002 0.0024 0.0041 0.004 0.0037 0.0051 0.0044 0.0045
500 0.0008 0.0017 0.0022 0.0023 0.0037 0.0041 0.004 0.0051 0.0045 0.0041
600 0.0009 0.0017 0.0022 0.0023 0.0034 0.0041 0.0042 0.0048 0.0044 0.0041
700 0.0009 0.0017 0.0023 0.0022 0.0034 0.0042 0.0046 0.0047 0.0048 0.0039
800 0.0009 0.0017 0.0022 0.0022 0.0033 0.0045 0.0044 0.0044 0.0047 0.0038
900 0.0009 0.0017 0.0022 0.0021 0.0038 0.0045 0.0045 0.0042 0.0046 0.0035
1000 0.001 0.0018 0.0022 0.0022 0.004 0.0044 0.0043 0.004 0.0045 0.0036
1100 0.001 0.0017 0.0022 0.0022 0.0039 0.0045 0.0041 0.0042 0.0043 0.0035
1200 0.001 0.0017 0.0022 0.0024 0.0038 0.0044 0.0041 0.0042 0.0044 0.0035
1300 0.0009 0.0017 0.0022 0.0023 0.0039 0.0044 0.004 0.0044 0.0043 0.0035
1400 0.001 0.0017 0.0022 0.0023 0.0041 0.0044 0.004 0.0042 0.0043 0.0035
1500 0.001 0.0017 0.0021 0.0023 0.0042 0.0044 0.0038 0.0041 0.0043 0.0036
1600 0.001 0.0017 0.0022 0.0024 0.0041 0.0043 0.0037 0.0041 0.0043 0.0037
1700 0.001 0.0017 0.0022 0.0023 0.004 0.0044 0.0039 0.0042 0.0043 0.0036
1800 0.001 0.0017 0.0022 0.0023 0.0039 0.0044 0.0039 0.0042 0.0043 0.0036
1900 0.001 0.0017 0.0022 0.0024 0.004 0.0045 0.0039 0.0041 0.0042 0.0036
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